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ABSTRACT 
The devastating wildfires in the Fort McMurray, Alberta, region in May of 2016 forced 
the evacuation of almost 90,000 people from their homes.  This study examines and 
compares risk perceptions and evacuation behaviours between young adults, 18 to 24 
years of age and older adults, 25 years and older, and between genders.  The study 
participants (n = 299) were students and staff at Keyano College in Fort McMurray.  
They indicated only slight differences in their perceptions of risk and their evacuation 
behaviours between both the age groups and by gender.  Environmental cues were 
significant indicators of risk for all participants.  The majority of respondents (82 percent) 
fled the day the mandatory evacuation order was issued.  Social media and local news 
were the most relied on sources of disaster and evacuation information utilized by 
respondents.  Facebook was the most popular for social media platforms.  Emergency 
managers must ensure effective use of these two information sources to communicate 
disaster information.   
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I - Introduction 
 Wildfires consume an average of 2.83 million hectares of land in the United 
States (National Interagency Coordination Center, 2015) and 2.4 million hectares of land 
in Canada (Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre Inc., 2015) every year. These events 
trigger evacuations, causing people to flee from their homes and communities to seek 
refuge.  A study of Canadian wildfire evacuations, between 1980 and 2007, revealed that 
the average annual number of evacuees, due to wildfires, was 7,469 people (Beverly & 
Bothwell, 2011).  A large wildfire in May 2016, in the Fort McMurray area of Alberta, 
Canada, resulted in the evacuation of 88,000 people (KPMG, 2017). 
Problem Statement 
 Wildfire evacuations are a regular occurrence in different parts of the world, 
including Canada.  The main predictors of risk perception need to be understood in order 
to determine how to best communicate during wildfire situations.  The source and type of 
information, concerning wildfires and evacuations, could influence risk perceptions.  It is 
unclear whether the risk perceptions, influencing evacuation decision making and 
behaviours, differ between young adults and older adults.  
The differences in evacuation behaviours among young adults and older adults, 
and by genders should be examined to determine the trends between them.  This 
information could be used by emergency management professionals to better plan their 
communication strategies during wildfires and, potentially, other disaster events.  
		 2 
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of the research was to examine wildfire risk perceptions and 
evacuation behaviours of a younger population, 18 to 24 year olds, in comparison to an 
older age group, 25 years and older.  The goal was to determine whether emergency 
managers need to utilize different communication methods and take special 
considerations when trying to disseminate information and evacuate young adults from 
areas threatened by wildfires.  The study also took advantage of the opportunity to run 
similar evacuation behaviour comparisons on the data between the two gender groups, 
male and female.   
Research Questions 
 The primary research questions were: (1) Do young adults, 18 to 24 years, and 
older adults, 25 and older, differ in their risk perceptions in a wildfire situation.  (2) What 
are the sources of disaster and evacuation information that young people rely on?  From a 
descriptive statistics standpoint, what are the evacuation behaviours of young adults 
versus older adults?  What are the differences in evacuation behaviours between genders?   
Significance 
 The research is important because emergency managers may have to change their 
methods of communication, during catastrophic incidents, in order to reach out to the 
young adult population.  The study will contribute to the body of knowledge since little 
research has been done, so far, focusing on the younger adult population during wildfire 
situations in Canada.  Furthermore, to date, there has been no published academic 
focused research on the Fort McMurray wildfire with the exception of two government 
sponsored reports on the incident. 
		 3 
Study Area 
 The study investigated the experiences and perceptions of residents of the Fort 
McMurray area during the wildfire in 2016.  The total population of the Regional 
Municipality of Wood Buffalo (also known as Fort McMurray) was 73,252, in 2015 
(Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo, 2015).  Fort McMurray is located in Northern 
Alberta, Canada, 270 miles from Edmonton, the capital city of Alberta (see Figure 1).   
	
Figure 1.  Map of the Province of Alberta, with the red arrow pointing at Fort McMurray.  Map retrieved 
from Portable Atlas [PAT], (2013), Public Domain Maps of Alberta. At 
http://ian.macky.net/pat/map/ca/ab/ab_blu.gif 
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Assumptions 
This quantitative study surveyed students and staff from Keyano College, in Fort 
McMurray, to understand their wildfire perceptions and evacuation experiences.  In 
conducting this research study, it was assumed that the participants would adequately 
recall the circumstances and would truthfully answer the survey questions.  It was also 
assumed that there were no underlying causes or circumstances that would create a bias 
in the answers provided.  A limitation of this survey was that the subjects were all from 
Keyano College; therefore, the participants may not have adequately reflected all of the 
adults in the Fort McMurray area, but rather reflected the staff and student population at 
Keyano College.  Although the results are still relevant for the purpose of the study, this 
limitation must be considered when attempting to generalize to a broader population of 
18 to 24 year olds and 25 and older adults.   
Introduction to the incident  
In May of 2016, a wildfire ripped through the Northern Alberta community of 
Fort McMurray.  The fire, the costliest natural disaster in Canadian history (Insurance 
Bureau of Canada, 2016), lasted for more than a month and burned 589,552 hectares 
(Government of Alberta, 2017) – approximately the same land area as the entire state of 
Delaware.  The wildfire resulted in an evacuation of the entire region surrounding Fort 
McMurray, Alberta.   
The purpose of this study was to examine and compare the risk perceptions and 
evacuation experiences of 18-24 year olds and older adults, during the Fort McMurray 
wildfire of 2016.  The Government of Alberta has just recently completed a full review of 
the emergency response, which included discussion about the evacuation of the 
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communities affected (KPMG, 2017).  The breakdown of the government review like 
other reviews i.e. the Slave Lake fire review (KPMG, 2012) and the 2013 Floods in 
Alberta review (MNP, 2015), did not specifically focus on young adults as their own 
categorical age range. This study sought to determine whether the evacuation of this age 
group of adults was different than older adults.   
A survey of staff and students, from Keyano College, who were living in the Fort 
McMurray area at the time of the wildfire, was conducted to learn of their experiences.  
The questionnaire was administered via an internet based survey.  
Background 
Fort McMurray is actually an unincorporated city located in the Regional 
Municipality of Wood Buffalo (RMWB).  The RMWB was established in 1995 when the 
City of Fort McMurray amalgamated with the local Improvement District No. 143 (Fort 
McMurray Tourism, 2017).  The entire community, encompassing 68,454 square 
kilometers, is one of the largest municipalities in North America (Fort McMurray 
Tourism, 2017).   
The wildfire event started as a small, two-hectare blaze, southwest of Fort 
McMurray on Sunday May 1, 2016.  At 9:57 p.m. the mayor of the Regional 
Municipality of Wood Buffalo, Melissa Blake, declared a state of local emergency and 
issued an evacuation order for one neighbourhood (Regional Municipality of Wood 
Buffalo [RMWB], 2016a).  By Tuesday May 3 the fire had grown significantly, 
threatening the entire region, and eliciting a mandatory evacuation order from the 
mayor’s office (French, 2016).  It is estimated that 88,000 people fled from their homes 
during the disaster (KPMG, 2017).  
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On May 4, 2016, the lieutenant governor of the Province of Alberta issued an 
order in council declaring a provincial state of emergency in the Regional Municipality of 
Wood Buffalo (Order in Council, 2016).  By Thursday May 12, the wildfire had 
destroyed more than 2,400 buildings and damaged in excess of 500 structures (French, 
2016).   
The wildfire was dubbed the Horse River Fire by the Alberta Government’s 
Environment and Sustainable Resource Development (ESRD) – part of Alberta 
Agriculture and Forestry, as the blaze originated in the bush near the Horse River.  The 
fire eventually passed through the Fort McMurray area and continued east to the 
Alberta/Saskatchewan border.  At the peak of the firefighting, there were 2,161 
firefighters and support staff, 80 helicopters, and 217 pieces of heavy equipment 
attempting to staunch the blaze (Government of Alberta, 2016a). The province had 
assistance from firefighters from almost every province and territory in Canada, from the 
United States, and from as far away as South Africa (Government of Alberta, 2016a).  
The firefighters, with heavy equipment, managed to build a perimeter guard around the 
fire of approximately 442 km (Government of Alberta, 2016a).  By July 4, officials 
declared the Horse River fire under control after burning for 65 days (Government of 
Alberta, 2016b).   
The re-entry of the residents to the Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo 
started on June 1.  The community was divided into five different zones and residents 
were allowed to return on a scheduled per zone entry, over a four-day period (RMWB, 
2016c).  The provincial state of emergency was rescinded on June 30 (Alberta 
Emergency Management Agency [AEMA], 2016). The municipal state of local 
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emergency was finally lifted on November 10, 2016 (RMWB, 2016b).  The extensions to 
the state of local emergency were in the interests of public safety while hazardous 
materials were being removed from the neighbourhoods impacted by the fires (RMWB, 
2016b).  
The Insurance Bureau of Canada placed the Fort McMurray wildfire as the 
costliest insured natural disaster in Canadian history, with an estimate of $3.58 billion in 
insured losses (Insurance Bureau of Canada, 2016).  This is almost twice the amount of 
the previous costliest disaster on record, the 2013 southern Alberta floods, which rang in 
at $1.7 billion (Insurance Bureau of Canada, 2016).  The Conference Board of Canada 
estimated that the rebuilding effort will inject $5.3 billion into Alberta’s economy 
(Antunes, Bernard, & Owusu, 2016).  The oil and gas industry is the region’s largest 
economic contributor; the Conference Board of Canada’s report indicates that, 
“Production valued at over 47 million barrels and $1.4 billion in revenues will be lost to 
producers and the province in 2016” (Antunes et al., 2016, p. 9).  A more recent report 
from MacEwan University suggests that the original estimates of losses, are a little shy of 
the actual losses of $8.86 billion (Quantifying Disasters, 2017).  This amount includes 
both direct and indirect costs according to the researchers.  Things such as mental health, 
environmental losses, and other physical and psychological impacts contribute to the 
overall economic losses in the area (Quantifying Disasters, 2017).  Despite all of these 
economic losses the rebuilding effort will generate a lot of economic benefits.  It is 
estimated that 2,574 new homes will be built and the recovery will generate 8,968 jobs in 
2017 (Antunes et al., 2016).   
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Despite the devastation and the tragedy, the Fort McMurray wildfire situation 
only claimed two lives, but not from the fire itself.  Two young people were evacuating 
from the region, when their vehicle collided with a transport truck (Lamoureux, 2016).  
The pair unfortunately died at the scene of the accident (Lamoureux, 2016).   
Demographics 
The latest federal census data available, of the Fort McMurray area, is from the 
2011 census.  The Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo conducted a municipal census 
in 2015.  The data between the two surveys does not exactly line up.  The federal census 
survey puts age in narrower categories than the RMWB survey.  The concern, is in the 
specific age range, between 18 to 24 years.  The federal survey individualizes 18 year 
olds, 19 year olds and 20 to 24 year olds as their own categories.  The RMWB survey 
categorizes 15 to 19 year olds and 20 to 24 year olds in two separate categories.  The 
RMWB survey has the more recent data, and is therefore a little more applicable to the 
research; however, their age range data does not align with the target age range.  The 
2011 federal census data indicates that there were 7,985 people aged 18 to 24 in the Fort 
McMurray area (Statistics Canada, 2011a).  The same data set indicates that there were 
10,195 people 15 to 24 years of age (Statistics Canada, 2011a).  The difference, 2,100 
people, indicates those persons aged 15 to 17.  The RMWB survey indicates that there 
were 8,579 people aged 15 to 24 (RMWB, 2015).  As compared to the 2011 federal 
census data, this represents a 16 percent decrease for this age group.  Specifically, 
comparing the numbers between the two surveys for 15 to 24 year olds, there is a 13 
percent decrease for males and a 19 percent decrease for females (see Table 1).   
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Table 1 
Census Information – 15 to 24 Year Olds, Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo 
2011	Federal	Census 2015	RMWB	Census Difference	(%)Males 5,330																				 	 4,619																				 	 13%Females 4,865																				 	 3,960																				 	 19%Total 10,195																		 	 8,579																				 	 16%
15	to	24	Year	Olds
Note: 	Data	values	are	from	the	2011	Federal	Census	(Statistics	Canada,	2011a)	and	from	the	2015	RMWB	Census	(RMWB,	2015).
 
If it is assumed that the same percentage decrease would hold true for 18 to 24 
year olds, then based on the 2011 federal survey numbers, the 2015 numbers would be 
3,631 males and 3,089 females (see Table 2).  This projection provides a total of 6,719  
18 to 24 year olds in the Fort McMurray area in 2015.  
Table 2 
Census Information – 18 to 24 Year Olds, Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo 
2011	Federal	Census Decrease	(%) Estimation	of	the	2015	RMWB	Census	Results
Males 4,190																				 	 13% 3,631																				 	Females 3,795																				 	 19% 3,089																				 	Total 7,985																				 	 16% 6,719																				 	
Note:	 Data	values	are	from	the	2011	Federal	Census	(Statistics	Canada,	2011a).
18	to	24	Year	Olds
 
The total population of the Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo, according to 
the 2015 municipal census was 73,252 people (RMWB, 2015).  Given the estimated 
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number of 18 to 24 year olds, 6,719, it represents just under ten percent of the total 
population of the region, at 9.17 percent.   
The 2011 census data indicates that there were 2,245 people living with relatives, 
7,040 people living with non-relatives and an additional 4,125 people living alone 
(Statistics Canada, 2011a); this represents 3 percent, 11 percent, and 6 percent of the total 
population, respectively, for a total of 20 percent of the population not living in a family 
situation.  Of these, the census data indicates that 2,500 people were 18 to 24 year olds 
(Statistics Canada, 2011b).  This reveals that one third of all 18 to 24 year olds in the 
Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo (in 2011) were not residing in family situations.   
The total population of the Wood Buffalo area in 2011 was 66,896 people 
(Statistics Canada, 2011a). The total population in 2015, as mentioned above, was 73,252 
(RMWB, 2015); therefore, the increase in population was 9.5 percent from 2011 to 2015. 
The total number of occupied private dwellings in the Fort McMurray region, according 
to the 2011 census was 23,544 (Statistics Canada, 2011a).  If homes increased by a 
similar percentage to population growth, the number of occupied private dwellings in the 
Fort McMurray region would be approximately 25,780.  The Government of Alberta 
reported that there were 1,929 homes destroyed in the fire (AEMA, 2016).  Therefore, it 
is safe to assume that about 7.5 percent of the community’s homes were destroyed by 
fire.  See Appendix A for detailed census information. 
Organization of the Study 
 The following chapter provides a comprehensive literature review of the relevant 
research.  Chapter 3 breaks down the methodology for the research including the 
theoretical and conceptual frameworks.  This chapter also outlines the research questions, 
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the hypotheses, the data collection methods and the ethical considerations.  Chapter 4 
provides the results of the research.  Each of the hypotheses is examined relative to the 
data collected.  This section also reviews the descriptive statistical data.  The last chapter 
is a discussion about the results.  This chapter concludes with a look at the limitations of 
the study and the opportunities for additional research.   	 	
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II – Literature Review 
There is a lot of literature available concerning the impacts of disasters (Neria, 
Nandi, & Galea, 2007; Norris et al., 2002); however, this study was aimed at looking 
specifically at a small segment of disaster research – risk perceptions and evacuation 
behaviours in wildfire settings.  Risk perception is associated with disaster preparedness 
and evacuation (Baker, 1991; Dash & Gladwin, 2007; Gladwin, Gladwin, & Peacock, 
2001; Huang et al., 2012) and in many cases, it is the risk perception that people hold, 
that leads them to evacuation decisions (Hasan, Ukkusuri, Gladwin, & Murray-Tuite, 
2011; Lindell, Lu, & Prater, 2005; National Research Council [NRC], 2006).  This 
section starts with an overview of the literature related to evacuation during disasters 
generally, then it delves more deeply into the individual characteristics that may relate to 
risk perceptions and behaviours, and then wraps up with a review of wildfire specific 
literature.   
Evacuation During Disasters 
 Many different types of disasters trigger evacuations.  Some of these include, 
wildfires, hurricanes, tornados, tsunamis, humanitarian emergencies, nuclear events and 
others.  This research project, as stated, was primarily focused on a comparison of risk 
perceptions and evacuation behaviours of younger and older adults, and gender, during an 
evacuation due to a wildfire in a northern Canadian community. Prior to that discussion, 
it will be beneficial to get a grasp on the literature related to risk and evacuation 
generally, and then expressly related to wildfires.   
Lim and Rungta (2013) define evacuation as involving, “…the mass movement of 
a population in the wake of an impending danger from an impacted geographical region 
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toward safer destinations” (p. 98).  Michael Lindell (2013) refers to evacuation as, “…a 
process intended to temporarily move people from a hazardous location to a place of 
greater safety” (p. 122).  Fitzpatrick and Mileti (1991) state that, “Evacuation is largely a 
function of people coming to define themselves as being in danger and perceiving that 
leaving their immediate environment is an appropriate action” (p. 137).  Alternatively, 
Bateman and Edwards (2002), indicate that, “The primary utility of evacuating a 
threatened population before the impact of a disaster is to protect property, prevent 
injury, and sustain life” (p. 107).  There are other definitions, of course, but, the 
overarching theme of evacuation is movement from danger to a place of safety.   
In the United States, evacuations, involving at least 100 people, occur more than 
once a week; evacuations, involving more than 1,000, people occur more than three times 
per month (Dotson & Jones, 2005).  The numbers for Canada are presumed to be much 
less although no formal studies on overall evacuations in Canada have been conducted in 
recent times.  That being said, a 2011 study of wildfire evacuations in Canada, between 
1980 and 2007, revealed that an annual median of 3,590 people were evacuated due to 
wildfires in Canada (Beverly & Bothwell, 2011).  Evacuations are not an uncommon 
occurrence – there is probably one happening somewhere in North America right now.   
There has been a lot of research and study about evacuations.  In 1987 John 
Sorensen, Barbara Vogt and Dennis Mileti authored a paper titled, Evacuation: An 
Assessment of Planning and Research.  They reviewed over 300 documents pertaining to 
evacuations with the goal of assessing the current research (at the time) and identifying 
the knowledge gaps (Sorensen, Vogt, & Mileti, 1987).  Like much of the research 
literature concerning evacuations, their study specifically identified behavioural findings 
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for earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, tsunamis, and volcanoes.  Wildfires are not expressly 
covered; however, some of the generalities noted in the study can be applied to wildfire 
situations.   
There were many findings in their assessment of the research; however, only a 
few of them will be noted here.  The authors identify a lack of special evacuation 
planning information for fast moving events (Sorensen et al., 1987).  When the amount of 
time, from detection of an impending event to the event’s impact, is short, it necessitates 
a fast evacuation.  There is not a lot of research identifying how to plan for these types of 
scenarios (Sorensen et al., 1987).  The researchers also questioned the prior research on 
human behaviour in evacuations, stating that, “Knowledge about public evacuation 
behavior is broad; however, it is the result of a piecemeal effort that pulled together the 
findings of divergent pieces of research involving varied hazards and using somewhat 
different research designs, methods, approaches and models” (Sorensen et al., 1987, p. 
xii).  They go on to suggest that there is no evidence that differences in hazards results in 
differences in public responses (Sorensen et al., 1987).  Another finding, is about special 
populations, which includes people in institutions (prisons, hospitals, nursing homes, 
schools, etc.) or dispersed throughout the community including the deaf, disabled, 
mentally challenged, and foreigners (Sorensen et al., 1987).  They indicate that although 
some research has been done concerning these special groups, the information may not be 
readily available to evacuation planners at the local level (Sorensen et al., 1987).  This 
finding may be relevant to the current study, as one of the target comparator age groups 
of the research is 18 to 24 year olds.  Although not traditionally considered a special 
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population, in this case, they may meet some similar challenges as the groups identified 
in the Sorensen, Vogt and Mileti (1987) assessment.   
The document discussed above is a synthesized version of a more complete 
annotated guide to evacuation literature, written by Vogt and Sorensen in 1987.  Their 
findings are more detailed and document 10 years (1975 to 1985) of evacuation research.  
As noted previously, wildfires, are not one of the specific disaster types discussed; and 
there is no research reviewed by the authors that involves wildfires.  That being said, 
some of the findings relevant to this paper are as follows: 
• Warning, confirmation and evacuation are highly interrelated (Drabek, 1969, as 
cited in Vogt & Sorensen, 1987). 
• Flood evacuees will seek refuge with family and friends rather than emergency 
shelters (Drabek & Boggs, 1968 and Michael, 1954, as cited in Vogt & Sorensen, 
1987). 
• People evacuate as family units, not as isolated individuals (Drabek & Stephenson 
III, 1971, and Moore, Bates, Layman, & Parenton, 1963, as cited in Vogt & 
Sorensen, 1987). 
• Personality, age, gender and socioeconomic status are factors affecting evacuation 
response (Gruntfest, Downing, & White, 1978, as cited in Vogt & Sorensen, 
1987). 
• In pre-disaster settings, time is of central importance for explaining evacuation 
behaviour due to warnings (Mileti and Beck, 1975, as cited in Vogt & Sorensen, 
1987).  
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• Once decided, the majority of respondents would be ready to evacuate within four 
hours (Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety, 1984, as cited in Vogt & Sorensen, 
1987). 
Clearly there were a lot of findings in this 10-year study.  Vogt and Sorensen 
(1987) reviewed hundreds of documents pertaining to multiple disasters and different 
types of incidents.  Many of the conclusions from the research they have noted seems to 
contradict conclusions made from other research.  This potentially is because of the 
different types of disasters.  It would appear that people take more seriously the threat of 
a rail car accident carrying hazardous materials, that just occurred, versus an oncoming 
hurricane that will arrive in two days.  Therefore, timing appears to play a role in 
evacuation behaviour and risk perceptions.  Location of the disaster and experience with 
disasters are also important, but, sometimes have conflicting results.  Coastal residents 
who have suffered losses in the past, due to a hurricane, may be very motivated to leave 
when they hear another hurricane is approaching; however, ranchers who have lived 
through flooding dozens of times before, may be less inclined to leave when faced with 
another flood.  Both individuals have experience with disasters; but, their risk perceptions 
of the danger may be different. 
Sorensen and Vogt’s (1987) study is a thorough compendium of the research at 
the time.  There were a lot of other findings, in addition to the ones that have been noted; 
however, the conclusions indicated are either foundational or applicable to the topic that 
will be examined.  The study, admittedly, is dated, but many of the sociological 
characteristics discussed, i.e. age, gender, warnings by family and friends, etc. are still 
relevant today.  Many of the specifics concerning warning types, etc., are not as relevant, 
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due to the changes in technology and the different methods of warning that are currently 
available.   
Earl Baker (1991), conducted studies on hurricane evacuations. He reviewed 
almost 30 years’ worth of empirical research related to over 12 different hurricanes.  
Baker (1991) found that there were no consistent relationships between previous 
hurricane experience and evacuation.  He also noted that there was no consistent evidence 
to suggest that length of time lived in an area has an effect on evacuation response 
(Baker, 1991).  For hurricanes, Baker (1991) suggests that neighbourhood conformity 
may not be as strong as it is claimed.  The thought is, that if the neighbours are 
evacuating it would positively influence someone’s decision to evacuate; however, Baker 
(1991) indicates that this may not be the case.  He explains that there can be some 
confusion with this because people may be evacuating because they are in the designated 
risk area, or because public officials have instructed them to do so; it may be unrelated to 
what the neighbours are doing (Baker, 1991).  Baker (1991) identifies five variables: 
“risk level (hazardousness) of the area, action by public authorities, housing, prior 
perception of personal risk, and storm-specific threat factors” (p. 308) as the key factors 
influencing evacuation behaviour.  Baker further notes, that many demographic factors 
such as age, education, gender and family status are, “…rarely, weakly, inconsistently, or 
never related to evacuation” (Baker, 1991, p. 308).  Baker (1991) sums up his findings 
suggesting that the ideal would be to produce an evacuation model that can be used for 
any hazard to predict the public’s behaviour.  He comments that there is probably enough 
data to do this for hurricanes; however, until the databases for other hazard types are 
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more fully developed it will be difficult to generalize for all hazard evacuation response 
(Baker, 1991).   
Decision to Evacuate 
The decision to evacuate in the face of an impending disaster is complicated.  
Research has proven that there are many considerations taken into account prior to 
making the decision (Baker, 1991; Fitzpatrick & Mileti, 1991; Gladwin & Peacock, 2000; 
Vogt & Sorensen, 1987; and others).   
While researching the evacuation that occurred during Hurricane Andrew, 
Gladwin and Peacock (2000) noted that there are many factors relevant to evacuation 
decision making.  First and foremost is being located in an evacuation zone.  Size of the 
household, having elders and/or children, and residing in a single-family dwelling, were 
the other mentioned factors of importance (Gladwin & Peacock, 2000).  Their findings 
indicated that, “…being located in an evacuation zone increased the odds of evacuation 
by over eight times” (Gladwin & Peacock, 2000, p. 67).  This would seem to make sense, 
in that if a person’s home is located within a zone declared to be at risk, then the residents 
would be more inclined to leave, compared to others not in the area declared to be at risk.  
In their study, 91 percent of people who did not evacuate stated that they believed their 
homes were safe; they perceived no personal risk (Gladwin & Peacock, 2000).  Their 
findings also concluded that having children present increased the likelihood of 
evacuation by seven times; however, having elderly persons present decreased the 
likelihood of evacuation by approximately 25 percent (Gladwin & Peacock, 2000).  
People are generally protective of their children; therefore, it would be logical that having 
young children in the home would trigger a sense of protection and thus cause people to 
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leave (Carter, Kendall, & Clark, 1983; Gladwin & Peacock, 2000; Hasan et al., 2011).  
Conversely, evacuating elderly household members can be challenging – particularly if 
there are mobility or other health related issues complicating movement (Gladwin & 
Peacock, 2000; Hasan et al., 2011).  The research further indicated that people living in 
single family households are about 33 percent less likely to evacuate (Gladwin & 
Peacock, 2000).  The researchers suggest that homeowners may be concerned about the 
security of their home in the event of an evacuation; hence part of the resistance to leave 
(Gladwin & Peacock, 2000).  This was consistent with a study by Lazo, Waldman, 
Morrow and Thacher (2010), who found that concern about leaving property unprotected 
was a barrier to evacuation.   
In a similar study, Gladwin, Gladwin and Peacock (2001), trialed a decision tree 
model.  They surveyed a sample of residents of South Florida who had been present 
during both Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and Hurricane Erin in 1995.  The researchers 
arrived at a model of “if then” results that could be trialed using the real data from the 
surveys.  The researchers found that their model demonstrated the reality of, “the 
complexity and messiness of real-life decision-making” (Gladwin et al., 2001, p. 136).  
Messiness is great word to describe decision making during disasters.  People do not all 
behave and react the same way as others; or, as emergency managers may expect (Dash 
& Gladwin, 2007).  In this particular study, the authors noted that people’s perceptions of 
the hurricane, the safety features of their homes, the amount of time prior to the 
hurricane’s arrival, their age, and the influence of family members who were also 
determining whether to evacuate or not, all played a role in the decision making process 
(Gladwin et al., 2001).  The importance of this study is that it highlights people’s 
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independence when it comes to deciding to evacuate or not.  Despite evacuation orders 
given by emergency managers, 60 percent of people move on to weigh the riskiness of 
the hurricane for themselves prior to leaving, simply because an order has been issued 
(Gladwin et al., 2001).  As a result of this, the researchers caution policy makers that the 
decision process and the weighing of the risks may occur past the timeline for evacuation; 
therefore, there could be substantial delays in the overall evacuation (Gladwin et al., 
2001).   
Many previous sociological evacuation behaviour based studies have indicated 
that families act as a unit during times of crisis (Quarantelli et al., 1980).  Quarantelli, 
Baisden, and Bourdess (1980), state, “The vast majority of the literature either explicitly 
or implicitly indicates that instead of responding as separate individuals, family members 
act as collective units at times of evacuation.  Household members will try to respond to 
warnings together, to withdraw together, and to find shelter together” (p. 46).    
Gladwin, Gladwin, and Peacock (2001), found the same to be true in a study of 
South Florida residents, present during Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and Hurricane Erin in 
1995.  They found that, of their survey group, there was a strong desire amongst 
respondents to evacuate as a family, and, in fact, a number of informants commented that 
they had been ready to leave; however, because other family members were not, they 
stayed and did not evacuate (Gladwin et al., 2001).  
When it comes to age being a variable in evacuation behaviour and risk analysis, 
it should be noted that in almost all of the research concerning evacuations that the author 
found, age was referring to either the elderly, 65 years plus; or children, 18 years of age 
or younger. Those between the ages of 18 and 65 were not referred to in relation to their 
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age. This is further demonstrated in the 2014 publication from the National Governors 
Association, Governor’s Guide to Mass Evacuation, where there are sections dedicated to 
the evacuation of senior citizens and children.  The guide indicates that seniors are more 
likely to stay home rather than evacuate; however, they are more likely to evacuate if 
they are able to share transportation with family, close friends, or neighbours (MacLellan, 
Powell, & Saporito, 2014).  The guide also highlights that children should be educated 
about natural disasters and what to expect during an evacuation (MacLellan et al., 2014).  
Overall, age is referring either to the elderly or to children.  There is limited evacuation 
research specific to 18 to 24 year olds.   
In another hurricane evacuation study, conducted by Hasan, Ukkusuri, Gladwin 
and Murray-Tuite (2011), the researchers concluded that there were several factors that 
could influence a household’s evacuation behaviour.  The findings are similar to the 
study by Gladwin and Peacock (2000) and other studies.  They summarized, the 
“…factors include the household’s location, source of the news of evacuation notice, 
mandatory work requirement during the evacuation, number of children, type of house 
(e.g., living in a mobile house), house ownership status, type of evacuation notice 
(mandatory or optional) received, previous hurricane experience, and income or 
educational attainment (e.g., high income or postgraduate)” (Hasan et al., 2011, p. 347).   
All of these key evacuation themes have been researched and written about 
previously.  The presence of children or elderly in the household influences decisions 
positively and negatively respectively (Carter et al., 1983; Gladwin & Peacock, 2000; 
Hasan, et al., 2011); females are more likely to evacuate than men (Bateman & Edwards, 
2002; Fothergill, 1996); persons with disabilities face unique challenges during 
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evacuations (Kearns & Lowe, 2007; Van Willigen, Edwards, Edwards, & Hessee, 2002); 
race and ethnicity play a factor in emergency decision making (Perry, Lindell, & Greene, 
1982); and finally, income plays a role when determining course of action (Sorensen et 
al., 1987).   
In an assessment of evacuation planning and research, Sorensen, Vogt and Mileti 
(1987), identify seven individual or family level decisions that must be made concerning 
evacuation.  They are: 
• whether to evacuate, 
• when to evacuate, 
• what to take, 
• how to travel,  
• route to travel, 
• where to go, and 
• when to return (Sorensen et al., 1987, p. 8). 
The authors, in listing these decisions, highlight that deciding to evacuate is a 
complex social process requiring “considerable communication and social interactions” 
(Sorensen et al., 1987, p. 8) to occur.  Therefore, it is not easy to perfectly predict the 
responses that people will make when faced with these decisions.   
Specific thoughts about how to evacuate, who to evacuate with, where to go, 
when to go, are all worthwhile considerations when an individual is deliberating 
evacuation.  Lindell (2000) comments that household resources such as having cash, 
having access to a credit card, the ability to travel to and stay at friend’s or relative’s 
homes, all are taken into account when deciding about evacuation.  He comments that 
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although Red Cross shelters (and similar shelters) are excellent options, people would 
prefer to avoid them.  Lindell (2000) states, “Consequently, the inconvenience of 
evacuating is something that people tend to balance against the perceived risk” (p. 124).  
Warnings 
When speaking of evacuation, one should also consider the warnings. Warnings 
are often the initial triggers for evacuation decision making.  Warnings are the sources of 
information that provide people with the data to form the perceptions about the risk they 
are facing.  It is these perceptions of the risk that will influence the subsequent actions 
that the people will take as a result (Fitzpatrick & Mileti, 1991).  Recognizing that there 
are a variety of sources involved in warning of a disaster and multiple factors that must 
be considered, will help us understand the impact they all have on resultant behaviours.   
For an evacuation order to be heeded it needs to be communicated in such a way 
that the message is heard, received, and believed.  Mileti and O’Brien (1992) summarize 
the process: First, someone needs to hear the risk information that is communicated; 
second, people will typically attempt to verify the warning; third, people will form an 
understanding of the risk; fourth, people will develop a belief that the risk information is 
relevant and accurate; lastly, people will decide what to do and then act on it.  Individual 
meaning must be associated to the information heard prior to an individual being able to 
act – the warning must be personalized (Mileti & O’Brien, 1992).  It goes without saying, 
that the warning must be believable.  Dash and Gladwin (2007) state, “If individuals do 
not believe warnings are valid or the risk real, then the likelihood of response is 
decreased” (p. 70).  Tierney, Lindell and Perry (2001) state that the processing of the 
information results in two types of psychological effects, “cognitive reactions such as 
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perceptions of threat and of alternative protective actions, and affective responses such as 
fear” (p. 85).  They continue to state that these reactions then lead to behaviours 
applicable to their interpretations, such as continuation of normal activities to pursuing 
personal and property protective measures (Tierney et al., 2001). 
As for content of the messaging, Mileti and Sorensen (1990) outline the necessary 
message components, “(1) information about the location(s) at risk and not at risk; (2) 
information about the character of risk, for example, the depth of expected flood waters; 
(3) information about guidance, or what people should do to protect themselves; and (4) 
information about how much time there is before impact or before a protective action 
should be initiated or completed” (p. 5-4).   
The source of the evacuation warning has significant impact as well.  Receiving 
an evacuation notice from friends and relatives, prior to hearing about it from other 
sources (i.e. television, radio, or internet), increases the probability of evacuation (Hasan 
et al., 2011; Lindell et al., 2005).  Tierney, Lindell and Perry (2001), observe that in the 
United States, warnings by a uniformed officer, face to face, tend to be most credible 
source of information for much of the population; however, it is obviously a slow and 
labour intensive method.  Drabek (2013) echoes this same thought, that, “…a police 
officer at your door, for example, is more likely to produce a high degree of concern than 
any other message source” (p. 80).  Kuligowski (2011), in a study of the evacuation of 
The World Trade Center during 9/11 concurred, that an in-person direction increased the 
observers’ perceptions of risk and positively influenced their evacuation response.  
Fitzpatrick and Mileti (1991) describe several information factors that must be considered 
when sending out a warning.  These are: the source of the information, the consistency of 
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the message, the accuracy of the information, the clarity, the certainty the message is 
communicated with, the sufficiency of the information provided, the guidance given, the 
frequency of the messaging, the specificity of the locations involved, and the channels 
that the message is communicated through (Fitzpatrick & Mileti, 1991).   
 Vogt and Sorensen (1987), in their review of evacuation literature, concur that 
simply giving a warning is not enough incentive to instigate an evacuation.  Instead, 
people’s initial reaction is one of disbelief, followed up with an attempt to confirm the 
threat from a different source (Vogt & Sorensen, 1987).  They provided the example, 
“…if neighbors were seen leaving, the tendency to evacuate was found enhanced” (Vogt 
& Sorensen, 1987, p. 3).  That being said, Carter et al. (1983) observed that single 
residents, once having considered evacuation, tend to do so with little effect from sources 
of input; whereas, couples with children seek out additional confirmations and 
information prior to deciding whether to evacuate or not.  This indicates that although 
disbelief and confirmation are important in risk evaluation and evacuation decision 
making, it may not be of primary importance for those who are single or live alone.   
Sources of Information 
 As noted above, the source that one obtains disaster information from will have an 
impact on the believability of the information received and of the actions taken. Previous 
studies have indicated that the mass media, broadcast media particularly, have been the 
primary and most effective source of hearing warnings among all of the available types 
(Lindell et al., 2005; Mileti & Sorensen, 1990).  With the proliferation of internet usage 
and social media, this finding may no longer be true.  Regardless of the source, prior 
studies allege that the more that different sources are used, the more that people become 
		 26 
aware and remember that they have heard a warning (Mileti & Sorensen, 1990) and the 
increased likelihood that they will take action.   
Dow and Cutter (1998) conducted an interesting study on two specific hurricane 
evacuations and concluded that evacuation decision making was based on multiple 
sources of risk information.  Confirmation of the risk was more inclined to be done from 
electronic sources, such as the Weather Channel, rather than seeking confirmation from 
emergency management officials (Dow & Cutter, 1998). 
In a study, specific to wildfire evacuations during the Colorado wildfires in 2002, 
researchers determined that over 75 percent of people used a combination of sources for 
fire information, including, television, phone, newspaper and the internet (Benight, 
Gruntfest, & Sparks, 2004).  The same study indicated that 50 percent of people used 
three or more sources and just over 35 percent of people used four or more sources to 
obtain fire information (Benight et al., 2004).  That being said, when it came to 
evacuation information, 76 percent of those surveyed only used one source of 
information with 50 percent of that group using the telephone as their source (Benight et 
al., 2004).  Just over 15 percent of people used the television for their evacuation 
information (Benight et al., 2004); which is interesting, given that the study is a little 
dated and the internet was not as prevalent back then as it is today.  In a separate study 
specific to wildfires, Steelman, McCaffrey, Knox Velez and Briefel (2015), found that 
television and radio were used less frequently than family, friends and neighbours as 
important information sources.   
 The use of social media during times of crisis is continuously evolving as the 
technology evolves.  Veil, Buehner, and Palenchar (2011) have put together what they 
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refer to as a “work-in-process literature review” (p. 110) of social media in risk and crisis 
communication.  The study suggests that, “the news of a crisis can be shared and 
reshared, reaching millions of people without the intervening presence of journalists” 
(Veil, Buehner, & Palenchar, 2011, p. 111). They are indicating that social media has the 
potential to bypass traditional media and inform the masses without organized journalism 
required.  They recommend that crisis managers embrace the use of social media because 
if they do not, the conversation will ensue on social media regardless (Veil et al., 2011).  
They conclude their study indicating that crisis managers must be proficient in both 
traditional media and social media to effectively reach the public (Veil et al., 2011).    
 A social media and crisis study, conducted by Jin, Liu and Austin (2014), found 
that the form and source of the crisis information provided impacted the public 
acceptance of the crisis message and impacted their emotional response to the crisis.  
Although the study was predominantly focused on organizational types of crises rather 
than natural disasters, the study utilized participants from a large East Coast university.  
Their sample size was 338 participants.  The researchers chose to use young adults as 
their subjects because they are more frequent users of social media (Jin, Liu, & Austin, 
2014).  Their study indicated that the majority of their participants used Facebook more 
frequently than online videos, blogs and twitter (Jin et al., 2014).   
 The Pew Research Center regularly conducts studies on internet and social media 
usage.  In a recent study, released in May 2016, the researchers found that 62 percent of 
U.S. adults receive news on social media (Gottfried & Shearer, 2016).  They further 
discovered that, for news, on social media, Facebook is the most popular, with 67 percent 
of U.S. adults utilizing Facebook, and 44 percent obtaining news from Facebook 
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(Gottfried & Shearer, 2016).  Figure 2 provides the breakdown of social media type and 
news obtained from those sources.   
	
Figure 2. Visual depiction of the social media sources that U.S. adults receive news. Taken from “News 
Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016” by J. Gottfried and E. Shearer, 2016. Pew Research Center. p. 4. 
 	 The Pew Research Center also reports, that as of 2016, 86 percent of U.S. 18 to 29 
year olds use at least one social media site regularly (Pew Research Centre, 2017a).  See 
Figure 3 for a complete age breakdown of social media usage over the last decade.  
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Figure 3. Visual depiction of social media use by age by U.S. adults. Taken from “Social Media Use by 
Age”, 2017a. Pew Research Center.  (http://www.pewinternet.org/chart/social-media-use-by-age/) 
 
In a separate chart, they indicate that of all Americans utilizing social media, 76 percent 
use Facebook daily with Instagram next, at 51 percent using it daily (Pew Research 
Centre, 2017b).  See figure 4 for a full summary of their findings.  
	
Figure 3. Visual depiction of frequency of social media use by Americans. Taken from “How often 
Americans are using social media”, 2017b. Pew Research Center.  (http://www.pewinternet.org/chart/how-
often-americans-are-using-social-media/) 
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Insights West, a market research company, conducted a survey of Canadian social 
media use in March of 2016.  Their results were a little lower than the American results, 
found above.  Seventy-one per cent of Canadians use Facebook on a weekly basis; where 
54 percent of Canadians use Facebook daily (Insights West, 2016); see Figure 5.  
YouTube and Twitter are next with 49 percent and 27 percent respectively for weekly use 
(Insights West, 2016).  Of 18 to 34 year olds, only 10 percent have never tried Facebook; 
with only 4 percent having never tried You Tube (Insights West, 2016).   
 
Figure 5.  2016 Survey of Canadian social media Use.  Taken from “2016 Canadian Social Media 
Monitor”, 2016, Insights West (http://www.insightswest.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/Rep_InsightsWest_CDNSocialMediaMonitor_2016.pdf) 
 
 Both the American and the Canadian surveys indicate that Facebook is the most 
popular social media site; and that its use has continued to grow year over year.  This 
trend would validate Veil, Buehner and Palenchar’s (2011) recommendation that 
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emergency managers must become proficient in both traditional and social media 
platforms.   
Risk Perception 
Having looked at evacuation and warnings generally, this brings us to risk 
perception, one of the key purposes behind this study.  Disaster decision making is 
inextricably intertwined with warnings and risk perception.  Mileti and Peek (2000) 
discuss risk perception in terms of expected personal impacts following or in advance of 
a disaster event. Risk perception has been measured in a variety of different ways by 
different researchers.  Tierney, Lindell and Perry (2001), describe them as, “…the 
perceived likelihood of a particular type of event, such as an earthquake; as the perceived 
magnitude of an event; as expectations about the severity of its impacts on the 
community; and as expectations about the personal threat posed by the hazard” (p. 89).  
Eiser et al. (2012) suggest that risk is, “...a function of (a) the likelihood and (b) the value 
of some possible future event or events” (p. 7).  They go on to state, “More importantly, 
however, risk arises not just from how some future can be described, but from the 
uncertainty, actual or perceived, surrounding that description” (Eiser et al., 2012, p. 7).  
Risk has different connotations to individuals. Perceived personal risk, depends on 
people’s personal experience with hazards.  Some research has found it to be related to 
the recency, frequency and intensity of personal experiences (Lindell & Prater, 2000; 
Weinstein, 1989).  Weinstein (1989) postulates that if someone’s experience with a 
hazard is minor, they, “…are not inclined to adopt additional preventive measures or to 
respond more quickly to future warnings” (p. 47); whereas, he states, “If the harm 
experienced is serious, people have increased motivation to reduce their risk” (p. 47).  
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When referring to personal experience, Lindell and Hwang (2008) indicate that this can 
be casualties or damage experienced by the person themselves, or by members of their 
immediate family, extended family, friends, neighbours, or coworkers.  Mileti and 
O’Brien (1992) state, “perceived risk has a direct and positive impact on responding to 
warnings with protective actions” (p. 53).  In other words, as stated earlier, if someone 
believes the threat of harm or loss is real then the likelihood of him or her responding to a 
warning, i.e. an evacuation warning, is greater (Dash & Gladwin, 2007).  Further to this 
then, the individual must have an understanding and a belief of the risks if emergency 
managers expect them to respond to the warnings.   
Mileti and Peek (2000) describe this in a little more detail, suggesting that risk 
perception includes: understanding the warning, having a belief in the risk information 
and its accuracy, and being able to personalize the risks.  This leads to deciding what 
actions to take in light of the risk perceptions, and then executing those actions (Mileti & 
Peek, 2000).    
One would think that timing of an evacuation would be linked to risk perception.  
Sorensen (1991) indicates that, “People appear to adjust the rapidity of their evacuation 
behavior in accordance with the severity and timing of the impending threat” (p. 155).  
Threats that are more imminent will elicit a faster response than a threat that is slow 
moving.  Sorensen (1991) cites Burton (1981) while discussing the example of the 
Mississauga, Ontario hazardous material train derailment, where 90 percent of the first 
group of evacuees evacuated within 60 minutes, and of those, 60 percent left within 10 
minutes or less.  Yet, in a study of the Nanticoke, Pennsylvania hazardous materials fire, 
Sorensen (1991), found that there was no correlation between the perceived threat and the 
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amount of time it took people to evacuate.  That being said, the personalization of the 
warning did have an impact on mobilization time – i.e. if the message was delivered by a 
friend or a relative, the evacuation response was quicker; if the message was delivered by 
a siren the evacuation response was slower (Sorensen, 1991).   
Fitzpatrick and Mileti (1991), discuss the perceptions that motivate evacuation 
and note, as mentioned above, that understanding, belief and personalization are the 
necessary perceptual elements.  Looking at each element, the researchers comment that 
the individual’s interpretation of the meaning of the message may differ and thus affect 
their interpretation of the risks being communicated (Fitzpatrick & Mileti, 1991).  They 
further comment that, “…understanding is connected to people’s existing frames of 
knowledge and reference developed prior to the emergency situation” (Fiztpatrick & 
Mileti, 1991, p. 140).  If a person has little prior knowledge of a hazard situation then it 
will be difficult for them to understand or contextualize the risks they could be facing.  
Mileti (1999) comments on this, stating, “the overwhelming scientific evidence is that 
people typically are unaware of the hazards they face, underestimate those of which they 
are aware, overestimate their ability to cope when disaster strikes…” (p. 136).  As 
mentioned earlier, belief is critical in instigating a response.  Part of developing belief is 
confirmation.  People will typically try to confirm the information they have heard by 
seeking out alternative sources for the information (Fitzpatrick & Mileti, 1991; Mileti & 
Sorensen, 1990).  Confirmation is therefore, an important part of the warning and 
believing process.  While discussing the confirmation process, Mileti & Sorensen (1990) 
state, “It helps people better understand warnings, believe them, personalize the risk, and 
make response decisions” (p. 5-3).  Speaking of personalization, this is when people 
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determine the amount of danger or risk that the hazard poses to them personally (Dash & 
Gladwin, 2007).   
Much of the research on evacuation and evacuation risk perceptions, as mentioned 
previously, is focused on tornadoes, hurricanes, flooding (Sorensen et al., 1987) and to a 
lesser extent wildfires.  This study, focused on a wildfire in a northern Canadian 
community, fills a gap in the current academic literature for both risk perceptions and 
evacuation behaviours, particularly in regards to age and gender. 
Wildfire Evacuation 
 Jennifer Beverly and Peter Bothwell (2011) conducted an interesting study of 
wildfire evacuations in Canada between 1980 and 2007.  Their research was challenging, 
as there is no central repository for this type of information.  They derived their statistics 
from news media, individual agencies, etc., but in many cases the exact numbers of 
evacuees were estimates based on census data or numbers of people who registered at 
evacuation sites (Beverly & Bothwell, 2011).   They found that between 1980 and 2007 
there were 547 evacuation events, ranging from 1 to 53 with an average of 20 per year 
(Beverly & Bothwell, 2011).  Beverly and Bothwell reported that 70 percent of the 
evacuations involved less than 300 people with a minimum of 40 people in 1984 and a 
maximum of 51,346 people in 2003.  In the 28 year study a total of 497 homes were 
destroyed; an average of 18 homes per year (Beverly & Bothwell, 2011).  The researchers 
noted that the majority of wildfire related evacuations were a result of an evacuation 
order due to a direct threat from wildfire; less than 3 percent of evacuations were 
voluntary (Beverly & Bothwell, 2011).  As an aside, the researchers only found one 
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reference to a direct wildfire related death in the entire study period (Beverly & Bothwell, 
2011).   
Comparing these statistics with the United States, in 2015 wildfires destroyed 
2,638 residences; with the State of California accounting for 1,892 of those homes 
(National Interagency Coordination Center, 2015).  This is more than five times as many 
homes destroyed by wildfire, in the U.S., than all the homes destroyed by wildfire in 
Canada in the 28-year study conducted by Beverly and Bothwell (2011).  Interestingly 
enough, total areas consumed by wildfire, for both the U.S. and Canada are very similar.  
The 68,151 wildfires in the U.S. in 2015, burned a little more than 4 million hectares 
(National Interagency Coordination Center, 2015).  These numbers are a little higher than 
the typical U.S. average over the last 10 years, of 2.83 million hectares (National 
Interagency Coordination Center, 2015).  Meanwhile, in Canada, the 2015 number is 
3,903,277 hectares consumed; also, a little higher than the 10 year average for Canada, of 
2.4 million hectares (Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre Inc., 2015).  The summary 
of these statistics, is that Canada and the U.S. have, on average, a similar amount of land 
area consumed by wildfire each year.  The United States, on the other hand, has a 
significantly higher annual average number of homes lost to wildfires.  Beverly and 
Bothwell (2011) surmise that this is because two thirds of Canada’s population live 
within a narrow stretch of land along the Canada/United States border.  They state, 
“Overall, Canada’s population density is 3.5 persons per km2 or about one-tenth that of 
the United States, but in the most fire-prone regions of the country, population densities 
are much lower” (Beverly & Bothwell, 2011, p. 575).  This is consistent with the findings 
of a 2002 study by Stocks et al., whereby they examined Canadian wildfires that occurred 
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between 1959 and 1997.  Stocks et al. (2002) mention several times throughout their 
discussion, that Canadian wildfires occur predominantly in the northern forested areas 
where the population is sparse.  They also note that almost half of the areas burned by 
fires were not suppressed to some degree unless they were threatening communities 
(Stocks et al., 2002).  In other words, if the fires were not near homes, little effort was 
made to contain the fires.   
Australia has also had its share of deadly bushfires over the years.  Therefore, 
there has been a number of applicable studies conducted that could be relevant to the 
research in this study.  In 1967 the Hobart Fires killed 62 civilians; the “Ash Wednesday” 
fires in 1983 killed 60 civilians; and in 2009, the “Black Saturday” fires killed 173 people 
and destroyed over 2,000 homes (Beatson & McLennan, 2011).  In a report on the “Black 
Saturday” fatalities, Handmer, O’Neil and Killalea (2010), indicate a number of reasons 
why the fatalities occurred.  Some of the reasons include, unawareness of the risk, 
misconceptions about bushfire safety, lack of official warning that plans should be 
activated, and waiting until the flames could be seen prior to taking action (Handmer et 
al., 2010).   
It should be noted that Australia has a ‘prepare, stay and defend, or leave early’ 
policy, that allows residents the freedom to decide whether they will evacuate, 
presumably early, or stay and attempt to defend their property against the fire (Stephens 
et al., 2009).  Stephens et al. (2009) suggest that this policy may actually be better than 
the U.S. practice of anticipating the fire spread, ordering mandatory evacuations, and 
having professional fire services move in to suppress the blaze.  The caveat, of course, is 
having trained residents with the knowledge and capabilities to defend their property 
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(Stephen et al., 2009).  Paveglio, Carroll and Jakes (2008), also did some research 
examining the “prepare, stay and defend, or leave early” response to wildfires and 
suggested the Australian policy would be worth considering.  Both sets of researchers 
made these comments and suggestions prior to the Black Saturday fires that killed 173 
civilians.   
In a separate study, examining fatalities in Australian bushfires from 1900-2008, 
researchers found that the majority of deaths were the result of late evacuations, or, in the 
case of males, defending property outside (Haynes, Handmer, McAneney, Tibbits, & 
Coates, 2010).  These researchers stated, “…while there is no zero risk option when 
confronted with a bushfire, staying and actively defending a dwelling appeared to be the 
safest option, and leaving at the last minute the most dangerous” (Haynes et al., 2010, p. 
192).  Again, these comments were made prior to the results of the Black Saturday fires 
being analyzed and the authors noted that their findings could change based on new data.  
Staying to defend property has obvious risks; but, evacuating too late has equally life-
threatening consequences.   
In the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (VBRC) (2010) final report 
on the Victorian Bushfires, known as the Black Saturday fires, it noted that, “The stay or 
go policy failed to allow for the variations in fire severity that can result from differing 
topography, fuel loads and weather conditions” (2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal 
Commission [VBRC], 2010, p. 5).  The report indicated that evacuating early is still the 
safest option; however, staying to defend a home, in less severe fires, with the proper 
qualifications, may still be a sound option to consider (2009 VBRC, 2010).  In fact, 
Gledhill (2003), presented a paper at the Third International Wildland Fire Summit, and 
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stated that, “Most Australian fire authorities, including Tasmania Fire Service, no longer 
support large-scale evacuation of people from areas threatened by bushfires” (p. 1).   
Beatson and McLennan (2011) reviewed three different studies related to the 
Black Saturday fires and concluded that, “Few people in high bushfire risk communities 
personalized warnings of the dangers posed by extreme fire danger weather; few 
undertook thorough preparation of their homes to resist bushfire attack; few undertook 
the necessary planning and preparation to leave in a safe and timely manner; many were 
caught unawares by the rapid advance of the fires; and many residents expected 
authorities to issue a specific direction to them that it was time to leave” (p. 172).  
Between the Beatson and McLennan (2011) reviews and the 2009 Victorian Bushfires 
Royal Commission (2010) report, it would appear that there were some deficiencies with 
the stay or go policy.  It further appears that leaving early posed the best possible 
outcome in terms of survivability.  The 2009 VBRC (2010) report had 67 
recommendations covering everything from planning and building, land and fuel 
management, fireground response, and others.  The very first grouping of 
recommendations concerned Victoria’s bushfire safety policy.  Specifically, enhancing 
the role of warnings to include information about the predicted path of the fire and the 
actions people are to take; emphasizing that all fires are different and a certain level of 
awareness of fire conditions, local circumstances and personal capacity are important; 
and recognizing that on the worst days, heightened risk may necessitate a different 
response (2009 VBRC, 2010).  Another recommendation was specific to evacuation, 
stipulating that the state encourage early evacuation, particularly for vulnerable people 
with consideration that the vulnerable may require assistance (2009 VBRC, 2010).   
		 39 
Doug Cote and Tara McGee (2014) did a small case study in the hamlet of Mt. 
Lorne, Yukon, Canada.  The purpose of their research was to examine residents’ 
perceptions of evacuation and the alternatives available; determine how residents planned 
to respond to a wildfire; and identify the influencing factors (Cote & McGee, 2014).  The 
community they studied has a population of 410 people; their focus group consisted of 12 
participants ages 28 to 64 (Cote & McGee, 2014).  One of the lines of inquiry of their 
research, was to explore the stay and defend alternative to evacuation.  All but one of 
their participants had heard of it and all of the participants concurred that they would 
prefer to stay and defend (Cote & McGee, 2014).  That being said, a majority of their 
participants said that if conditions got extreme, they would evacuate.  This is a problem, 
because as noted in the previous studies, fleeing at the last moment during a wildfire is 
exceptionally dangerous (2009 VBRC, 2010; Beatson & McLennan, 2011; Haynes et al., 
2010; Stephens et al., 2009). The study highlighted that wildfire management agencies 
need to ensure that local residents understand the risks associated with wildfires and 
staying to defend their property (Cote & McGee, 2014).  The people in the study had the 
best intentions for their properties, but the majority did not come across as 
knowledgeable, informed, or as prepared as they would need to be to stay and defend 
their properties during a wildfire incident (Cote & McGee, 2014).  Finally, Cote and 
McGee (2014) suggest that, “Further study is needed to obtain an understanding of 
Canadians’ wildfire evacuation intentions, and to identify factors that influence 
evacuation intentions” (p. 501).   
In 2003 there was a wildfire in the area of Barriere, British Columbia, known as 
the McClure fire.  Researchers from the University of Lethbridge conducted a survey 
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from the community seeking information about their evacuation experiences.  Their study 
resulted in a number of interesting statistics relating to households and community. 
Twenty nine percent of the survey group had previous experience with wildfires (Kulig et 
al., 2010).  Of the group surveyed, 201 individuals, only one person thought that they 
would die as a result of the fire (Kulig et al., 2010).  Ninety percent of the participants 
were evacuated, and of those, 37 percent were evacuated more than once (Kulig et al., 
2010).  A large portion of the study was devoted to inquiry about the aftermath of the fire 
and community resiliency.  The majority of the survey participants felt that the 
community came together and helped one another through the experience (Kulig et al., 
2010). 
Taylor et al. (2007), conducted a “quick response” research study during the 2003 
wildfires in the San Bernardino area of California.  Quick response research is intended 
to, “…understand circumstances that exist only fleetingly and/or to document evidence 
created as a result of a damaging event that will not survive clean-up operations” 
(Michaels, 2003, p. 15).  In this case, the researchers were studying how communities, 
threatened by wildfire, communicate and obtain information (Taylor et al., 2007).  Their 
study revealed that the primary information the public was seeking, at the outset of the 
fire, was, ““Where exactly is the fire?” “How bad (how big) is it?” and “Which direction 
is it moving?”” (Taylor et al., 2007, p. 202).  The answers to these questions would allow 
the community to determine whether their homes were at risk and whether they should or 
should not evacuate.  In the study conducted by Taylor and his colleagues, residents 
reported requiring “real-time” information, regardless of whether it was obtained from 
official sources or not (Taylor et al., 2007).  The official information disseminated often 
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spoke of number of fire fighters and amount of apparatus but it failed to provide the local 
specifics that the residents required for decision making (Taylor et al., 2007).  Although 
the affected county had set up a hot line switchboard, where residents could call in to 
obtain information, the call in line was understaffed and didn’t have updated information, 
causing frustration for callers (Taylor et al., 2007).  Taylor and the other researchers 
noted, “That lack of up-to-date, site specific information from official sources was a 
consistent concern heard throughout this fire communication study” (Taylor et al., 2007, 
p. 204).  Other sources of information were a little hit or miss, according to the study.  
San Bernardino is relatively close to Los Angeles.  The large media outlets were targeting 
the masses in Los Angeles, rather than focusing on providing quality information to the 
residents of the San Bernardino area affected by the wildfires.  As a result, the 
information broadcasted was often inaccurate, sensationalized, and not timely (Taylor et 
al., 2007).  On the positive side, a small local radio station made a point of broadcasting 
relevant information as often as possible.  Even when the radio station owner had to 
evacuate, he continued to provide updates on his radio station’s web site (Taylor et al., 
2007).  The summary of the study is that people need timely and accurate information to 
help them cope with the threat facing them; if they are unable to get this information from 
official sources, they will likely turn to less formal information networks to obtain the 
necessary information (Taylor et al., 2007).   
Slave Lake Fire 
The Slave Lake fire of 2011, in northern Alberta, resulted in an evacuation of 
almost 15,000 people and the destruction of 730 homes (KPMG, 2012).  At the time, the 
Insurance Bureau of Canada stated that the Slave Lake fire was the second costliest 
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disaster in Canadian history, estimated at over $700 million (KPMG, 2012).  This fire, is 
the most closely related disaster, both in terms of type and of the evacuation, to the Fort 
McMurray wildfire of 2016.  Both communities are fairly isolated in Northern Alberta.   
A group of Alberta researchers investigated the impacts of the Slave Lake wildfire 
on local area school children.  Although the study is interesting and was seemingly 
relevant, because it is a specific age based survey relating to a Canadian wildfire incident, 
the study focused on examining the psychological effects on children in grades three to 
twelve (Townshend et al., 2015). As a result, the study is not applicable to the research 
being undertaken in this Fort McMurray research project.   
A separate study concerning the Slave Lake fire (with some of the same 
researchers) focused on family functioning in the recovery phase after the fire.  This 
study is also revealing in relation to the project that this paper is focused on, in that, it is 
family specific.  Young people, aged 18-24, were not included in the Slave Lake study, as 
this age range was not part of any of the family units studied.  Of the 19 families 
surveyed, adults were aged 29 to 48 years and the children were aged, 9 to 12 years 
(Pujadas Botey, & Kulig, 2014).  This could potentially indicate that future research may 
need to be conducted on the recovery phase of young adults from wild fires.  Another 
interesting note from the Pujadas Botey and Kulig (2014) study, was that families 
evacuated as family units.  This sentiment, of needing to evacuate as a family unit, was 
also observed during Hurricane Katrina (Peek, Morrisey, & Marlatt, 2011).  In the 
Hurricane Katrina study, like the Slave Lake study, young adults, aged 18 to 24, were not 
typically included in family units.   
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About Young People 
 The survey for this research project was conducted on a college campus.  
Students, staff and faculty were respondents.  The research intended to focus on 18 to 24 
year olds as compared to adults who are older.  The Pew Research Center conducts 
research on a variety of social science, political, scientific, and demographic trends.  
They suggest that people born between 1981 and 1997 fall into the “Millennial” 
generation (Pew Research Center, 2015a).  It can be noted that 18 to 24 year olds, at the 
time of the wildfire in Fort McMurray, would have been born between 1992 and 1998.  
Some of these young people would be at the very tail end of the millennial generation.  
Monster Worldwide Incorporated, is a company that focuses on connecting people to jobs 
(Monster Worldwide Inc., 2016a).  In a 2016 survey they sponsored, they dubbed 
“Generation Z” as young people born between 1996 and 2001; they also referred to the 
Millennial Generation as “Generation Y” (Monster Worldwide Inc., 2016a).  Needless to 
say, the young people in the Fort McMurray evacuation survey cross over between these 
two generations.  Many of the adults, 25 and older, who participated in the survey fall 
within the “Millennial Generation” or, if older than 36 years of age at the time of the 
wildfire, they would fall into the “Generation X” category (as defined both by the Pew 
Research Center (2015a) and Monster Worldwide Inc. (2016a)).  Adults older than 51 
years of age, at the time of the wildfire, would be “Baby Boomers” (Pew Research 
Center, 2015a).   
 The generational differences may be important when examining information 
sources and differences in evacuation behaviours between the groups.  Monster 
Worldwide Inc. (2016b) describes Generation Z as, “…the first generation that has grown 
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up with access to ubiquitous internet technology since birth” (p. 6).  They further claim 
that for Generation Z, “there is no separation between online and offline worlds” 
(Monster Worldwide Inc., 2016b, p. 6).  A Pew Research Center report suggests that 
Millennials are not much different, in that, “They are history’s first “always connected” 
generation” (Taylor & Keeter, 2010, p. 1).  Millennials have been referred to as “digital 
natives” because they have not needed to adapt to technologies such as social media, the 
internet, mobile technology, etc. – they have grown up with it (Pew Research Center, 
2014).  Millennials tend to stay connected via social media sites more so than their older 
counterparts.  In the same report cited above, Millennials, in 2013 had an average of 250 
Facebook friends; where Generation X Facebook users had an average of 200; older 
generations peaked at 98 friends on average (Pew Research Center, 2014).  In another 
survey of technology stakeholders and critics, conducted by the Pew Research Center, 
they described the life skills of young people in the year 2020 as: able to search for online 
information and be able to determine the quality and the veracity of the information 
found; able to synthesize information from a variety of sources; and able to differentiate 
between “noise” and the message actually being communicated (Anderson & Rainie, 
2012).  The online savviness of the younger generation (either Generation Y or 
Generation Z) is worth noting when considering methods of communication to this 
populace.  This is highlighted in the previous section discussing social media usage; 
where it is mentioned that 86 percent of 18 to 29 year olds, in the United States, use at 
least one social media site regularly (Pew Research Center, 2017a).   
 Speaking of communications, in 2013, nearly all Millennials, 96 percent, and 
Generation Xers, 95 percent, reported having a cellular telephone (Pew Research Center, 
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2014).  In a Canadian survey by Catalyst, a consumer research company, they found that 
18 to 24 year olds had the largest growth of “at home” usage on their smart phones across 
six common activities, such as getting directions, finding restaurants, etc. (Catalyst, 
2015).  Refer to Figure 6 for the details.   
 
Figure 6.  Growth in share of ‘at home’ users within respondents who use a smartphone as a primary 
device for activity.  Taken from “With Growth Comes Change: The Evolving Mobile Landscape in 2015”, 
2015. Catalyst. (http://catalyst.ca/2015-canadian-smartphone-market/) 
 
In Canada 73 percent of the population owns smartphones (Canadian Radio-
television and Telecommunications Commission [CRTC], 2016); with over 30 million 
wireless phone subscriptions throughout the country (Canadian Wireless 
Telecommunications Association [CWTA], 2017).  The Catalyst survey states, 
“Smartphones are no longer merely prevalent in Canada, but virtually ubiquitous” 
(Catalyst, 2015, “Mobile is growing – and fast,” para. 5).  In summary, a majority of the 
population has smartphones, and the younger generations are clearly excelling in their 
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use – to obtain news, to stay in touch, to check the weather, and to communicate to name 
a few.   
When referring to sources of information, an additional study by the Pew 
Research Center (2015b) comments that, much of the news obtained by Millennials 
comes from Facebook and Google News.  This study indicates that Millennials are almost 
opposite Baby Boomers, in that Baby Boomers obtain 39 percent of their political news 
from Facebook and 60 percent from local TV; whereas Millennials obtain 61 percent of 
their political news from Facebook and only 37 percent from local TV (Pew Research 
Center, 2015b).  Generation Xers fall into the middle with 51 percent getting political 
news on Facebook and 46 percent from local TV (Pew Research Center, 2015b).  
Millennials and Generation Xers are more inclined than other generations to actually 
follow news organizations on their respective social networking sites (Pew Research 
Center, 2015b).   
The other interesting fact about Millennials, and potentially Generation Z is their 
living arrangements.  According to the Pew Research Center, Millennials are more likely 
to live at home than earlier generations (Fry, 2017).  Their study indicates that 15 percent 
of 25 to 35 year olds (in 2016) were living in their parents’ or a parent’s home (Fry, 
2017).  The report suggests that success in the labor market (or lack thereof), the cost of 
living independently and the amount of debt one has, may all be influential in the 
propensity for Millennials to stay at home (Fry, 2017).   
Students in Disasters 
A 2005 journal article compares experiences from Hurricane Floyd between 
community members and university students.  It is one of the few studies where students 
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are considered as a separate entity in disaster research.  The authors found that, 
“…students occupy a unique position within university communities which buffers them 
from them effects of natural hazards” (Van Willigen, Edwards, Lormand, & Wilson, 
2005, p. 180).  In this research study, they found that students evacuated at higher rates 
than did other members of the community (Van Willigen et al., 2005).  The authors 
suggest that the high rate of evacuation of students could be as a result of them being able 
to evacuate to their parents’ homes; 71 percent stayed with their parents after evacuating 
(Van Willigen et al., 2005).  Conversely, of the community residents surveyed, 29 
percent stayed with parents, 31 percent with other relatives, and 22 percent with friends 
(Van Willigen et al., 2005).  Of the students, 2 percent stayed in hotels or motels and less 
than 1 percent stayed in community shelters; compared with the rest of the community 
where it was 14 percent and 4 percent respectively for hotels or motels and community 
shelters (Van Willigen et al., 2005).  This study also examined risk perception in terms of 
expectation of flood as a predictor of evacuation.  In the study, both populations, students 
and the rest of the community, had similar risk perceptions, “Community residents and 
off-campus students who perceived that their home was at risk of flooding evacuated in 
greater numbers than those who did not” (Van Willigen et al., 2005, p. 185). 
Conclusion of the Literature Review 
As noted, there has been a significant amount of research on evacuations, 
evacuation behaviour, warning systems, and risk perceptions.  Evacuation behaviour is 
largely focused on whether people evacuated or not.  There is some attention on where 
they went, who they went with, and other related information.  Risk perceptions are 
influenced by the information received (Fitzpatrick & Mileti, 1991); therefore, it is 
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important to have a good understanding of the sources of information and the messages 
being communicated that affect risk perception.  Fitzpatrick & Mileti (1991), state,  
When information is repeatedly and consistently delivered and when it enters into 
the public’s informal communication processes with one another, the message 
(e.g., evacuation warning) is provided its greatest opportunity to help an 
endangered public form a definition of the situation consistent with the risk it 
faces.  In this way, by assisting and guiding the definition of the situation, the 
actual behavioral outcome can also be greatly enhanced (p. 147). 
Dow and Cutter (1998) echo a similar sentiment stating, “In general, the stronger 
predictors of evacuation behavior are tied to personal risk perception” (p. 239). In the 
case of the Fort McMurray wildfire, the end result behaviour was evacuation, because, 
for the most part, everyone was forced to leave.  Regardless of that, people still had 
personal perceptions of the risks they faced and their potential personal impacts.  These 
perceptions were influenced by a variety of different factors, including, the source of the 
information, the environmental cues, social cues, etc.  It is worthwhile to look at these 
factors and draw a correlation between them and their perceptions of risk.  It is further 
interesting to examine the differences in these factors and their possible effects on risk 
perception between 18 to 24 year olds and older adults and between genders.  Studies, 
focusing on risk perceptions and evacuation behaviours in Canada are fairly limited; 
therefore, this study aimed at contributing to the knowledge base for practitioners and 
academics to draw upon.   	 	
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III – Methodology 	 This study was intended to survey adults about their experiences and risk 
perceptions during the evacuation from Fort McMurray during the wildfire in May of 
2016.  Ideally, important information about their risk perceptions and their expected 
personal impacts, while considering evacuation, will be beneficial for emergency 
managers.  Understanding the differences between young adults and older adults in terms 
of their expected personal impacts and their evacuation behaviours is of interest as well.  
Examining these same differences from a gender perspective was decided upon after the 
fact. 
Theoretical Framework 
 Protection motivation theory was first described by Ronald Rogers in 1975.  The 
theory proposes that a fear appeal initiates a cognitive appraisal process that mediates an 
attitude change (Rogers, 1975).  Rogers (1975) cites Atkinson’s conceptualization of 
achievement motivation, Edwards’ decision making theory, Lewin’s decision making and 
field theory, Tolman’s purposive behaviourism, and Rotter’s social learning theory as 
examples of prior theories with similar expectancy and value concepts to explain 
behaviour in a choice situation.  Rogers states, “For all of these researchers, the tendency 
to act in a particular fashion is said to be a function of the expectancy that the given act 
will be followed by some consequence and the value of the consequence” (Rogers, 1975, 
p. 96).  Rogers (1975) develops this more specifically relating fear with cognitive 
appraisal and attitude change or response.  The original model was developed to explain 
the effects of fear appeals on health attitudes and behaviours (Rogers, 1975).  Figure 7 
displays the original concept model, outlined by Rogers.  
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Figure 7. Schema of the Protection Motivation Theory. Adapted from “A Protection Theory of Fear 
Appeals and Attitude Change” by R. W. Rogers, 1975, Journal of Psychology, 91, p. 99. 
 
 Maddux and Rogers (1983) refined this model slightly to include self-efficacy as 
an additional cognitive mediating process.  Self-efficacy theory, as described by Maddux 
and Rogers (1983) includes, “outcome expectancy, the belief that a given behavior will or 
will not lead to a given outcome; and a self-efficacy expectancy, the person’s belief that 
he or she is or is not capable of performing the requisite behavior” (p. 470).   
In the early development of the model, like Roger’s first model, it was used 
primarily for health-related issues such as smoking cessation (Maddux & Rogers, 1983), 
breast cancer self-exams (Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987) and others (Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & 
Rogers, 2000).  As researchers continued to apply the model, it expanded to a wider 
variety of issues including injury prevention, politics, the environment, and the protection 
of others (Floyd et al., 2000).  Therefore, instead of just health related issues and threats, 
“the protection motivation concept involves any threat for which there is an effective 
recommended response that can be carried out by the individual” (Floyd et al., 2000, p. 
409).   
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The model outlined by Rogers and colleagues has similar elements to the model 
by Michael Lindell and Ronald Perry (2004; 2012), coined, The Protective Action 
Decision Model or PADM.  They summarize the research by stating:  
[S]ensory cues from the physical environment (especially sights and sounds) or 
socially transmitted information (e.g., disaster warnings) can each elicit a 
perception of threat that diverts the recipient’s attention from normal activities.  
Depending on the perceived characteristics of the threat, those at risk will either 
resume normal activities, seek additional information, pursue problem-focused 
actions to protect people and property, or engage in emotion-focused actions to 
reduce their immediate psychological distress. Which way an individual chooses 
to respond to the threat depends on evaluations of both the threat and the available 
protective actions (Lindell & Perry, 2004, p. 46). 
Disaster warnings and other hazard communications generally prompt people to 
reexamine their current situation and realize the potential threat that their environment 
poses.  The process of reexamining the situation will ideally lead to options for action and 
finally a decision on an appropriate response to the threat (Lindell & Perry, 2004).  
Figure 8 presents the protection action decision model as described by Lindell and Perry.  
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Figure 8. Information flow in the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM). Taken from “The Protective 
Action Decision Model: Theoretical Modifications and Additional Evidence” by M. K. Lindell & R. W. 
Perry, 2012, Risk Analysis, 32, p. 617. 
 
Tierney et al. (2001) confirms that, “Evacuation decisions are affected by 
observable cues in the environment, such as wind and rain…” (p. 92), or in the context of 
this study, fire and smoke, “…as well as by message and warning system characteristics” 
(p. 92).  The text continues suggesting, “Other influences include psychological, 
sociodemographic, and sociocultural characteristics and past experiences of the 
individuals and groups that receive disaster warning” (Tierney et al., 2001, p. 92).  The 
PADM as indicated above contains many of the elements or variables that Tierney et al. 
(2001) describe. 
Lindell and Perry’s PADM has been adapted for different studies depending on 
the type of event and whether the study was pre or post disaster.  While examining 
household evacuation decision making in response to Hurricane Ike, researchers modified 
the PADM model (Huang et al., 2012) to look like the following, in Figure 9.   
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Figure 9. Abbreviated form of the PADM applied to the Hurricane Ike evacuation study. Taken from 
“Household Evacuation Decision Making in Response to Hurricane Ike” by S.-K. Huang, M. K. Lindell, C. 
W. Prater, H.-C. Wu and L. Siebeneck, 2012. Natural Hazards Review, 13. p. 286. 
 
The researchers commented that in this case, their study required a modification 
of the PADM because the study was retrospective, or after the fact; therefore, some of the 
variables could not be reliably measured i.e. the pre-decision processes of exposure, 
attention and comprehension (Huang et al., 2012).  In this model, like the prior version of 
the model by Lindell and Perry (2012), the behavioural response, or evacuation, is the 
outcome.   
Conceptual Framework 
For the study at hand, the evacuation of Fort McMurray, a similar modified 
version of the protective action decision model is proposed; however, the model is 
shortened, only looking at the factors influencing the risk perceptions.  McLennan, 
Cowlishaw, Paton, Beatson, and Elliott (2014), in their investigations of theory of 
planned behaviour (TPB) and protection motivation theory (PMT), related to wildfires, 
surmise that utilizing a theoretical model to analyze social and behavior aspects of 
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communities during wildfire events, should be encouraged.  In the hurricane evacuation 
study by Huang et al. (2012) hurricane threat was divided into two categories: 
perceptions of the storm’s characteristics and the expected personal impacts.  This 
research project combined risk perceptions as a measurement of expected personal 
impacts.  The full protective action decision model, as outlined by Lindell and Perry 
(2012) leads to a behaviour. In the Fort McMurray study, almost all of the residents 
evacuated; thereby making the decision to evacuate (the behaviour), as a variable, 
immeasurable. What was being sought in this study was to understand some of the factors 
that affect risk perception and examine evacuation behaviours.  When considering the 
PADM this leads to a modified, shortened version, of the model, looking solely at the 
variables affecting risk perception.  Kuligowski (2011) states that, “…the PADM is based 
upon theories that link cues, cognitive processes, and subsequent protective action.  Much 
of that research seeks to establish links between the perception of risk and the 
performance of protective action” (Kuligowski, 2011, p. 59).  One group of researchers 
defined risk perception as, “…the subjective evaluation of the probability to be affected 
by an imminent undesirable event and the assessment of one’s own perceived 
vulnerability” (Kinateder, Kuligowski, Reneke, & Peacock, 2015, p. 11).  As risk 
identification and risk assessment are the first two steps in the PADM model (Lindell & 
Perry, 2012), it goes without saying that risk perception is an integral part of the PADM.  
As such, risk perception is inextricably linked to evacuation and evacuation behaviours.  
This study examined some of those risk perceptions in the Fort McMurray wildfire 
setting.  Refer to the conceptual study model in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10. Conceptual model of the proposed study using an adapted Protective Action Decision Model. 
Research Questions 
 The research questions that this study intended on answering were: 
1. What are the risk perceptions of adults during a wildfire? Are there differences 
between younger adults, 18-24 year olds, and older adults, 25 and older? Are the 
perceptions the same for males and females? 
2. How did young adults receive evacuation and disaster information? 
a. Were the sources from traditional sources of information i.e. the radio, 
newspaper, television, or from more modern sources, i.e. websites and 
social media.  If social media were used, which social media platform(s)? 
3. What were the evacuation behaviours of young adults versus other adults? 
a. At what point did they evacuate? 
b. Who did they evacuate with? 
c. By which means of transportation did they evacuate? 
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d. Where did they go? 
e. Where did they stay? 
Hypotheses 
 The hypotheses for this study intended to explore whether certain attributes 
impacted risk perceptions of wildfires.  
H1: Seeing the smoke and the fire positively related to the risk perceptions 
(Environmental Cues).   
H2: Observing what others were doing positively related to the risk perceptions (Social 
Cues). 
H3: Young adults aged 18-24 years relied primarily on social media for their information 
about the wildfire positively relating to their risk perceptions (Information Sources). 
H4: Young adults sought out confirming information from sources other than official 
sources which positively related to their risk perceptions (Channel Access and 
Preference). 
 The first hypothesis, environmental cues impacting risk perceptions, was 
attempting to confirm prior disaster research indicating similar results.  Kinateder et al. 
(2015), albeit a study on evacuation from building fires, suggests that fire cues that are 
closer, unexpected, and more intense, lead to higher perceived risk. Other research in a 
variety of disaster situations has indicated similar risk perception findings (Dash & 
Gladwin, 2007; Drabek, 2013; Huang, 2014; Lindell & Perry, 1993; Van Willigen et al., 
2005), i.e. seeing the hazard approaching, experiencing the flood waters rising, etc. 
increase perceptions of risk.   
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 The second hypothesis, suggested that observing others evacuating and businesses 
closing would be positive indicators of risk perception.  Baker (1991) commented that 
this may not be an indicator of risk perception, and that people may choose to evacuate 
for other reasons, aside from the neighbours leaving.  Other studies; however, have 
indicated that social cues are correlated with perception of storm characteristics (Huang 
et al., 2012).  This hypothesis tested whether witnessing others evacuating and businesses 
closing impacted risk perceptions.   
 The next hypothesis, was about whether social media played a primary role for 
young people to obtain information about the wildfire.  Given the research about the 
younger generations and their extensive social media use (Catalyst, 2015; Pew Research 
Center, 2014; Taylor & Keeter, 2010), it appeared to be a logical hypothesis that social 
media tools would be a primary source of information for young people in Fort 
McMurray.   
 The last hypothesis carried over a little from the previous hypothesis, in that the 
assertion was that young people did not necessarily rely on traditional or official sources 
of information related to disasters, but rather, relied on information from other sources of 
information, such as the internet, friends, social media, etc. This is consistent with the 
Pew Research Center’s indication, that younger generations rely on the internet and 
social media for news (Pew Research Center, 2017a; Pew Research Center, 2015b; 
Taylor & Keeter, 2010).  The question was whether this held true when seeking 
information about disasters.  
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Data Collection 
 This study was conducted using convenience sampling of students and staff 
attending and working at Keyano College in Fort McMurray.  Although, there are clear 
issues with convenience sampling, i.e. bias and lack of representativeness (Gravetter & 
Forzano, 2014), the study aimed at soliciting feedback from a broad spectrum of the 
students, staff and faculty at the college.  The college graciously agreed to assist in the 
research by promoting survey participation in their classrooms, on bulletin boards, and 
through email.  They also provided access to physically visit the college to directly 
encourage participation of the college population at their main campus.  The opportunity 
to participate in the survey was available to all of the students and staff.   
 The survey was internet based, utilizing a website provider, specific to the 
purpose, Survey Monkey (www.surveymonkey.com).  The website allowed the 
researcher to formulate his own questions and format.  The survey was then made 
available, at a specified, and customized internet address for participants.  The surveyor 
had access, through a special log on, to view and download the results.  The internet 
address for this survey was: www.surveymonkey.com/r/FortMacEvac. The survey can be 
viewed in Appendix B.   
 The researcher and an assistant travelled to Fort McMurray April 4, 2017 and set 
up a table at Keyano College to invite students and staff to participate in the survey.  The 
research team had two Android tablets available for participants to fill out the survey.  If 
the individual was not able to fill out the survey at the time, they were provided with a 
business card with the web address of the survey printed on it, for them to participate at a 
later time.  The research team had a large poster on the table to attract attention to the 
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survey.  Participants were offered an incentive to take the survey - an opportunity to win, 
via a raffle, a pair of wireless headphones, valued at $250.  Participation in the raffle was 
completely optional with the disclaimer that their contact information would not be used 
for any purpose, other than the raffle.  The survey and the raffle were set to close on June 
1, 2017.   
 The initial response, while at the college, was a little dismal.  It was very apparent 
that there were not as many students on campus as had been originally predicted.  Despite 
that fact, upon leaving, after three days at the college, the researcher had elicited 151 
responses to the survey.  The college’s marketing and media liaison was contacted, and 
she sent an email out to all staff and students of the college on April 18, encouraging 
them to take part in the survey (See Appendix C).  By the close of the survey, 299 people 
had participated.   
Ethical Considerations 
 The survey involved human subjects and therefore required approval from 
Jacksonville State University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB).  The application was 
completed and submitted on March 14, 2017.  No special populations were involved in 
the study, therefore, an exemption was requested.  Part of this process required the 
investigator to complete “Investigator Responsibilities & Informed Consent” training, 
through the Human Subject Assurance Training at the Office for Human Research 
Protections (OHRP) website.  IRB approval was granted March 15 (See Appendix D).   
 As the study was being conducted at Keyano College, they too required an ethics 
review prior to allowing the survey on their campus.  The application to the Keyano 
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College Research Ethics Board was submitted on March 20, and approved shortly 
thereafter (see Appendix E). 
 People have been known to suffer from psychological effects after wildfires 
(McDermott, Lee, Judd, & Gibbon, 2005; Townshend et al., 2015); therefore, it was 
important to include a commentary in the survey about the various psychological helps 
available to participants if they felt they required them.  This information was mentioned 
at both the beginning of the survey and at the conclusion.  
The Survey and Measurement 
 Each participant was asked to fill out the online survey comprised of 23 core 
questions.  The questions queried about participant’s information sources, risk 
perceptions, evacuation influences, evacuation behaviours, and demographics.  The very 
first question addressed whether the participant was living in Fort McMurray or the 
surrounding area at the time of the wildfires in May 2016 (yes or no answer). If the 
respondent was not living in the area, they were directed to a, “Thanks for Participating!” 
page and that was the end of questions for that individual.   
Information Sources 
 The next question offered a variety of different information sources (local 
authorities, local news media, national television news media, internet website sources, 
social media sources, and peers), with examples of each, and requested participants to 
score, on a scale of 1 to 5, how much they relied on each source for information about the 
wildfire and/or evacuation.  A score of one (1) constituted, “Did not rely on”; and a score 
of five (5) was, “Greatly relied on”.  In many cases throughout the survey, a comment 
		 61 
field, addressed as “Other” was made available for participants to indicate their own 
answer to the question.   
Social Media 
 The participants were asked to rank social media platforms that they were using in 
May of 2016 from “most used” (number 1) to “least used” (number 6).  The social media 
platforms offered in the question were:  Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, 
Snapchat, and other.   
Risk Perceptions and Thoughts on Evacuation 
Determining the respondent’s perceptions of the risks associated with the wildfire 
and their thoughts about evacuating were goals of the study.  As a result, the next five 
questions (questions four through eight) focused on these two matters.  Four of the 
questions asked the participants to rate their expected personal impacts, on a scale of one 
(1) to five (5), of the threat characteristics listed, where one (1) was “extremely unlikely” 
and five (5) was “extremely likely”.  The expected personal impacts were: damage or 
destruction of their home; personal harm or death to self, family or friends; impact on 
services such as electricity, water, etc.; and the ability to work and/or attend classes.  The 
threat characteristics were: the wildfire itself, the smoke, the potential toxic emissions, 
the after effect of potential flooding and the after effect of potential landslides.  The next 
question explored the impetus or the impediments to evacuation, asking participants to 
rate, on a scale of one (1) to five (5) whether a series of items were a consideration while 
they were contemplating evacuation.  “Not at all considered” was scored as one (1); “It 
was a huge consideration” was scored as five (5) on the scale.  The items included: seeing 
the wildfire approach; seeing or smelling smoke; wind direction changes; nearby 
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combustibles; local businesses closing; friends, relatives, etc. evacuating; hearing local 
authorities issue official evacuation orders; previous personal experience with wildfires; 
concerns about protecting home from fire; concern about evacuation expenses; concern 
about where to stay; other concerns such as pets, medical conditions, etc.; concern about 
getting stranded on the highway; and the possibility of rain slowing down or putting the 
fire out.   
Evacuation 
 The next series of questions asked specific information about the participant’s 
evacuation.  They focused on: what day they evacuated, what approximate time they 
evacuated, who they evacuated with, their mode of transportation, where they stayed 
once they evacuated, and what community they evacuated to.  The first question in this 
series inquired whether the participant evacuated or not using a “yes” or “no” response.  
Next was an inquiry as to what day the participant left their home.  The wildfire started 
on Sunday May 1, 2016, with the first evacuation order given at 10:00 p.m. that day 
(KPMG, 2017).  A mandatory evacuation order, for the entire region, was issued on 
Tuesday, May 3 (KPMG, 2017).  The options for this question were, “before May 1” to 
“After May 5”, with every date in between. The last option for this question was, “I did 
not leave”.   Question 11 queried what time of day the participant left, starting with 
“middle of the night (midnight to 3:00 a.m.)” to “late evening / night (9:00 p.m. to 
midnight)”, with all of the options, in 3 hour increments, between those times.  A 
question about who they evacuated with was asked; options included: immediate family, 
other relatives, friends / neighbours / room mates, by yourself, and other.  Mode of 
transportation was the next question, which encompassed: personal vehicle, someone 
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else’s personal vehicle, municipal transit bus, Greyhound or other similar commercial 
bus, train, plane or other.  Question 14 inquired where the participant stayed after their 
evacuation: with friends; with relatives; in a hotel or motel; at an evacuation shelter; or 
other.  This was followed with a final question in this section concerning which city or 
location they evacuated to.  Options for this question were: stayed within the Fort 
McMurray area; north to an industry camp; Edmonton; Red Deer; Calgary; and other.  
Demographics 
 The last pertinent questions in the survey were demographics.  The participant’s 
gender, age, occupational/student status, marital status, living arrangements, and type of 
dwelling were all polled.  Gender was “male” or “female”.  Age was divided up into “17 
or younger”, “25 or older”, with individual ages, “18”, “19”, etc. in between.  The 
occupational or student status question allowed participants to select multiple answers. 
The selections were: working full time; working part time; full time student; part time 
student; and unemployed.  Marital status had the usual options: single; married; common 
law; separated / divorced; and other.  Question 20 inquired about living arrangements.  
The options were: living with spouse/common law partner; living with parents; living 
with relatives; living with friends/roommates; living by yourself; and other.  The final 
demographic question inquired about type of dwelling lived in.  Choices for this question 
were: a house/townhouse; an apartment/condo building; an apartment/suite in a house; a 
college residence; or other.   
Qualitative Questions 
The survey was predominantly intended to be a quantitative study exploring the 
stated hypotheses and the descriptive statistics noted.  That being said, the opportunity 
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was present to solicit some further feedback, in the form of a few qualitative questions, 
about the participants’ involvement with the Fort McMurray wildfire of 2016.  Therefore, 
the final two questions of the survey asked for a positive outcome as a result of their 
experience, and any other comments that people wished to share concerning their 
evacuation or wildfire experiences.  Comment boxes with unlimited text were provided 
for these last two questions.   
Method of Analysis 
 All of the results of the survey were imported into an SPSS database.  The data 
was cleaned, labeled and categorized in preparation for the statistical analysis.   
The primary dependent variables were risk perceptions of the smoke, the fire, and 
the after effects, measured predominantly through expected personal impacts of those 
variables.  The independent variables were the variables associated with information 
sources, the variables related to thoughts on evacuation, and demographics.   
Multiple Response Sets 
 In order to perform analysis on some of the results of the questions, where the 
answers allowed the participant to select multiple answers, the responses needed to be 
consolidated in SPSS to a multiple response set.  As an example, question 12, asked, 
“Who did you evacuate with (select multiple answers if necessary)?”; the answers: 
Immediate family; Other relatives; Friends / neighbours / room mates; By yourself; and 
Other (please specify), were each coded as separate variables in SPSS.  When the data 
was imported “Immediate family” was scored as a 1; “Other relatives” was scored as a 2, 
etc.  Each of these was considered as a separate variable in SPSS and had its own 
column.  Many respondents selected one or more of the provided variables.  The ones 
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they did not select were left blank, presumably because the answers were not applicable 
to their situation.  The blank responses were considered missing statistics for each 
variable.  The question may have been answered, so the blanks were not truly 
representative of a “missing answer”, only that that particular response wasn’t selected.  
Keeping in mind, that all of the responses that were answered, i.e. scored a 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., 
were recorded in their own variable (column).  All of the answers, for each separate 
variable were converted in SPSS, using the “Recode into same variable” function to a 1.  
All of the blank responses were converted to 0.  As an example, if a participant had 
selected, “Other Family” for Question 12, the affirmative answers indicated a 1 whereas, 
if they didn’t evacuate with “Other Family” it indicated a 0 in that column.   
Any of the questions where there was an “Other (please specify)” had to be 
treated differently as well.  Like above, the “Other (please specify)” was in its own 
column.  For these variables, a new variable was created to input a strictly numerical 
response.  Aligning the columns, “Other (please specify)” with the new numerical 
response column, the researcher manually entered a “1” in the new column alongside any 
of the comments in the “Other (please specify)” column.  Therefore, anywhere a 
respondent had entered data into the “Other (please specify)” column, a corresponding 
“1” was alongside in the adjacent new column that was created.  Blank cells in the new 
column aligned with blank cells in the “Other (please specify)” column. These blanks, in 
the new column, were converted to zeros, consistent with the handling of the other 
variables for the question.  The end result is either a 1 for an answer that was checked (or 
had a comment), or a 0 for an answer that wasn’t checked for each of the answers to the 
question, including the newly created “Other (please specify)” column.  The regular 
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variables for the question (i.e. “Immediate family”, “Other relatives”, etc.) and the new 
“Other” variable that was created were then grouped together into a multiple response set, 
using the “Define multiple response set…” in SPSS.  To put the data into a multiple 
response set SPSS requires a value to be counted; hence the requirement to have either a 
0 or a 1 in all of the cells for each variable.  The counted variable, 1, in this case, 
represents an answer that was selected by a respondent.   
 The questions and their associated answers that were grouped into individual 
multiple response sets were:  
Q12. “Who did you evacuate with?” 
Q14. “Where did you stay once you evacuated?” 
Q15. “Where did you evacuate to?”   
Q18. “What was your occupational / student status at the time of the wildfire? 
Question 17 inquired about the age of the respondent at the time of the wildfire.  
There were nine different responses: 17 or younger; 18; 19; 20; 21; 22; 23; 24; and, 25 or 
older, they were coded 1 through 9.  For simplification, and to focus on a specific age 
grouping, it was decided to amalgamate this question into three responses: 17 or younger; 
18 to 24; and 25 or older.  The values were coded 1 through 3, where 1 was “17 or 
younger”, 2 was “18 to 24”, and 3 was “25 or older”.  
Handling of Missing Variables 
There were 299 responses in the Fort McMurray evacuation survey.  Some of the 
respondents did not fully participate. Some were total nonresponse, also referred to as 
unit nonresponse, and some were item nonresponse.  Total nonresponse occurs when 
none of the survey responses are available due to refusals, inability to participate and 
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other untraced elements (Kalton & Kasprzyk, 1986).  Item nonresponse occurs when 
some but not all of the responses are available often due to item refusals, “don’t knows”, 
and omissions (Kalton & Kasprzyk, 1986).  In the Fort McMurray survey, there were 20 
participants, or 6.69 percent, who answered only the first question, “Were you living in 
Fort McMurray or the surrounding area during the wildfire in May 2016?”, in the 
affirmative and then skipped to the end of the survey and filled out the contact 
information relating to winning the prize for participating in the survey. They did not 
answer any of the other questions in the survey.  These cases were treated as total 
nonresponse.  There were an additional 10 respondents, 3.34 percent, who answered “no” 
to the first question, they were not living in Fort McMurray or area at the time of the 
Wildfire.  These participants were not provided the opportunity to answer any additional 
survey questions. These cases were also treated as total nonresponse as they were 
ineligible to continue with the survey.  Unit or total nonresponse must be dropped from 
analysis (Garson, 2015); therefore, these 30 cases, or 10 percent of the responses, were 
removed from the survey results.  This left 269 cases for analysis, or 90 percent of the 
overall respondents.  
This study was predominantly focused on risk perceptions; therefore, the 
questions in the survey specifically related to risk perceptions and demographics were 
initially examined; the rest of the questions were dropped for the moment. For reference, 
the survey can be found in Appendix B.  The questions eliminated from the study, at this 
point, were questions: 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 22 and 23. Any portion of an answer that 
included a string variable (text) was also eliminated (i.e. “Other (please specify)”) or 
converted to a numerical value. Keeping in mind that several questions in the survey had 
		 68 
multiple parts, therefore, after the noted questions were removed, the dataset had 51 
variables remaining.   
Some of these remaining 269 participants had occasional item nonresponse.  The 
issue was whether the nonresponse items were missing completely at random (MCAR) or 
whether there was some systematic reasoning for the missing data.  To determine this, 
Little’s (1988) test was conducted using SPSS.  The test was done utilizing all of the 
remaining variables noted. 
After the missing variable analysis function was run in SPSS, the results, revealed 
a significance of 0.591 for Little’s MCAR test (X2(1,121) = 1,109.529, p = 0.591).  The 
test is not significant, as p is greater than 0.05.  Nonsignificant test results indicate that 
the missing variables are missing completely at random (Garson, 2015; Little, 1988). 
Garson (2015), recommends that in such circumstances listwise deletion of the cases with 
missing variables could be done, if the sample size is large enough not to cause bias, or 
Type II errors due to reducing the sample size.  Garson (2015) indicates that there is no 
accepted consensus on what defines a “larger sample” however, he states that if the 
missing data is less than 5 percent of the sample, it is common to drop the cases from 
analysis.  In this study of the 51 variables, only 8 variables had complete data.  Of the 
cases, or the individual survey respondents, there were 225 complete cases.  Looking at 
all of the values for all of the variables, there was only 1.115 percent missing data (see 
Figure 11 for further details concerning missing values). In this study, the sample size of 
269 cases is relatively small, and any further reduction of the sample size to 225 cases, 
through listwise deletion, could introduce bias. Therefore, in this situation, imputation 
was the preferred methodology of handling the missing data.   
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Figure 11. Overall summary of the missing values from the variables selected for data analysis from the 
Fort McMurray Evacuation Survey. Image produced using SPSS. 
 
There are many methods of imputation.  Both multiple imputation (MI) methods 
and expectation maximization (EM) methods were considered.  EM is a single imputation 
method and can be used under the following circumstances:  when less than 10 percent of 
the data is missing, when examining the means; and it can be used when less than 5 
percent of the data is missing, when examining the variance structures in the data 
(Scheffer, 2002).   
Expectation maximization is a valid method of data imputation, provided that the 
missing data are either missing at random or missing completely at random and the 
percentage of data missing is not too great, i.e. more than 5 percent (Scheffer, 2002). As 
noted above, the missing data in this study is much less than this; therefore, expectation 
maximization was utilized to fill in the data for the missing values.  In the process, a 
duplicate variable was created for each of the variables where data was to be replaced.  
The newly formed duplicate had the old values plus the missing values replaced, whereas 
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the old variable still had the occasional missing data.  A paired t test was done to compare 
the means, the standard deviations and the standard error means of each of the pairs of 
variables (with the missing and not with the missing).  Fifty-one pairs of variables were 
examined. The means, the standard deviations and the standard error means were the 
exact same within the paired groups. This indicates that the imputing of values did not 
change these statistics.   
The Dependent Variables 
 One of the primary focuses of the study was risk perceptions.  Several of the 
questions were seeking risk perception information from respondents in terms of the 
threats that the respondents believed certain attributes posed.  These are the dependent 
variables.  The specific attributes were: the wildfire itself; the smoke; the potential toxic 
emissions; the after effect of potential flooding; and the after effect of potential 
landslides.  The responses, ranging from “Extremely Unlikely” up to “Extremely Likely” 
(on a scale of 1 to 5), were sought for each of the attributes listed for Questions 4 through 
7.  The responses for Questions 4 through 7 were averaged for each attribute, into a new 
variable.  Ending up with a numerical value, on a scale of 1 to 5, for “The wildfire itself”, 
“The smoke”, “The potential toxic emissions”, etc.  (all based on answers from questions 
4 through 7).  This was done using the “compute variable” function in SPSS; where the 
average was taken for each row of the 269 participants for each attribute for each 
question noted.   
 Cronbach’s Alpha was checked on each of the sets of the variables to check for 
internal consistency between the sets.  The lowest value on the test was a = 0.797.  All of 
the others exceeded a = 0.8. This indicates a high degree of reliability (Gravetter & 
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Forzano, 2014) between the variables in each grouping.  See Table 3 for the specific 
values for each.   
Table 3 
Cronbach’s Alpha Test on 5 New Variables Variables Cronbach's	AlphaThe	Wildfire 0.824The	Smoke 0.797The	Toxic	Emissions 0.843The	Potential	Flooding 0.866The	Potential	Landslides 0.899  
 A factor analysis, through SPSS, was done to examine each of these of these five 
variables (The Wildfire, The Smoke, The Toxic Emissions, The Potential Flooding, and 
The Potential Landslides) against each other.  It was determined that the correlation 
between the smoke and the toxic emissions was sufficient (Pearson r = 0.646) enough to 
group the two variables together into one variable.  Likewise, flooding and landslides 
were similarly correlated (Pearson r = 0.845) indicating that they also could be combined 
together into one variable.  Using the same method described above for combining 
variables in SPSS, the smoke and toxic emissions were combined, as were the flooding 
and the landslide variables.  This reduces the five dependent variables down to three. 
They are: the fire; the smoke (which includes the toxic emissions); and the after effects 
(including both flooding and landslides).  See Table 4 for the correlation analysis.  
Cronbach’s Alpha was checked again, for internal consistency between the variables in 
each of the groups that were combined.  As expected, the reliability was high, a = 0.939 
for “the smoke” variables, and a = 0.930 for “the after effects” variables. 
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Table 4 
Factor Analysis – Correlation of Dependent Variables Correlation	Matrix Variable Wildfire	Itself Smoke Toxic	Emissions Flooding LandslidesCorrelation Wildfire	Itself 1.000 0.646 0.466 0.226 0.214Smoke 0.646 1.000 0.697 0.335 0.305Toxic	Emissions 0.466 0.697 1.000 0.465 0.422Flooding 0.226 0.335 0.465 1.000 0.845Landslides 0.214 0.305 0.422 0.845 1.000
 
The Independent Variables 
Using a similar methodology to the above, some of the other variables were 
grouped to form new independent variables.  Question 8 had a number of sections to it.  
The first four elements all had to do with environmental cues: seeing the wildfire 
approaching; seeing or smelling smoke; feeling a change in the wind intensity or 
direction; and seeing combustibles nearby (i.e. gas, propane, brush, etc.).  These were all 
combined into one variable, “environmental cues”.  Another two variables, “Seeing local 
businesses closing” and “seeing friends, relatives, neighbours and coworkers evacuating” 
were combined into one variable titled, “social cues”.  Still in Question 8, there were a 
number of variables about evacuation concerns: concern about evacuation expenses; 
concern about where to stay; concern about other special considerations (pets, medical 
needs, etc.); and concern about getting stranded on the highway.  These were all 
combined into a variable titled, “evacuation concerns”.  Cronbach’s Alpha was run for 
each of the newly created variables resulting in internal consistency (environmental cues 
a = 0.844; social cues a = 0.877; and evacuation concerns a = 0.891). 
 When considering risk perceptions and demographics, the independent variables 
related to demographics were also slightly adjusted for ease of analysis.  Question 16, 
gender, was left as it was with “Male” = 1 and “Female” = 2.  Question 17, age, was 
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modified from 9 groups to 3 groups; group 1 (coded as 1) was “17 or younger”; group 2 
(coded as 2) was “18 to 24”; and group 3 (coded as 3) was “25 or older”.   
As an afterthought, group 1, “17 or younger” was eliminated from the data 
analysis, 23 cases, as much of the study was attempting to draw comparisons between 
younger adults and older adults.  The 17 or younger category was not included for that 
reason.  This left the sample size, without the 17 or younger participants, at n = 246.   
Question 19, marital status, was modified to “Married” = 1, and “Not Married” = 
0.  The same modification was done with question 20, living arrangements, “Living by 
self” = 1, “Living with Others” = 0.   
 Preparing the data was a necessary evil of conducting statistical analysis.  Once 
fine-tuned it could be analyzed.   
Data Analysis 
 As mentioned earlier, three key dependent variables for analysis of risk perception 
are, “The Fire”, “The Smoke”, and “The After Effects”.  These variables were looked at 
alongside each other without the influence of the independent variables.  Wilk’s Lambda 
test results in l = 0.034, a significant result.  A significant result indicates that the 
dependent variables are not equal therefore we can examine them individually against the 
independent variables.  
 Next paired t tests were conducted to compare the difference between each of the 
three dependent variables.  The paired t tests indicated that each of the pairs was 
statistically significant at the 0.001 level, indicating that they were each different (See 
Table 5). 
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Table 5 
Paired t Tests with Dependent Variables 
Mean Std.	Deviation t df Sig.The	WildfireThe	SmokeThe	WildfireThe	After	EffectsThe	SmokeThe	After	Effects
268 .000
25.203 268 .000
Pair	1
Pair	2
Pair	3
0.46138 0.75161
0.79717 0.51878
10.068 268 .000
1.25855 0.84151 24.5269
 A number of new datasets were created.  The first, as mentioned earlier, excluded 
participants who had selected “17 or younger”.  Another dataset was created that was 
only participants who identified as being “18 to 24 years” of age.  The next dataset 
created was for participants who identified as “25 and older”.  Two additional datasets 
were created, one for males and one for females.  
 An intercorrelation matrix was constructed between all the variables, for the 
different datasets.  As well, a regression analysis was run for each of the three dependent 
variables, with the other variables as independent variables.  A number of frequency 
distribution analyses were conducted and, when deemed necessary, independent t tests 
were examined.  For some of the nominal data, Chi Square tests of independence were 
conducted when analyzing against other variables.  The results of these different analyses 
are discussed in the next chapter.  		 	
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IV - Results 	 This chapter presents the results of the study about the evacuation of Fort 
McMurray during the 2016 wildfire.  The subjects in the study were predominantly 
students and staff from Keyano College in Fort McMurray.  They were surveyed in an 
effort to gain a greater understanding of their risk perceptions in relation to the fire and 
their specific evacuation behaviours.  The research questions, the hypotheses and the 
descriptive statistics attempted to gain some broad knowledge applicable to both younger 
and older adults, but also specific differences between the two groups and between 
genders.  The results of the different analyzes are documented in the following 
paragraphs. 
 As a reminder, the hypotheses dealing with risk perceptions utilized the dependent 
variables: the wildfire, the smoke (which comprised the smoke and the toxic emissions), 
and the after effects (which were flooding and landslides).  These variables were derived 
from a number of questions in the survey that queried participants’ thoughts on the 
likelihood of an impact as a result of the mentioned variables.  Their answers were 
measured on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 was “extremely unlikely” and 5 was “extremely 
likely”.  
A regression analysis was run to determine which of the independent variables 
were predictors of risk perception.  The results of Table 6 are for all of the cases with the 
exception of participants who indicated they were 17 years old or less as of May 2016. 	 	
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Table 6 
Regression Analysis – Risk Perception and Independent Variables (Section 1) 
Entire	Sample
FIRE Smoke After	Effects
All	Variables All	Variables All	Variables
Gender B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.220 0.104 -0.026
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.114 0.114 0.105
Exp(B) 0.125 0.058 -0.015
Significance 0.054 0.362 0.805
Age B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.014 0.048 -0.030
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.141 0.142 0.130
Exp(B) 0.009 0.029 -0.019
Significance 0.921 0.735 0.817
Full	Time	Student B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.025 0.050 0.111
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.133 0.134 0.123
Exp(B) 0.015 0.029 0.067
Significance 0.849 0.708 0.367
Work	Full	Time B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.128 0.050 0.078
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.129 0.129 0.118
Exp(B) 0.078 0.029 0.049
Significance 0.320 0.701 0.511
Married B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.007 0.057 0.110
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.140 0.140 0.129
Exp(B) 0.004 0.030 0.061
Significance 0.958 0.684 0.392
Living	with	Parents B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) -0.042 0.053 0.027
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.145 0.146 0.134
Exp(B) -0.025 0.030 0.016
Significance 0.770 0.717 0.842
Living	in	a	House/Townhouse B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.293 -0.061 -0.069
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.118 0.119 0.109
Exp(B) 0.165 -0.034 -0.040
Significance 0.014 0.608 0.526
Social	Cues B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.066 0.076 0.085
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.057 0.057 0.053
Exp(B) 0.085 0.096 0.112
Significance 0.249 0.186 0.109
Environmental	Cues B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.191 0.230 0.189
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.063 0.063 0.058
Exp(B) 0.227 0.266 0.231
Significance 0.003 0.000 0.001
Note.	 Highlighted	yellow	is	significant	at	p	<	.05 			 	
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Table 6 Continued 
Regression Analysis – Risk Perception and Independent Variables (Section 2)	
Entire	Sample
FIRE Smoke After	Effects
All	Variables All	Variables All	Variables
Prior	Experience B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.005 -0.058 0.022
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.038 0.038 0.035
Exp(B) 0.009 -0.103 0.040
Significance 0.896 0.131 0.540
Evac	Impediments B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) -0.033 0.049 0.110
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.046 0.046 0.042
Exp(B) -0.052 0.075 0.178
Significance 0.467 0.287 0.009
Local	Authorities B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) -0.002 -0.028 0.018
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.043 0.043 0.039
Exp(B) -0.003 -0.042 0.028
Significance 0.967 0.514 0.656
Local	News	Media B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) -0.018 -0.003 0.013
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.045 0.045 0.041
Exp(B) -0.028 -0.004 0.021
Significance 0.683 0.949 0.752
National	Television	News B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) -0.071 -0.001 0.017
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.042 0.042 0.039
Exp(B) -0.122 -0.001 0.030
Significance 0.091 0.989 0.657
Internet	Web	Sources B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.018 0.007 -0.027
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.049 0.049 0.045
Exp(B) 0.027 0.009 -0.041
Significance 0.716 0.895 0.556
Social	Media	Sources B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.087 0.127 0.104
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.044 0.044 0.040
Exp(B) 0.136 0.192 0.167
Significance 0.048 0.004 0.011
Peers,	friends,	relatives,	etc.	 B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.000 0.034 -0.017
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.053 0.053 0.049
Exp(B) 0.001 0.042 -0.022
Significance 0.993 0.523 0.732
Note.	 Highlighted	yellow	is	significant	at	p	<	.05	
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis stated that observing the smoke and fire positively related to 
the risk perceptions.  Observing the smoke and the fire was an environmental cue.  As 
noted earlier, feeling a change in the wind intensity or direction and seeing combustibles 
nearby were two variables that were included in the “environmental cues” variable.  The 
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standardized regression coefficient for environmental cues was small, for each of the 
listed perceived risks (Wildfire b = 0.063, Smoke b = 0.063, and the After Effects b = 
0.058); however, all were statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  
A paired t test between the individual environmental cues, seeing the fire 
(question 8.1) and seeing or smelling the smoke (question 8.2) and the perceived risks 
was also conducted, see Table 7. 
Table 7 
Paired t Tests - Environmental Cues and Perceived Risk 
Mean n Std.	Dev. t df SignificanceSeeing	the	wildfire	approaching 4.550 0.9710Wildfire	Risk 4.187 0.8223Seeing	the	wildfire	approaching 4.550 0.9710The	Smoke	Risk 3.690 0.8427Seeing	the	wildfire	approaching 4.550 0.9710The	After	Effects	Risk 2.898 0.7968Seeing	or	smelling	smoke 4.110 1.2260Wildfire	Risk 4.187 0.8223Seeing	or	smelling	smoke 4.110 1.2260The	Smoke	Risk 3.690 0.8427Seeing	or	smelling	smoke 4.110 1.2260The	After	Effects	Risk 2.898 0.7968
246246246246246
5.477 0.00011.329 0.00021.976 0.000
245245245245
Pair	6
-0.863 0.3894.831 0.00014.151 0.000245245246
Pair	1Pair	2Pair	3Pair	4Pair	5
 The results indicated that with the exception of pair 4, seeing or smelling smoke 
and perceived wildfire risk, the environmental cues are related to perceptions of risk and 
were statistically significant at the .001 level.  
 This finding was further confirmed in an examination of the intercorrelations 
among the variables (See Table 8).  Environmental cues were correlated with risk 
perceptions and the findings indicated a weak but direct relationship (Wildfire Pearson r 
= 0.233, Smoke Pearson r = 0.318, and After Effects Pearson r = 0.364), all at the 0.01 
significance level.   
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Table 8 
Intercorrelations Among Variables	
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	 Given the statistical tests conducted, it can be surmised that the environmental 
cues are predictors of risk perceptions.  Therefore, for the purposes of this study, 
hypothesis 1 will be considered upheld.   
Hypothesis 2 
 The second hypothesis asserted that observing what others were doing positively 
relates to the risk perceptions.  In this case, the question inquired about whether seeing 
local businesses closing and seeing friends, relatives, neighbours and coworkers 
evacuating were considerations in the participants’ decision process for their own 
evacuation.  The question was ranked on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 was “not at all 
considered” and 5 was “it was a huge consideration”.  As noted earlier, these two 
variables were combined to form a new variable called, “Social Cues”.  Looking at all of 
the participants, the average ranking was 3.93 (m = 3.93, sd = 1.057, n = 246).  This 
indicates that the social cues were certainly a consideration for the majority of the 
participants when considering their own evacuation requirements.  That being said, it 
doesn’t explicitly imply that social cues are positively correlated to their risk perceptions.   
When social cues were controlled into the regression model (Table 6), social cues 
did not indicate that they were predictors of perceived risk.  The standardized regression 
coefficient for social cues is small, for each of the listed perceived risks and not 
statistically significant (Wildfire b = 0.057, Smoke b = 0.057, and the After Effects b = 
0.053). 
 Table 8, the intercorrelation table, indicates that social cues are directly, albeit 
weakly, correlated to the perceived risks for the three dependent variables (Wildfire 
Pearson r = 0.167, Smoke Pearson r = 0.247, and After Effects Pearson r = 0.305), all at 
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the 0.01 significance level.  The disparate answers between the tests are perhaps due to 
some collinearity between the variables when introduced into the regression model.  To 
further flesh this out, the social cues variable was separated back into the two original 
variables (seeing businesses closing and seeing friends, relatives, etc. evacuating) and a 
series of paired t tests were conducted (See Table 9).  
Table 9 
Paired t Tests - Social Cues and Perceived Risk 
Mean n Std.	Dev. t df SignificanceSeeing	Local	Businesses	Closing 3.510 1.4110
Wildfire	Risk 4.187 0.8223
Seeing	Local	Businesses	Closing 3.510 1.4110
The	Smoke	Risk 3.690 0.8427
Seeing	Local	Businesses	Closing 3.510 1.4110
The	After	Effects	Risk 2.898 0.7968Seeing	Friends,	Relatives,	Neighbours,	and	Coworkers	Evacuating 4.370 1.0000Wildfire	Risk 4.187 0.8223Seeing	Friends,	Relatives,	Neighbours,	and	Coworkers	Evacuating 4.370 1.0000The	Smoke	Risk 3.690 0.8427Seeing	Friends,	Relatives,	Neighbours,	and	Coworkers	Evacuating 4.370 1.0000The	After	Effects	Risk 2.898 0.7968
-7.03 0.000
11.329 0.048
21.976 0.000
245
245
245
-0.863 0.022
4.831 0.000
14.151 0.000
245
245
245246
Pair	1
Pair	2
Pair	3
Pair	4
Pair	5
Pair	6
246
246
246
246
246
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The results of the t tests were significant at the 0.05 or less level; however, given 
the weakness of correlation (Table 8) and the indeterminate results with the regression 
analysis (Table 6); further research would have to be done before hypothesis 2 could be 
upheld.   
Hypothesis 3 
 The third hypothesis states that young adults, aged 18 to 24 years, relied primarily 
on social media for their information about the wildfire and that this positively related to 
their risk perceptions.   
Question 2 in the survey purposely inquired about information sources, stating, 
“Please rate how much you relied on the following information sources for information 
about the wildfire and/or evacuation during the wildfire?” The scale was from 1 to 5, 
where 1 was “Did not rely on” and 5 was “Greatly relied on”.  In a comparison of the 
results between 18 to 24 year olds and adults 25 and older, it was apparent that their use 
of information sources is very similar, see Figure 12. 
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 Figure 12. Information sources used for wildfire information by age group.    
 For young adults, 18 to 24 years of age, they relied almost equally between local 
news media (m = 4.21, sd = 1.146, n = 119) and social media (m = 4.20, sd = 4.20, n = 
119).  Adults 25 years of age and older, like their younger counterparts, also relied the 
most on local media (m = 4.14, sd = 1.342, n = 127), but to a slightly lesser extent than 
the 18 to 24 year olds.  The next most prevalent source of information for 25 and older 
was internet web sources with a mean of 4.08 (sd = 1.152, n = 127).   
 Looking at the percentage values, for “greatly relied on (5)”, per age group, for 
the information sources, revealed slightly different results, see Figure 13.  The 18 to 24 
year old age group relied primarily on social media; whereas, the results for the older 
adults indicated they relied primarily on local news sources.  Of the younger adults, 60 
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percent said they greatly relied on social media as an information source compared to 49 
percent for the older group. 
 
Figure 13. Comparison by age group of information sources “greatly relied on” for wildfire and evacuation 
information during the Fort McMurray wildfire in 2016. 
 
A regression analysis, similar to the regression analysis in Table 6, was also run 
for the 18 to 24 year old age group, see Table 10 for the results.  The standardized 
regression coefficient for social media sources against the perceived risk for fire (b = 
0.072), smoke (b = 0.073) and the after effects (b = 0.065) were all quite small.  The only 
one with statistical significance was social media sources and smoke, significant at the 
0.05 level.   
 In light of the results noted above, it would be difficult to assert that hypothesis 3 
was upheld.  It was clear, from the information presented that younger adults, 18 to 24 
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years of age, utilize social media as one of their primary sources of disaster information; 
however, whether this related positively to their risk perceptions was not apparent.   
Table 10 
Regression Analysis – Risk Perception and Independent Variables, 18 to 24 Year Olds 
(Section 1) 
FIRE Smoke After	Effects
Gender B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.061 -0.138 -0.331
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.187 0.189 0.168
Exp(B) 0.032 -0.074 -0.189
Significance 0.745 0.466 0.052
Age B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient)
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient)
Exp(B)
Significance
Full	Time	Student B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.006 0.029 0.160
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.178 0.180 0.161
Exp(B) 0.004 0.017 0.103
Significance 0.974 0.873 0.323
Work	Full	Time B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.204 0.079 0.147
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.198 0.200 0.178
Exp(B) 0.108 0.042 0.084
Significance 0.305 0.695 0.412
Married B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.167 0.484 1.066
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.442 0.446 0.398
Exp(B) 0.036 0.106 0.247
Significance 0.707 0.280 0.009
Living	with	Parents B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) -0.073 0.173 0.089
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.178 0.179 0.160
Exp(B) -0.042 0.101 0.055
Significance 0.682 0.338 0.580
Living	in	a	House/Townhouse B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.446 0.012 -0.073
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.183 0.185 0.165
Exp(B) 0.239 0.006 -0.042
Significance 0.017 0.950 0.658
Social	Cues B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.052 0.135 0.177
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.089 0.090 0.080
Exp(B) 0.065 0.170 0.237
Significance 0.563 0.137 0.030
Environmental	Cues B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.227 0.071 0.038
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.096 0.097 0.086
Exp(B) 0.268 0.085 0.045
Significance 0.020 0.464 0.658
Note.	 Highlighted	yellow	is	significant	at	p	<	.05
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Table 10 Continued 
Regression Analysis – Risk Perception and Independent Variables, 18 to 24 Year Olds 
(Section 2) 
FIRE Smoke After	Effects
Prior	Experience B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) -0.032 -0.091 -0.035
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.057 0.058 0.052
Exp(B) -0.058 -0.167 -0.069
Significance 0.578 0.119 0.496
Evac	Impediments B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) -0.027 0.050 0.095
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.073 0.074 0.660
Exp(B) -0.041 0.076 0.154
Significance 0.707 0.500 0.150
Local	Authorities B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.026 0.006 0.096
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.067 0.068 0.061
Exp(B) 0.038 0.009 0.148
Significance 0.698 0.926 0.117
Local	News	Media B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) -0.045 -0.065 -0.035
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.075 0.076 0.068
Exp(B) -0.061 -0.090 -0.051
Significance 0.553 0.393 0.610
National	Television	News B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) -0.067 -0.010 0.051
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.064 0.064 0.057
Exp(B) -0.113 -0.018 0.092
Significance 0.296 0.874 0.380
Internet	Web	Sources B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.035 0.017 -0.051
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.073 0.073 0.065
Exp(B) 0.054 0.026 -0.084
Significance 0.627 0.817 0.434
Social	Media	Sources B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.090 0.152 0.097
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.072 0.073 0.065
Exp(B) 0.128 0.218 0.147
Significance 0.215 0.040 0.142
Peers,	friends,	relatives,	etc.	 B	(Logistic	Regression	Coefficient) 0.067 0.108 0.058
Standardized	Regression	Coefficient) 0.078 0.079 0.070
Exp(B) 0.083 0.134 0.077
Significance 0.391 0.176 0.411
Note.	 Highlighted	yellow	is	significant	at	p	<	.05
 
Hypothesis 4 
 The fourth hypothesis was linked with the third hypothesis, in that it was about 
information sources that young adults relied on.  A quick re-examination of Figure 13 
indicates that young adults relied on social media (60 percent), their peers (50 percent), 
and internet web sources (42 percent) more so than local authorities (35 percent) for 
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information about disasters and evacuation.  The interesting result is that 57 percent of 
young adults stated they greatly relied on local news media for their wildfire and 
evacuation information.  This was their second highest ranked source of information.   
 This hypothesis was focused on young people; however, the results for young 
people and older adults are very similar.  The young people, as noted in hypothesis 3 
utilized social media for their information more than their older counterparts; but the rest 
of the results were very similar.  In both groups, 35 percent of the participants stated they 
greatly relied on local authorities for information.  Local authorities were ranked fifth of 
the six options presented for either age group.  Peers, defined in the survey as friends, 
neighbours, relatives and coworkers, were greatly relied on by 50 percent of younger 
people compared to older adults who greatly relied on their peers 42 percent.   
 The results of an independent samples t test indicated that the differences in the 
means (see Table 11) for the information sources, by age group, are not statistically 
significantly different.  The largest difference in the means is within the social media 
variable, but the difference is only 0.27 (t = 1.65, df = 244).  The rest of the differences 
are smaller than that.   
Overall, the information sources relied on by younger adults and older adults were 
very similar.  There was not a lot of variability between what they rely on for 
information.  As a result, it would difficult to assert that there were differences between 
younger adults and older adults.  For the purposes of the hypothesis, it could be said that 
young people relied more on other sources, than local authorities, as local authorities was 
ranked, fifth out of six sources.  For older adults, local authorities were ranked last.  So, 
although part of the hypothesis was confirmed, it was also true for older adults, indicating 
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that it was not just applicable to the young adult sample.  Like the previous hypothesis, 
linking information sources to risk perceptions was not statistically significant, therefore, 
it cannot be stated that the information sources were predictors of risk perception.   
Table 11 
Independent t Tests - Information Source Variables by Age Group 
Variables Age	Group n mean std.	deviation mean	difference t df sig.18	to	24	Year	Olds 119 3.76 1.2125	and	Older 127 3.55 1.3218	to	24	Year	Olds 119 4.21 1.1525	and	Older 127 4.14 1.3418	to	24	Year	Olds 119 3.48 1.4225	and	Older 127 3.56 1.3918	to	24	Year	Olds 119 3.83 1.2825	and	Older 127 4.08 1.1518	to	24	Year	Olds 119 4.20 1.1925	and	Older 127 3.93 1.3518	to	24	Year	Olds 119 4.13 1.0325	and	Older 127 4.00 1.03
0.210.08-0.08-0.250.270.14 1.65 244 0.101.03 244 0.31
-0.43 244 0.67-1.62 244 0.11
1.32 244 0.190.47 244 0.64
Peers
Local	AuthoritiesLocal	News	MediaNational	TV	NewsInternet	Web	Social	Media
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Question 1 – Risk Perceptions 
 The first research question inquired about the risk perceptions of adults during a 
wildfire.  It further sought to specify whether there were differences between younger 
adults and older adults.  A number of the hypotheses dealt with risk perceptions and the 
differences between younger and older adults.  The findings revealed that they are very 
similar.  To explore this a little further, the original questions in the survey were 
reexamined.  Questions 4 through 7 ask about the likelihood of something happening as a 
result of, a number of different variables.  The participants were to answer on a scale of 1 
to 5, where 1 was, “extremely unlikely”, and 5 was, “extremely likely”.  The variables for 
each of the questions were the same: the wildfire itself; the smoke; the potential toxic 
emissions; the after effect of potential flooding; the after effect of potential landslides; 
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and other.  For the analysis, the smoke and toxic emissions were combined to form one 
variable as were the after effects of potential flooding and potential landslides.  This was 
done for each of the four questions.  The methodology was the same as was done when 
combining the other variables, as explained in the methodology section.  This combining 
of variables aligned with the combining of the dependent variables in the examination of 
the hypotheses.  Question 4 asks about the extent the threats posed to the damage and 
destruction of the participant’s home. Question 5 asked about the extent personal harm to 
self, friends, or family that would be likely from the threats.  Question 6 asked about the 
likelihood of loss of services such as electricity, water, and telephone.  Finally, question 7 
was concerned with loss of either work time or school time by participants as a result of 
the threats.   
 An independent t test was run to determine the differences in the means between 
younger adults and older adults in terms of the questions posed, see Table 12.  With the 
exception of two pairs, the differences in the means between the age groups were not 
significantly different.  The two pairs, where the means could arguably be different, were 
question 4, the after effects, the difference is 0.37 (t = 2.578, df = 240); and question 7, 
the after effects again, the difference is 0.43 (t = 2.497, df = 240).  In both of these cases 
the younger adults indicated a higher average likelihood of harm to their home, or 
missing school or work, as a result of potential landslides and potential flooding.   
 The table indicated some other interesting findings.  The after effects, potential 
landslides and potential flooding all ranked, on average, less than 2.7 for all of the 
questions.  This suggested that participants, on average, regardless of age, viewed the 
extent of harm or damage, of these after effects, as somewhat unlikely.   
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 The smoke, in all of the situations, for all of the age groups, ranked between 3 and 
4.  This suggested that people viewed the smoke, and the toxic emissions (because they 
were included in that variable), as a threat that was somewhat likely but not extremely 
likely to cause damage or harm.   
Table 12 
Independent t Tests – Risk Perceptions and Age 
The	Likelihood The	Risk Age	Group n mean std.	deviation mean	difference t df sig.18	to	24	Year	Olds 118 4.03 1.1325	and	Older 125 3.91 1.2418	to	24	Year	Olds 119 3.88 0.8925	and	Older 126 4.02 0.9118	to	24	Year	Olds 119 2.43 1.1125	and	Older 123 2.06 1.1318	to	24	Year	Olds 119 3.70 1.3725	and	Older 125 3.73 1.3618	to	24	Year	Olds 119 3.46 1.1925	and	Older 125 3.58 1.2418	to	24	Year	Olds 119 1.94 1.1425	and	Older 124 1.92 1.1918	to	24	Year	Olds 119 4.34 1.1025	and	Older 125 4.57 0.9218	to	24	Year	Olds 119 3.47 1.2225	and	Older 124 3.12 1.2918	to	24	Year	Olds 119 2.49 1.3325	and	Older 123 2.45 1.3418	to	24	Year	Olds 119 4.61 0.8825	and	Older 124 4.57 0.9618	to	24	Year	Olds 119 3.90 1.1825	and	Older 125 3.96 1.2018	to	24	Year	Olds 119 2.69 1.4025	and	Older 123 2.26 1.27
Note. 	The	yellow	highlighted	mean	differences	are	significant	at	the	0.05	level.
0.12 0.800 241 0.425
The	Smoke -0.14 -1.234 243 0.218
0.37 2.578 240 0.011
The	Wildfire -0.03 -0.174 242 0.862
-0.11 -0.731 242 0.466
The	After	Effects 0.01 0.091 241 0.928
Damage	or	Destruction	to	Home(Q.	4)
Personal	Harm	to	Self,	Friends,	or	Family(Q.	5)
Impact	to	Services	(electricity,	water,	telephone,	etc.)(Q.	6)
The	Wildfire
The	Smoke
The	After	Effects
The	Smoke
The	After	Effects
The	Wildfire
Impact	to	Ability	to	Work	and/or	Attend	Classes(Q.	7)
The	Wildfire
The	Smoke
The	After	Effects
-0.22
0.04
-0.06
242 0.860
0.26 1.617 241 0.107
-1.725
240 0.814
0.03 0.274 241 0.784
0.235
242 0.690
0.43 2.497 240 0.013
-0.399
 The wildfire ranked, between 3.70 and 4.57 in all circumstances, which indicated 
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that people were a little more concerned of the threat of the fire itself, than the other 
variables.  Looking at this in terms of percentage of respondents who selected, 
“Extremely Likely”, or 5, on the scale of 1 to 5, demonstrated the similarities between the 
two age groups, see Figure 14, Figure 15, and Figure 16.  The charts depict the likelihood 
of the impact of the fire, the smoke, and the after effects by age group.  
 
Figure 14. Respondents who selected “Extremely Likely” for the threat of wildfire impacting them 
personally by age group. 
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Figure 15. Respondents who selected “Extremely Likely” for the threat of smoke impacting them 
personally by age group 
 
 
Figure 16. Respondents who selected “Extremely Likely” for the threat of the after effects impacting them 
personally by age group 
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As noted previously, the fire itself was clearly perceived to be the greatest threat, 
based on the percentage of respondents who thought the impacts related to the fire were 
extremely likely.  The smoke caused moderate concern, whereas the after effects were 
not perceived, by most to be an extremely likely threat.  
 The research question also sought to learn whether the risk perceptions, as 
discussed above, were the same for males and females.  Looking at the same three charts, 
but comparing males and females, one can see again, that they are very similar between 
the groups (see Figures 17, 18, 19).  Females tended to select “extremely likely” in a 
slightly higher proportion than men for the fire and smoke variables, but not for the most 
part, in a statistically significant way.  The mean difference, on the scale of 1 to 5, is less 
than 0.5 in all circumstances (n = 163 to 165 for females; n = 80 for males).   
 
Figure 17. Respondents who selected “Extremely Likely” for the threat of wildfire impacting them 
personally by gender. 
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Figure 18. Respondents who selected “Extremely Likely” for the threat of smoke impacting them 
personally by gender. 
 
 
Figure 19. Respondents who selected “Extremely Likely” for the threat of the after effects impacting them 
personally by gender. 
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Similar to the charts comparing age, it was evident that the after effects were not 
considered an extremely likely threat by the majority of males and females.  It was 
interesting though, that unlike fire and smoke, where the majority of females considered 
those variables to be of greater concern than males; in the case of the after effects, more 
males considered the after effects extremely likely than females.   
 For this research question, it appeared that the differences in risk perceptions 
between younger adults and older adults and between males and females are minimal.   
Question 2 – Information Sources 
 This research question sought to determine how young adults received evacuation 
and disaster information.  Much of the data analysis for this was covered with hypotheses 
three and four.  The outcome, specifically for young adults, indicated that 60 percent of 
young adults “greatly relied on” social media as their source of disaster related 
information (see Figure 20).  Local news media was “greatly relied on” by 57 percent of 
young adults, followed up with peers and internet web sources.   
		 96 
 
Figure 20. Information sources “greatly relied on” by 18 to 24 year olds. 
 The research question only intended to look at the information sources related to 
18 to 24 year olds; however, while conducting some exploratory research on this age 
group and gender differences, some intriguing results emerged.  Females, overall, 
selected “greatly relied on” more than males for the information sources (see Figure 21).  
The largest differences were with local news media, where 62 percent of females selected 
“greatly relied on” and 44 percent of males selected this; and with social media, where 65 
percent of females selected “greatly relied on” compared with 47 percent of males.  An 
independent t test was conducted, revealing that the differences in the means between 
males and females were statistically significant at the 0.05 level, for the “local news 
media” (t = -2.08, df = 50) and “social media” (t = -2.03, df = 51) variables (see Table 
13).   
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Figure 21. Information sources “greatly relied on” by 18 to 24 year olds, gender comparison. 
 
Table 13 
Independent t Tests - Information Sources, 18 to 24 Year Olds and Gender 
18-24	year	olds	only!Variables Age	Group n mean std.	deviation mean	difference t df sig.Males 34 3.71 1.14Females 85 3.79 1.24Males 34 3.84 1.33Females 85 4.36 1.03Males 34 3.26 1.38Females 85 3.56 1.44Males 34 3.65 1.37Females 85 3.91 1.25Males 34 3.82 1.36Females 85 4.35 1.09Males 34 3.85 1.13Females 85 4.25 0.98
Note.	 The	yellow	highlighted	mean	differences	are	significant	at	the	0.05	level.
Social	Media -0.53 -2.03 51 0.05Peers -0.39 -1.90 117 0.06
National	TV	News -0.30 -1.04 117 0.30Internet	Web	 -0.26 -1.00 117 0.32
0.74Local	News	Media -0.53 -2.08 50 0.04
Local	Authorities -0.08 -0.34 117
 For the remaining variables (local authorities, national TV news, the internet, and 
peers) the mean differences between males and females were not statistically significant 
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and therefore can be assumed to be similar, despite any discrepancies indicated by the 
responses.   
 As noted, social media played a large role informing people about disaster and 
evacuation information.  Part of the research question sought to learn the preferred social 
media platforms that people used. In Question 3 of the survey, participants were asked to 
rank their social media platforms from most used to least used.  Facebook, by far, was the 
most prevalent amongst younger adults (69 percent) and older adults (72 percent) alike, 
see Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22. Social media, by platform, selected as “most used” comparison between 18 to 24 year olds and 
25 and older. 
 
Twitter was the next most favoured social media platform amongst both groups.  
Snapchat had a 9 percent usage amongst the younger age group; whereas, the older age 
group had no respondents select it as their “most used” platform.   
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The results were similar again, between males and females.  Figure 23 breaks 
down social media use by age group and by gender.  Women, in both groups were more 
inclined to use Facebook; 72 percent for females in the 18 to 24 year old category and 77 
percent for females in the 25 and older category.  Twitter, in the younger age group was 
used more by males (15 percent), compared to females (10 percent); but, in the older age 
group it was reversed, males (8 percent), females (15 percent).  Snapchat, was preferred 
equally by men and women between the ages of 18 to 24 years of age.   
 
Figure 23. Social media, by platform, selected as “most used” comparison between 18 to 24 year olds and 
25 and older and by gender. 
 
Question 3 – Evacuation Behaviours 
 A number of the questions in the survey were aimed at obtaining some evacuation 
information from the participants.  As a research question, learning about their evacuation 
behaviours seemed appropriate.  Queries such as: at one point in time people evacuated; 
who they evacuated with; where they went; and where they stayed, were covered.  
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Date and Time of Evacuation. 
 The Fort McMurray wildfire started on May 1, 2016.  An evacuation order, for 
one neighbourhood, was issued that evening (RMWB, 2016a).  On May 3, due to the size 
and continued growth of the wildfire, an evacuation order was issued for the entire 
municipality (KPMG, 2017).  Questions 10 and 11 of the survey asked participants the 
date and the time of day that they evacuated.  Tables 14 and 15 depict the responses.   
Table 14 
The Date that Participants Evacuated Q	.	10 AllDate	(Q.	10) Frequency PercentBefore	May	1 5 2%May	1 7 3%May	2 12 5%May	3 195 82%May	4 13 5%May	5 2 1%After	May	5 2 1%Did	not	leave 1 0%Total 237 100%  
Table 15 
The Time of Day that Participants Evacuated Q.	11 AllTime	of	Day	(Q.	11) Frequency PercentMiddle	of	the	night 2 1%Pretty	early	in	the	morning 4 2%First	thing	in	the	morning 5 2%Late	morning 5 2%Early	afternoon 72 30%Late	afternoon	/	Early	evening 97 41%Evening 39 16%Late	evening 14 6%Total 238 100%  
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The majority of the participants, 82 percent, evacuated on May 3, the day the 
mandatory evacuation order was pronounced.  Seven percent of the people evacuated 
afterwards.  The time of day results revealed that most people, 87 percent, evacuated 
between noon and 9:00 p.m.   
As noted, the majority of people evacuated on the 3.  Looking at the comparison 
between young adults, 18 to 24 years old, and older adults, 25 years or older, revealed no 
differences in this, see Table 16.  The difference between those who evacuated prior to 
May 3 compared to those afterwards, between the age groups is minimal.   
Table 16 
Date of Evacuation – Age Group Comparison 
Before	May	3 9% 11%May	3 83% 82%After	May	3 9% 6%
18	to	24	Years	Old 25	and	OlderDate
 
It was interesting to note the differences with gender and date of evacuation, see 
Table 17.  The majority of people, male and female, evacuated on May 3; however, more 
females (11 percent more) evacuated on May 3, the day of the evacuation order, than 
males.  It would appear, as a result, that less females than males evacuated after May 3.  
A Chi-Square test of independence was done on the two variables, gender and date of 
evacuation.  The relationship between the two was statistically significant at the 0.05 
level (c2 = 17.374, df = 7), indicating that they are not independent of each other.  
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Table 17 
Date of Evacuation – Gender Comparison 
Before	May	3 11% 10%May	3 75% 86%After	May	3 14% 4%
Date Male Female
 
 As noted, most people evacuated between noon and 9:00 p.m.  As far as the time 
of day of evacuation, between age groups (see Table 18), the relationship was not 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level (c2 = 8.952, df = 7), therefore the age groups and 
the time of day of evacuation were independent of each other.  When time of day of 
evacuation was examined in relationship to gender (see Table 19), the results were 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level (c2 = 14.135, df = 7), therefore, the results were 
related.  It was apparent that females evacuated earlier in the day than males, with only 7 
percent of females evacuating after 9:00 p.m.   
Table 18 
The Time of Day that Participants Evacuated, by Age Group 
Before	noon 5% 4%Noon	to	9:00	p.m.	 88% 88%Late	Evening	/	Night 9% 8%
Time 18	to	24	Years	Old 25	and	Older
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Table 19 
The Time of Day that Participants Evacuated, by Gender 
Before	noon 4% 4%Noon	to	9:00	p.m.	 85% 89%Late	Evening	/	Night 12% 7%
Time Male	 Female
 
Who People Evacuated With. 
The next question, related to evacuation behaviours, was who people evacuated 
with.  Question 12 of the survey, allowed respondents to select from several options: 
immediate family; other relatives; friends / neighbours / roommates; by yourself; and 
other.  The respondents could select more than one response.  The results indicated 
minimal variation in the responses between 18 to 24 year olds and older adults and then 
between males and females (See Table 20).  The majority of participants, in all 
circumstances greater than 50 percent, evacuated with their immediate family.  The next 
most frequent, in all of the groups, was evacuating with friends, neighbours, and 
roommates, at 20 to 23 percent in all groups.  The younger age group had a few less 
participants evacuate by themselves at 6 percent compared to the older age group at 9 
percent; however, the results were not statistically significant at the 0.05 level (c2 = 
2.540, df = 1).  The only other significant appearing difference (statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level) was between males and females in their response to “other” (c2 = 6.022, df 
= 1).  Females selected “other” at a much higher frequency than males, 10 percent versus 
3 percent, respectively.  An informal review of the responses that females included in the 
“other” variable could all be summarized either by answers in other variables, i.e. with 
family or with friends, or by the following three most commonly noted answers, “With 
		 104 
pets”, “With coworkers”, and “With colleagues”.  The male responses, in the “other” 
variable (there were only three), were, “With pets”, “With coworkers”, and “With an 
individual who had no other means of evacuation (was an employee of my father’s)”.  
Therefore, although the differences for the “other” variable between males and females 
was statistically significant, it was not practically different.   
Table 20 
Who did Participants Evacuate With – Comparison by Age and by Gender 
Q.	12Who	did	you	evacuate	with? Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency PercentImmediate	family 91 53% 84 52% 53 56% 122 51%Other	relatives 21 12% 12 7% 8 9% 25 10%Friends	/	neighbours	/	room	mates 38 22% 32 20% 22 23% 48 20%By	yourself 10 6% 19 12% 8 9% 21 9%Other		 11 6% 15 9% 3 3% 23 10%Total 171 100% 162 100% 94 100% 239 100%
25	and	Older(n 	=	125) All	Male(n 	=	77) All	Female(n 	=	161)18	to	24	Years	Old(n 	=	113)
 
Mode of Transportation. 
 Question 13 in the survey asked about mode of transportation.  The options were: 
personal vehicle; someone else’s personal vehicle; municipal transit bus; Greyhound (or 
similar commercial) bus; plane; and other.  The results (see Figure 24) indicated that 71 
percent of respondents evacuated in their own personal vehicle.  Twenty percent of 
respondents evacuated in someone else’s personal vehicle.  More people, evacuated by 
plane (6 participants) than by municipal transit bus (3 people).   
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Figure 24. Mode of transportation for evacuation by all participants. 
 The differences between age groups for mode of transportation were not 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level (c2 = 4.778, df = 4), indicating that the age groups 
are independent of each other.  The differences were very minor. The most notable being 
that 68 percent of 18 to 24 year olds took their own personal vehicle, compared with 74 
percent for the 25 and older group; conversely, 23 percent of the 18 to 24 year old group 
travelled in someone else’s personal vehicle whereas, only 17 percent of the 25 and older 
group travelled in someone else’s vehicle.  The differences in gender and mode of 
transportation were almost nonexistent.  The percentage of males and females that 
evacuated in their own personal vehicle was the same, 71 percent.  Travelling in someone 
else’s personal vehicle yielded similar results between males (19 percent) and females 
(20 percent).  Some of the “other” comments were interesting and worth noting.  One 
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person evacuated in a school bus.  A number of people mentioned that they evacuated in 
their employer’s vehicles (“work truck”), another person stated they fled in a motor 
home.   
Where did they go? 
 The survey inquired where respondents evacuated to.  The options presented, 
were: stayed within the Fort McMurray area; north to an industry camp; Edmonton; Red 
Deer; Calgary; and other.  This was a multiple response field, because a number of 
people initially went to one location, and then ended up at another.  Figure 25 indicates 
that the majority of people (45 percent) evacuated to Edmonton, Alberta.  A small 
percentage (2 percent) stayed within the Fort McMurray area.  A large number of 
respondents (18 percent) fled north to an oil field camp.  
 
Figure 25. Locations where participants evacuated to. 
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Twenty-seven percent of the participants fled to other locations.  Some of the 
“other” responses were not clear; however, many of the respondents travelled a great 
distance in their evacuation.  One respondent stated that they went to India.  Ten 
respondents headed off to the Maritimes.  Several went to British Columbia.  Table 21 
indicates the locations, by province and territory where participants went.  The average 
distance travelled (excluding the person that went to India) is 443 miles.  Appendix F has 
further details of the locations and distances that people travelled. 
Table 21 
Locations, by Province and Territory, That Evacuees Went Provinces	&	Territories ParticipantsAlberta 225British	Columbia 9Ontario 3New	Brunswick 2Nova	Scotia 4Newfoundland 4North	West	Territories 1  
 The results comparatively by age group and by gender were not notably different.  
See tables 22 and 23 for details.  
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Table 22 
Locations Where Participants Travelled To – By Age Group 
Q.	15Where	did	you	go? Frequency Percent Frequency PercentStayed	within	the	Fort	McMurray	Area 3 2% 4 2%North	to	an	Industry	Camp 25 16% 33 20%Edmonton 73 48% 68 42%Red	Deer 0 0% 3 2%Calgary 11 7% 9 6%Other 41 27% 45 28%Total 153 100% 162 100%
25	and	Older(n 	=	125)18	to	24	Years	Old(n 	=	113)
 
Table 23 
Locations Where Participants Travelled To – By Gender 
Q.	15Where	did	you	go? Frequency Percent Frequency PercentStayed	within	the	Fort	McMurray	Area 1 1% 6 3%North	to	an	Industry	Camp 19 20% 39 18%Edmonton 51 54% 90 41%Red	Deer 2 2% 1 0%Calgary 8 8% 12 5%Other 14 15% 72 33%Total 95 100% 220 100%
All	Male(n 	=	77) All	Female(n 	=	161)
 
Where did they Stay? 
The final curiosity, in terms of evacuation behaviours, was where the evacuees 
stayed.  Question 14 asked that exact question.  This multiple response question had the 
following options: with friends; with relatives; in a hotel or a motel; at an evacuation 
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shelter; and other.  The majority of participants, 26 percent, stayed with relatives.  The 
next most frequently selected item was staying in a hotel or a motel, 22 percent.  
 
Figure 26. Where evacuees stayed by age group. 
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Figure 27. Where evacuees stayed by gender. 
 
Figures 26 and 27 depict the results as a comparison by age group and a 
comparison by gender.  It was interesting to observe that more young people, 16 percent, 
stayed at an evacuation shelter than older adults, 13 percent.  This result was not 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level (c = 1.444, df = 1).  More males, 28 percent, than 
females, 19 percent, stayed in a hotel or a motel.  This result was also not statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level (c = 1.584, df =1).  The only statistically significant result at 
the 0.05 level, from the two comparisons, was the “other” variable between males, 16 
percent, and females, 24 percent (c = 5.551, df = 1).   
 Overall, 21 percent, of the respondents selected “other” to describe where they 
stayed.  A review of their specific answers indicated a wide range of other options.  Many 
people stayed in a recreational vehicle, summer cottage, or other vacation properties.  
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Nine people indicated that they slept in their vehicles for a night or more.  Several 
respondents indicated that they stayed or were provided lodging by strangers who offered 
to help them out.  Some other participants stayed at the University of Calgary’s or Mount 
Royal University’s residence halls.   
A Review of the Demographics 
 One of the last groupings of questions in the survey were demographic in nature.  
Part of the focus of this research project was to examine differences between younger 
adults, 18 to 24 years of age and older adults, 25 and older.  The original intent was not 
necessarily to examine gender differences; however, the opportunity presented itself and 
it made sense to conduct some exploratory analysis on the differences between the 
genders, as has been noted in the research results above.  Full demographic details of the 
survey participants can be found in Appendix G. 
 There were 299 participants in the survey.  Of those, 20 participants skipped all of 
the questions with the exception of the first one.  Those individual cases were eliminated.  
Ten participants selected, “no” to the very first question, “Were you living in Fort 
McMurray or the surrounding area during the wildfire in May 2016?”  Those cases were 
eliminated as well.  Question 17 asked about the participants’ age on May 1, 2016.  
Anyone who selected “17 or younger” was also eliminated from the study.  The original 
thought was to leave them in; however, where much of the research was comparing 18 to 
24 year olds with 25 and older, it did not make sense to leave the 17 or younger people in 
the study.  There were 23 cases that were 17 or younger as of May 1, 2016.  The final 
number, after the case deletion was 246 participants.   
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 Of the 246 participants, 33 percent were male (81 participants) and 67 percent 
were female (165 participants).  In terms of age, 48 percent were between the ages of 18 
to 24 years (119 participants) and 52 percent (127 participants) were 25 years of age or 
older.  Figure 28 indicates the breakdown by age and gender of the participants.  As a 
note, the 18 to 24 year age range had a 42 percent difference between male and female 
respondents (34 males and 85 females), a much larger gap than the 25 and older age 
group.   
 
Figure 28. Respondents by gender and age group. 
 Question 18 was a multiple response set, meaning that participants could select 
more than one answer.  The question inquired about occupational and student status, 
providing the following options: working full time; working part time; full time student; 
part time student; and unemployed.  Of the survey group, 37 percent were employed full 
time and 29 percent identified as full time students, see Table 24 for the full results.  
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When comparing this to ages, there were more 18 to 24 year olds who were full time 
students (39 percent) than the 25 and over adults (18 percent); whereas, the older adults 
had a greater percentage of people working full time (57 percent) than their younger 
counterparts (20 percent).   
Table 24 
Occupational / Student Status of All Participants Q.	18	(Multiple	Response	Set)Occupational	/	Student	Status All	ParticipantsWorking	Full	Time 112 37%Working	Part	Time 52 17%Full	Time	Student 88 29%Part	Time	Student 24 8%Unemployed 25 8%Total 301 100%  
 As for marital status, the majority of participants, 55 percent, were single.  
Twenty eight percent of respondents identified as being married, see Figure 29.  Only 
four percent of the 18 to 24 year olds were married in contrast to 50 percent of the 25 and 
older adults.  Conversely, 81 percent of the younger adults were single and only 31 
percent of the older adults were single.   
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Figure 29.  Pie chart indicating marital status of the survey participants.   
 Question 20 dealt with living arrangements.  Sixty four percent of the 18 to 24 
year olds lived with their parent(s).  Only eight percent of the 25 and older group lived 
with theirs.  The contrast is 54 percent of the 25 and older age group lived with their 
spouse or common law partner; only 13 percent of the younger age group lived with 
theirs.   
 The final demographic question inquired about the type of housing a participant 
resided in.  Seventy percent of the respondents lived in a house or townhouse.  The next 
most prevalent type of housing was apartment or condo buildings (20 percent).  Only two 
percent of participants lived in a college residence.  See Figure 30 for further details. 
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Figure 30. Type of dwelling lived in by participants compared by age group. 
The demographics were numerous and can be examined in a number of different 
lights.  As mentioned, additional details can be found in Appendix G. 
The Qualitative Questions 
 Participants were given an opportunity in question 22 to state in a couple of words 
or less one positive outcome learned or gained from their wildfire experience.  Of the 
respondents, 226 took the time to write something.  Few responses were only a couple of 
words, many of them were quite lengthy.  Some of the key themes that stood out: be 
prepared, make sure your gas tank is full, leave when instructed to, resiliency, 
community, good people, and family is everything, to name a few.  Some of the more 
interesting ones: “Have anti-depressants to help control the crying”, “The zoo was free 
and so was [the] West Edmonton mall attractions!”, “If your gut feeling says to go – do it 
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– even if you leave from work without permission…” and “Don’t sleep thru it”.  One of 
the more thought provoking comments was, “The fact that stuff is stuff and if I didn’t 
think to pack something in my car when we thought we would lose our home, then it 
must not have been that important”.  Figure 31 is a “word cloud” created from the most 
common words used by participants in question 22.   
 Question 23 stated, “If you have any other comments that you would like to share, 
concerning your evacuation or wildfire experience in May of 2016, please do so here”.  
One hundred and one participants left comments.  One of the common themes that people 
commented on here was that the municipality should have initiated the evacuation 
sooner.  The other recurring comments were about support of the other municipalities, the 
province, and the country.  A couple of quotes, 
It was a traumatic experience that brought a lot of mental illnesses to the community 
of Fort McMurray.  Till this day, I still have PTSD and anxiety whenever I hear the 
sirens go off on the firetruck.  I feel that my attention is drawn into the sound, and 
I start to feel anxious on wondering what is happening.  I’m glad no one got hurt in 
Fort McMurray after they evacuated, however, this fire was a learning experience 
to always have gas in your warehouse, an emergency kit, and to become aware of 
hot temperatures that surround Fort McMurray.  We all came together as one, and 
that made us #fortmacstrong.  (Comments from a respondent, Question 22) 
 
The experience was heartwarming when it comes to the surrounding area willing 
to help us. Some even bought water and drove to the highway 63 to hand us water. 
Simple gestures like that was very heartwarming. It's been almost a year & I get 
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teary eyed just talking about it because I don't think I'll ever forget the avalanche of 
kindness we felt and received across the country. I never felt that kind of help in 
my life and it's very overwhelming that goes through my soul. Throughout the 
course of our stay in Edmonton, I can't stop thanking every individual who was 
willing to help us. God bless their beautiful heart. And if you're one of those people 
who helped us, THANK YOU a million times over. (Comments from a respondent, 
Question 22) 
  
All of the comments from question 22 and 23 can be found in Appendix H. 		 	
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Figure 31. Word cloud created from participants’ comments in question 22 of the survey.  The word cloud 
was created on the Word Art website, https://wordart.com 	 	
		 119 
V – Discussion 
 The Fort McMurray evacuation survey research project started out as a 
comparative examination of evacuation experiences between college age students at 
Keyano College and the faculty and staff of the college.  The premise was that younger 
adults receive information differently and have different experiences than older adults.  
Younger people, in many cases, do not own their home (Hou, 2010), they do not have 
partners (Statistics Canada, 2012), and do not have the same financial commitments that 
older adults have.  Where 24 percent of Canadian young people live outside of traditional 
family groups (Statistics Canada, 2012) it would appear logical that they may have 
different considerations than older adults in terms of their risk perceptions and evacuation 
behaviours.  Emergency managers need to be aware, if special considerations need to be 
managed to reach out and effectively communicate to the younger adult age group.  This 
project set out to find and document the differences between 18 to 24 year olds and 25 
and older adults during the Fort McMurray wildfire in May of 2016.   
 As the project unfolded, it became apparent that the opportunity was present to 
utilize the same analyses to compare differences between genders.  As a result, the 
project includes these findings as well.   
Hypotheses 
 The first hypothesis, as per the data, would appear to be upheld.  People who 
observe the environmental cues are more inclined to believe they are at risk (Drabek, 
2013; Lindell & Perry, 1993; Van Willigen et al., 2005).  In the case of the participants of 
the survey, seeing the fire and smoke impacted their perceptions of their personal risk.   
		 120 
 The second hypothesis aimed to prove that social cues enhanced risk perception.  
This concept has been discussed by researchers, attesting that indeed, seeing others 
prepare for evacuation, or conversely, not evacuating, affects risk perceptions (Auf der 
Heide, 1989; Huang et al., 2012).  Baker (1991), however, had different findings, and 
suggested that seeing others evacuating does not necessarily influence someone else’s 
evacuation decisions.  In the case of the Fort McMurray study, the participants, on 
average, indicated that social cues were more than just a “considered this”, but not, on 
average, “it was a huge consideration”.  On the scale of 1 to 5, the average was 3.93.  The 
regression analysis (Table 6) indicated that social cues were not statistically significant as 
predictors of risk.  The intercorrelation table (Table 8) indicated there was a direct, but 
weak correlation between social cues and perceived risk.  There could be a variety of 
reasons why this result appeared to be inconclusive.  Perhaps, where 82 percent of the 
respondents evacuated on May 3 and the majority indicated they left in the afternoon or 
early evening, the participants didn’t have the time to truly consider what others were 
doing.  As it was a mandatory evacuation order, maybe the social cues did not matter 
because everyone was leaving anyway.  Baker (1991) suggested that, because public 
officials have instructed people to leave, this could be sufficient enough reason for them 
to leave, regardless of what the neighbours are doing.  This could be an area for further 
research in relation to wildfires.  Social cues may matter more in situations where there is 
a longer evacuation notice and time to leave.   
 The third hypothesis was specifically about the use of social media sources used 
by 18 to 24 year olds and the related impact on risk perceptions.  It did turn out that 18 to 
24 year olds relied more on social media for their information than other sources; 
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however, it was unclear the relationship between their social media use and their risk 
perceptions.  For the most part, the findings were not statistically significant.   
This hypothesis is related to the next hypothesis, that postulated that young people 
confirmed their disaster and risk information from sources other than official sources and 
this related positively to their risk perceptions.  Local authorities were ranked fifth of the 
six options presented for sources of information.  Therefore, to some extent, the fourth 
hypothesis is upheld, in that young people relied more on other sources than the official 
sources.  As far as a comparator, this argument falls apart somewhat.  Older adults also 
ranked official sources as fifth out of six options for information.  The results between the 
two groups were very similar, with the greatest disparity between younger and older 
adults with the social media variable.  Younger adults selected “greatly relied on” for 
social media 60 percent; whereas older adults greatly relied on social media 49 percent.  
In light of research conducted by the Pew Research Centre (2017a; 2017b; 2014) and 
others (Catalyst, 2015; Insights West, 2016), it perhaps goes without saying that the 
younger population utilizes social media more so than older people, so it shouldn’t be 
surprising that they use social media more than older adults to obtain disaster and 
evacuation information.   
It was not possible to indicate that information sources are linked to risk 
perception.  As a result, it was impossible to compare younger adults and older adults in 
terms of what sources influenced their risk perceptions because none of the sources were 
statistically significant predictors of risk for either age group.  This could be a flaw in the 
survey design, in that if more specific questions were asked related to risk and the use of 
information sources, the results may have been examined differently.   
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Descriptive Statistics 
 The descriptive statistics were intended to glean additional information about risk 
perceptions and evacuation behaviours.  The statistics were predominantly focused on 
comparing young adults (18 to 24 years) with older adults (25 and older) and with 
comparisons between the genders.   
 The first question focused on risk perceptions.  Much of the data about risk 
perceptions had been previously analyzed while looking at the hypotheses; but the 
comparisons between the groups indicated little difference.  The age groups, both young 
and old, perceived the fire itself to be the greatest threat.  Males and females concurred.  
The females’ opinion of “extremely likely” was, for the most part, more frequent than 
males across all categories, but not statistically significant.  This finding appeared to be 
consistent with other research that suggested that females are a little less skeptical than 
males to heed a disaster warning and take adaptive action (Drabek, 2013).   
 The next question focused a little more in depth on information sources for 
disaster and evacuation information.  As commented on earlier, 60 percent of the young 
adults selected “greatly relied on” for social media as their source of disaster related 
information.  The surprise was the second most prevalent source of information for young 
adults – local news media (57 percent).  Given the research indicating how connected the 
younger generation is, the indication that 18 to 24 year olds relied on their local radio 
stations and newspapers for information seems to be inconsistent.  The older adults 
ranked local news media the highest, 62 percent, for their source of information.  This 
finding was a little reminiscent of the San Bernardino County study by Taylor and 
colleagues who reported on the small local radio station being the only information 
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source with up to date and accurate information (Taylor et al., 2007).  The findings were 
further interesting, when considering the Pew Research Centre (2015b) report that states, 
Millennials obtain 61 percent of their political news from Facebook and 37 percent from 
local TV.   
 The comparison between males and females was interesting as well.  Sixty five 
percent of females ranked social media “greatly relied on”, as their source of information 
compared to 47 percent of males.  When looking at social media platforms, more females 
(74 percent) used Facebook than males (63 percent).  The differences in Facebook use, 
could account for the differences between males and females for social media use for 
disaster and evacuation information.   
 The findings from this question are not consistent with recent findings by Liu, 
Fraustino and Jin (2016).  In a study they conducted in 2013, they found that people were 
more inclined to seek additional disaster information from television and speaking 
personally with people they know, rather than utilizing social media (Liu, Fraustino, & 
Jin, 2016).  Their report had a much larger sample size (n = 2,015) of participants in the 
United States, but was not broken down by age group or by gender.  Meanwhile, Veil, 
Buehner and Palenchar (2011), indicated that emergency managers must embrace and 
utilize social media, because it will be used regardless.  Therefore, it may be beneficial to 
conduct a larger survey in Canada to specifically identify the social media trends in terms 
of disaster communication.  
 The date and time of day that people evacuated were looked at with the next 
descriptive statistical question.  The findings indicated that most participants (82 percent) 
evacuated on May 3.  There were almost no differences between the age groups; the 
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younger adults and the older adults primarily evacuated on May 3.  The evacuation order, 
for the entire municipality, was issued on May 3rd by the Regional Municipality of Wood 
Buffalo (KPMG, 2017).  It makes sense, that most people evacuated that day.  More 
females evacuated on May 3 (86 percent) than males (75 percent).  This could be another 
confirmation that females tend to heed evacuation warnings and more readily adopt 
protective action than males (Drabek, 2013; Gladwin & Peacock, 2000).  After May 3, 14 
percent of males evacuated, where only 4 percent of females evacuated, presumably, 
because most had already left the day before.  The timeline of the notice no doubt had an 
influence on the hastiness with which people left.  Had the fire been slow moving, 
perhaps there would have been greater variation in the timeline for people to leave.   
 As for the time of evacuation, it was apparent that the majority of people left 
between noon and 9:00 p.m.  A slightly higher percentage of females (89 percent) 
evacuated during that time frame than males (85 percent), but it was still fairly consistent.  
There was no difference between the younger and older age groups as 88 percent of both 
groups evacuated between noon and 9:00 p.m.  Again, this was consistent with the date 
and timeline of the evacuation.  The first evacuation order was given in the evening on 
May 1 for one neighbourhood; it was reduced to “shelter in place” shortly afterwards the 
next day (KPMG, 2017).  May 3 at 2:34 p.m. was when the next mandatory evacuation 
order went out (KPMG, 2017).  By 6:49 p.m. an evacuation order was put out for the 
entire municipality (KPMG, 2017).  It may have been interesting to have participants 
select a specific time of evacuation rather than a range of times.  This would have 
provided a broader picture of evacuation behaviour when aligned with the actual 
evacuation order timeline.   
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 The Canadian census indicates that 63.3 percent of males, aged 20 to 24 were 
living with their parents in 2011; 55.2 percent of young women were living with their 
parents in 2011 (Statistics Canada, 2012).  The participants, aged 18 to 24 years, in the 
Fort McMurray Survey had more females (66 percent) living with their parents, than 
males (59 percent).  When compared with who evacuated with their immediate family, it 
was not surprising then, that more younger females evacuated with their family members 
than younger males (see Figure 32).   
 
Figure 32.  Young adults (18 to 24 years) living with parents, taken from the research survey results; 
compared with young adults (20 to 24 years) living with parents, taken from a Statistics Canada Report 
(2012, p. 3); compared with the results, from the survey, of 18 to 24 year olds who evacuated with their 
immediate family.   
 
 As noted in the results section, there were no statistically significant differences in 
who respondents evacuated with by age group.  The younger adults and the older adults 
had similar results, although the younger adults more frequently evacuated with 
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immediate family (53 percent for the young adults versus 52 percent for the older adults), 
other relatives (12 percent for the young adults versus 7 percent for the older adults) and 
friends, neighbours, and roommates (22 percent for the young adults versus 20 percent 
for the older adults); whereas the older adults were slightly more likely to evacuate by 
themselves (12 percent for the older adults versus 6 percent for the younger adults).  
These findings could be attributed to the fact that a larger percentage of young people 
were still living with their parents, and thus more inclined to evacuate with them.  A 
shortcoming of the survey, could be that the older adults (52 percent) who indicated that 
they evacuated with their immediate family, could be referring to a spouse and children; 
whereas, the younger adults (53 percent) may have been indicating they evacuated with 
their parents.  If the survey question specified “with parents”, the results could have been 
analyzed more specifically.   
 The next question discussed mode of transportation utilized by the evacuees.  
There were no statistically significant differences; however, a little less (68 percent) of 
the younger age group took their own personal vehicle compared with the older age 
group (74 percent).  This could potentially be attributed to the younger adults not owning 
their own vehicles; whereas, the older adults most likely have greater economic means 
and therefore own their own vehicles.  That, however, is only a supposition that further 
research could flesh out.   
 The text field, “other” for this question in the survey, allowed participants to state 
an alternative choice to the choices indicated.  A number of people wrote that they took 
their work vehicles.  This was interesting.  The Oil and Gas industry is the largest 
employer in the Fort McMurray region.  It makes sense that numerous employees drive 
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vehicles owned by their employer and would take them as they evacuate.  Many 
respondents, in the qualitative questions at the end of the survey made positive comments 
about oil and gas industry employers helping out in a significant way during the wildfire.  
It would be a worthwhile venture to understand the role of industry during the Fort 
McMurray wildfire.   
 Lastly one of the respondents indicated that he or she evacuated in their 
motorhome.  This was also a great option and could have perhaps been captured in the 
survey question.  A recreational vehicle would allow a person to pack much more than 
just what would fit in a personal vehicle.  It also would provide the person with a place to 
live when they arrived at a safe location.  This would have been a good statistic to 
examine.   
 Fort McMurray is a fairly isolated community in Northern Alberta.  The closest 
community to Fort McMurray, of any notable size (20,000 people or more), that the 
respondents evacuated to, is Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta, with a population of 24,569 
people (Government of Alberta, Municipal Services Branch, 2016).  Only 2 respondents 
travelled the 409 km (254 miles) to Fort Saskatchewan.  Edmonton, Alberta is just a little 
south west of Fort Saskatchewan, 434 km (270 miles) from Fort McMurray.  Edmonton 
is where the majority, 141 (45 percent) of the evacuees travelled to.  Of the respondents, 
71 percent stayed within the province of Alberta.  Much of the remainder travelled to 
other locations within Canada.  Many of the respondents indicated they went east to the 
Maritimes - Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and New Brunswick.  Fort McMurray’s oil and 
gas industry attracts workers from across the country, many of them from the east coast.  
This could explain the respondents who headed that direction.   
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 The differences between the age groups and between the genders for where 
people evacuated to are not largely different.  Less females went to Edmonton (41 
percent) compared to males (54 percent); however, more females selected “other” (33 
percent) than males (15 percent).  As noted earlier, the “other” variable was populated 
with a variety of answers and can be found detailed in Appendix F.   
 The last descriptive statistic question looked at was where people stayed.  As the 
results describe, again, there are very few differences between gender and between age 
groups for this question.  The majority of people (26 percent) stayed with relatives.  The 
Van Willigen et al. (2005) university study indicated that 29 percent of evacuees stayed 
with parents and 31 percent with relatives.  It would be interesting to have examined 
more closely where participants’ final destination was and where they stayed at that 
destination.  Although 45 percent of people evacuated to Edmonton, can it be inferred 
that almost half of those people, or more, had relatives in Edmonton?  Ideally, a better 
breakdown of “where” and “with whom” could be analyzed to further determine final 
destination.  The question allowed for multiple responses, so although some indicated 
they stayed in a hotel or motel or at an evacuation shelter, there was no indication of how 
long they stayed there.  It perhaps was only for a night or two.  Further clarification in the 
survey design could have elicited more useful information.   
Qualitative Questions 
 The qualitative questions (questions 22 and 23) provided an opportunity for 
participants to write a few comments about their experiences with the Fort McMurray 
wildfire.  Their responses weren’t intended to be the subject of intense scrutiny, as they 
were open ended inquiries with no specific stated purpose other than an opportunity to 
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share some thoughts.  These thoughts were interesting and in many regards telling.  It is 
clear that people were truly appreciative and overwhelmed with the support they received 
from other Albertans and other Canadians.  There were some negative comments about 
the lack of timely information and the mishandling of the evacuation by Fort McMurray 
officials.  The survey wasn’t designed to query what people thought about their 
evacuation experience or to rate their experience.  This would have provided an 
opportunity for first hand feedback about the shortcomings of the evacuation which could 
be utilized for future learning.  The KPMG (2017) report about the Fort McMurray 
wildfires identified evacuation as opportunity for improvement.  The report suggests that 
although the municipal plan addressed evacuation, the plan did not address a mass 
evacuation (KPMG, 2017).  Residents apparently received mixed messages concerning 
evacuation.  In the morning of May 3, a press conference was held where residents were 
urged to “get on with lives...but be prepared to act on short notice… evacuation is a long 
way off” (KPMG, 2017, p. 68); however, later on in the day a mandatory evacuation 
order was issued (KPMG, 2017).  It is perhaps some of these issues that people referred 
to in their comments for questions 22 and 23.   
Limitations 
 This research study had a number of limitations.  To start with, the survey 
intended to reach out to Keyano College’s students and faculty.  Initial research indicated 
that the college had approximately 3,000 full time students and 13,000 continuing 
education students (Alberta Chamber of Resources, n.d.).  Given the large population of 
the college, the researcher presumed that respondents would be plentiful.  An article in 
Fort McMurray’s local news prior to the fire stated that the local economy, due to the 
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downturn in the oil and gas sector, was impacting the college and that enrollment was 
down (Barry, 2016, February 16).  The Colleges and Institutes Canada web site puts 
enrollment at Keyano College at 781 full time students and 2,108 part time students 
(Colleges and Institutes Canada, 2017).  Despite several inquiries, the college has not 
confirmed their enrollment numbers for 2017.  Needless to say, the sample from the 
college, including staff and students was 299 participants.  As indicated previously, 
several of these individual cases were removed, for a variety of reasons, leaving the 
usable sample at 246 participants.  The small sample size is a limitation of the study.   
 Another, related limitation of the study is that the college itself is like a small 
community within Fort McMurray.  It is possible that with the community atmosphere of 
the college, that the respondents do not behave as other people within the broader Fort 
McMurray community.  This was commented on by Van Willigen et al. (2005) in their 
university study.  They stated, “Our results suggest that students occupy a unique position 
within university communities which buffers them from the effects of natural hazards” 
(p. 180).  The Van Willigen et al.  (2005) study was done at a much larger institution with 
a larger sample size, so there would no doubt be differences compared with a small 
college, such as Keyano College.  Regardless, the results of this research could not truly 
be related to the larger Fort McMurray population, rather, it is a sample of the college 
only.   
 Another limitation, as discussed earlier, is that the information source questions 
do not relate as well to the risk perception concepts.  If the study was designed a little 
differently, and more specific questions were asked about the information sources, i.e. 
“To what extent did you believe the information you heard from the radio or local 
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media?” or “When utilizing social media for disaster information who were you obtaining 
your information from? Friends, Local Government Facebook/Twitter Account, 
Provincial Government Facebook/Twitter Account, News Media Facebook/Twitter 
Account, etc.  As can be seen, despite the fact that social media was a prevalent source of 
disaster information the question was not detailed enough to learn whose social media 
account the information was being gleaned from.   
 A couple of other minor changes to the questions in the survey would have 
garnered more useful data for analysis.  More specific times for when people evacuated 
as opposed to broad ranges; then the times could have been linked with more detail to the 
evacuation notices.   
The question about evacuating with parents as well as evacuating with immediate 
family could have been clarified to eliminate some ambiguity with the analysis.  
Evacuating with your parents is different than evacuating with your family, i.e. spouse 
and children. 
Some clean up with the questions about where people went and with whom would 
also have provided some additional useful information, particularly if final destination 
was included as another variable.  Duration evacuated could also have been included in 
this section.  For example, when someone states they stayed in their car, did they stay in 
their car for the entire time or did they end up somewhere else.  How long did they stay at 
each venue?   
The question about age, specifically for the “25 and older” variable should have 
been broken up further.  The 25 and older age range includes Millennials, Generation X, 
and Baby Boomers.  The research indicates that Millennials and Generation Z, the 
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younger group, have very similar traits in terms of technology use (Pew Research Center, 
2014; Taylor & Keeter, 2010).  Not knowing the age breakdown of the “25 and older” 
age group participants is a limitation of the study.  Ideally, the categories should have 
been, 18 to 24 (Generation Z, with a slight overlap of the Millennials); 25 to 35 
(Millennials / Generation Y); 37 to 52 (Generation X); and 53 and older (Baby Boomers).   
In the demographic section, income would have been another variable worth 
including.  Prior research has indicated that income is linked to risk perceptions and 
evacuation intentions (Gladwin & Peacock, 2000; Hasan et al., 2011); therefore, this 
variable could have been used to enhance the analysis.   
 Finally, some questions related to the specifics of their evacuation experience, for 
example, “Rate the way you feel the local government/provincial government handled the 
disaster”.  Information, first hand from people who experienced the disaster, would surely 
help inform emergency officials to better plan and prepare for the next disaster.   
 As with any survey there needs to be a balance in the amount of questions and the 
value that each question brings to the study vis a vis the time the respondents have 
available and their desire to participate.  In this study, soliciting students and staff in the 
hallways of Keyano College, required a survey that took less than ten minutes to 
complete.  As a result, the quantity of questions was intentionally limited.  A different 
delivery model, or perhaps two surveys, a long and a short, could have perhaps gained 
greater data. 
		 133 
Opportunities for Additional Research 
 This research study had some limitations, which if resolved, could provide 
opportunity for additional research.  There are a few other areas for additional research 
that this study identified.   
 Social cues and duration of notice is one such opportunity.  As noted, the 
evacuation of Fort McMurray occurred very quickly.  One moment people were being 
told to, “be prepared to leave”, and the next moment they were being told to “leave” 
(KPMG, 2017).  Social cues, in this situation, may not have played a role, simply because 
everyone was scrambling to evacuate.  Research on timing and notice is common in 
hurricane studies (Gladwin & Peacock, 2000; Huang, 2014); however, Sorensen et al. 
(1987) identified a number of years ago that more research was required for fast moving 
events.  Further research, specific to wildfires in Canada, could be done to determine if 
length of time of notice changes risk perception related to social cues.   
 Males and females appear to use social media differently.  It would be interesting 
to conduct further research specific to social media use in Canada, during disasters.  A 
detailed study on Twitter feeds during Hurricane Sandy was done by Murthy and Gross 
(2017); a study along the same lines would be informative.  Taking it a step further, 
focusing on males and females, and the differences in their usage and messaging, if any, 
may provide insight about which social media platforms to use and the messages that 
should be disseminated in them.   
 Finally, the role of industry during the Fort McMurray wildfire was not covered in 
this study.  The oil and gas sector is the largest employer in the region of Fort McMurray.  
Their relationship and partnership with the community is significant.  Many of the 
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industry camps have their own fire departments and acted as first responders, fighting the 
blaze, alongside the provincial forest fire fighting teams, the Fort McMurray Fire 
Department, and the hundreds of other fire fighters who arrived.  The industry camps 
housed evacuees and used their own private planes, vehicles and buses to assist their 
employees, their employees’ families and others to evacuate.  Many of the respondents, 
in their answers to questions 22 and 23 made reference to the great job that the industry 
did and how the outcome may have been different had it not been for them.  As a result, 
this would be an interesting study.  Do similar isolated communities have the same types 
of partnerships with industry?  Do they share plans and resources for disasters?   
Conclusion 
 The study was first envisioned as a look at evacuation decision making of the 
residents of Fort McMurray.  This was pared down to a manageable, and accessible 
sample, at Keyano College.  It becomes next to impossible to conduct data analysis on 
evacuation decision, when all of the participants evacuated.  The mandatory evacuation 
order was not optional, and as a result, all of the respondents, with the exception of three, 
left.  Of the three, one of them commented that she was out of town at the time of the fire; 
leaving only two respondents (less than 1 percent of the sample) that did not evacuate.  In 
the end, studying evacuation decision, when there was no decision to be made, makes for 
a difficult study.   
 Shifting gears, the study sought to examine the risk perceptions as a precursor to 
evacuation decision making.  Comparing younger adults with older adults is not common 
as evidenced in the literature review.  Given the differences, socially, economically, and 
from a family perspective, between 18 to 24 year olds and 25 and older adults, it made 
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sense to examine differences with regards to their risk perceptions and evacuation 
behaviours.   
 As this study has revealed, there are not very many significant differences 
between the two age groups when looking at their risk perceptions and their evacuation 
behaviours.  As an additional component of the study, these same variables were looked 
at between genders.  The results, again, are generally the same.  There are not very many 
differences between the genders.  
 The most important finding is that young adults, in this study, relied on social 
media more than other sources of evacuation and disaster information.  Older adults 
ranked social media as the second most relied on source of information.  Given all of the 
other available sources of information, it was with interest to note that young adults 
greatly relied on local media as the next most relied upon source of information.  Older 
adults relied more on local media than social media.   
 The message to emergency managers is that these two mediums, social media and 
local media, are the most important information sources that both younger adults and 
older adults rely on for disaster and evacuation information.   
 Some of the other interesting findings were related to the evacuation behaviours.  
Again, there were not significant differences between the groups studied; however, 
recognizing the distances that people travelled to evacuate, the methods they took and the 
people they went with are all intriguing precursors to a good sociological study.  As for 
the hypotheses, few were proven, but the academic exercise of running the analyses was a 
worthwhile venture, if anything, to prove that there are few differences between groups, 
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in a small contained college setting, when it comes to risk perceptions and evacuation 
behaviours.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
#FortMacStrong	
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APPENDIX A – Census Information 
 
Table A1 
Population by Age and Gender in the Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo in 2015 
Age Female Male Total
0	to	4 2,759														 2,898														 5,657														
5	to	9 2,261														 2,425														 4,686														
10	to	14 1,790														 1,905														 3,695														
15	to	19 1,637														 1,902														 3,539														
20	to	24 2,323														 2,717														 5,040														
25	to	29 4,106														 4,719														 8,825														
30	to	34 4,222														 5,297														 9,519														
35	to	39 3,262														 4,188														 7,450														
40	to	44 2,660														 3,891														 6,551														
45	to	49 2,148														 2,969														 5,117														
50	to	54 2,363														 3,281														 5,644														
55	to	59 1,562														 2,300														 3,862														
60	to	64 816																	 1,262														 2,078														
65	to	69 372																	 522																	 894																	
70	to	74 187																	 194																	 381																	
75	and	over 173																	 141																	 314																	
Total 32,641												 40,611												 73,252												
Note.	All	data	is	taken	directly	from	the	RMWB	
Census	(RMWB,	2015,	p.	17). 		 	
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Table A2 
Population by Age Groups and Gender in the Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo in 
2015	
Age Female Male Total %	of	the	Total	Pop.
0	to	14 6,810														 7,228														 14,038												 19.16%
15	to	19 1,637														 1,902														 3,539														 4.83%
20	to	24 2,323														 2,717														 5,040														 6.88%
25	to	29 4,106														 4,719														 8,825														 12.05%
30	to	64 17,033												 23,188												 40,221												 54.91%
65	and	over 732																	 857																	 1,589														 2.17%
Total 857																	 40,611												 73,252												 100%
Note.	All	data	is	taken	directly	from	the	RMWB	Census	
(RMWB,	2015,	p.	17)	and	grouped	into	the	age	groups	shown. 	
Table A3 
Canada Census Data Population of Wood Buffalo in 2011 
Age Male Female Total %	of	the	Total	Pop.
0	to	4 2,705													 2,555														 5,260													 7.86%
5	to	9 1,985													 1,775													 3,760													 5.62%
10	to	14 1,845													 1,690													 3,535														 5.28%
15	to	19 2,105													 1,920													 4,025														
15	years 385																 375																	 760																	 1.14%
16	years 370																	 320																	 690																 1.03%
17	years 385																 375																 760																 1.14%
18	years 445																 420																	 865																 1.29%
19	years 510																 430																	 940																 1.41%
20	to	24	years 3,235													 2,945													 6,180													 9.24%
25	to	29	years 4,365													 3,750														 8,115														 12.13%
30	to	34	years 3,700													 3,220													 6,920													 10.34%
35	to	39	years 3,290													 2,450													 5,740														 8.58%
40	to	44	years 3,020													 2,480													 5,500													 8.22%
45	to	49	years 3,130													 2,530													 5,660														 8.46%
50	to	54	years 3,155													 2,455													 5,610													 8.39%
55	to	59	years 2,225													 1,405														 3,630													 5.43%
60	to	64	years 1,020													 690																 1,710														 2.56%
65	to	69	years 380																 285																 665																 0.99%
70	to	74	years 145																 135																	 280																 0.42%
75	to	79	years 70																			 110																	 180																	 0.27%
80	to	84	years 30																			 45																			 75																			 0.11%
85	years	and	over 15																			 40																			 55																			 0.08%
Total 36,415												 30,480											 66,896											 99.99% 	
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Table A4 
Canada Census Data Population by Age Groups of Wood Buffalo 2011 
Age Male Female Total %	of	the	Total	Pop.
0	to	17	years 7,675													 7,090													 14,765											 22%
18	to	24	years 4,190													 3,795													 7,985													 12%
25	to	29	years 4,365													 3,750														 8,115													 12%
30	to	64	years 19,540											 15,230											 34,770												 52%
65	and	over 640																 615																 1,255													 2%
Total 36,415												 30,480												 66,896												 100%
Note.	All	data	is	taken	directly	from	the	Statistics	Canada	web	site	(Statistics	
Canada,	2011)	and	grouped	into	the	age	groups	shown. 	 	
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APPENDIX B - Fort McMurray Evacuation Study (The Survey) 
 
The survey for this study starts on the next page.  The survey was administered through 
an internet website, Survey Monkey.  The website address was: 
www.surveymonkey.com/r/FortMacEvac 	
We would like you to take part in a study conducted by researchers from Jacksonville State
University, Department of Emergency Management. The lead researcher, Chris Kearns, works in
emergency response in Lethbridge, Alberta.  Chris helped out in the Emergency Operations Centre
during the Fort McMurray wildfire in 2016.  
Keyano College has kindly agreed to help us promote this important research project. Thanks!
Participating in this study is optional.
If you choose to be in the study, you will complete an online survey. The questions will be about
your evacuation experiences during the Wildfires in 2016.  This survey will help us learn more about
how to communicate and facilitate an evacuation of young adults. The survey will take 7 to 10
minutes to complete.
You can skip questions that you do not want to answer or stop the survey at any time. The survey is
anonymous, and no one will be able to link your answers back to you. Please do not include your
name or other information that could be used to identify you in the survey responses.  
At the end of the survey, you will be given the option to leave your name, telephone number, and
email address solely for the purpose of participating in a raffle for a pair of Wireless Beats
Headphones.  This information will not be linked or associated with any of your survey answers. 
Once the raffle has been completed (June 1st) your personal information will be deleted.  Odds of
winning the prize are dependent on the number of participants who participate in the survey and
those who wish to participate in the raffle. You may only enter the raffle once.
This research is for residents of Canada over the age of 18; if you are not a resident of Canada
and/or under the age of 18, please do not complete this survey.
If you have any comments, concerns, or questions regarding the conduct of this research please
contact the researchers listed below.
Lead Researcher
Chris Kearns, M.Sc.
Dept. of Emergency Management, Jacksonville State University
Cell: (403) 894-0574
Email: Jsu7059k@stu.jsu.edu
Faculty Advisor
Dr. Tanveer Islam
Dept. of Emergency Management, Jacksonville State University
Study Information Sheet
Fort McMurray Evacuation Study
1
Office: (256) 782-5938
Email: tislam@jsu.edu
If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, you can contact the
Jacksonville State University IRB Board by email, addressed to Dr. Joe Walsh, Vice Provost, (256)
782-8186 or by email at ejwalsh@jsu.edu.  Alternatively, you may contact Mr. Louis Dingley, Keyano
College, at (780) 791-4832 or by email at Louis.Dingley@keyano.ca 
What is an IRB?  An Institutional Review Board (IRB) is a committee made up of scientists and non-
scientists.  The IRB’s role is to protect the rights and welfare of human subjects involved in
research.  The IRB also assures that the research complies with applicable regulations, laws, and
institutional policies. 
If you want to participate in this study, click the “Next Page” button to start the survey.
Thank you!
 
Wildfires and evacuations are difficult events.  If you feel you’d like to speak with a mental health professional about your
experiences, please call Alberta Health Services’ Health Link at 811 or visit
http://www.albertahealthservices.ca/assets/news/advisories/ne-pha-wildfire-mental-health-resources.pdf for a list of local
resources.  Thanks.
2
The Questions
Fort McMurray Evacuation Study
1. Were you living in Fort McMurray or the surrounding area during the wildfire in May 2016?
Yes
No
3
The Questions Continued...
Fort McMurray Evacuation Study
 Did not rely on (1) (2)
Somewhat relied on
(3) (4) Greatly relied on (5)
Local authorities (Mayor,
RCMP, Fire Dept., etc.)
Local news media
(Newspapers, i.e. Fort
McMurray Today; Radio
Stations, i.e. CRUZ FM,
KAOS Radio, Rock
97.9, etc.)
National television news
media (CTV National
News, CBC National
News, the Weather
Network, etc.)
Internet website sources
(i.e. CTV or CBC
websites, Alberta
Emergency
Management web site,
RMWB web site, etc.)
Social media sources
(i.e. Facebook,
Instagram, Twitter, etc.)
Peers such as friends,
relatives, neighbours,
coworkers
Other (please specify)
2. Please rate how much you relied on the following information sources for information about the wildfire
and/or evacuation during the wildfire?  (where 1 is low/no reliance and 5 is high/great reliance)
4
3. What social media platforms did you use in May of 2016? Place in order from most used to least used:
(where 1 is the most used and 6 is the least used)
Facebook  N/A
Twitter  N/A
Instagram  N/A
LinkedIn  N/A
Snapchat  N/A
Other  N/A
 Extremely Unlikely (1) (2) Somewhat Likely (3) (4) Extremely Likely (5)
The
wildfire
itself
The smoke
The
potential
toxic
emissions
The after
effect of
potential
flooding
The after
effect of
potential
landslides
Other (Extremely Likely)
4. To what extent did you think each of the following threats posed to the damage or destruction of your
home:  (where 1 is extremely unlikely and 5 is extremely likely)
5
 Extremely Unlikely (1) (2) Somewhat Likely (3) (4) Extremely Likely (5)
The
wildfire
itself
The smoke
The
potential
toxic
emissions
The after
effect of
potential
flooding
The after
effect of
potential
landslides
Other (Extremely Likely)
5. To what extent did you think that each of the following threats could cause you (or your friends/family)
personal harm or potentially kill you (or them):  (where 1 is extremely unlikely and 5 is extremely likely)
 
Extremely Unlikely
(1) (2) Somewhat Likely (3) (4) Extremely Likely (5)
The wildfire itself
The smoke
The potential toxic
emissions
The after effect of
potential flooding
The after effect of
potential landslides
Other (Extremely Likely)
6. To what extent did you think the following threats would impact your services (i.e. electricity, water
supply, landline and cellular telephone, etc.):    (where 1 is extremely unlikely and 5 is extremely likely)
6
 
Extremely Unlikely
(1) (2) Somewhat Likely (3) (4) Extremely Likely (5)
The wildfire itself
The smoke
The potential toxic
emissions
The after effect of
potential flooding
The after effect of
potential landslides
Other (Extremely Likely)
7. To what extent did you think that each of the following threats would impact your ability to work and/or
attend classes:  (where 1 is extremely unlikely and 5 is extremely likely)
 
Not at all considered
(1) (2) Considered this (3) (4)
It was a huge
consideration (5)
Seeing the wildfire
approaching
Seeing or smelling
smoke
Feeling a change in the
wind intensity or
direction
Seeing combustibles
nearby (i.e. gas,
propane, brush, etc.)
Seeing local businesses
closing
Seeing friends, relatives,
neighbours and
coworkers evacuating
Hearing local authorities
issue official evacuation
orders
Previous personal
experience with wildfires
Concern about
protecting your home
from the fire
8. To what extent did you consider the following issues in deciding whether or not to evacuate?   (where 1 is
not at all and 5 is greatly considered)
7
Concern about
evacuation expenses
such as gas, food, and
lodging
Concern about where to
stay
Concern about other
special considerations
(pets, medical needs,
etc.)
Concern about getting
stranded on the highway
Possibility of rain
(slowing down the
fire/putting it out)
 
Not at all considered
(1) (2) Considered this (3) (4)
It was a huge
consideration (5)
Other significant consideration?
9. Did you evacuate?
Yes
No
8
The Questions Continued...
Fort McMurray Evacuation Study
The wildfire started on Sunday, May 1st, 2016.  The first evacuation order, for one
neighbourhood, was given at 10:00 p.m.  By Tuesday, May 3rd, the wildfire had
grown and a mandatory evacuation order was given for the entire region.
10. When did you leave your home?
Before May 1st
May 1st
May 2nd
May 3rd
May 4th
May 5th
After May 5th
I did not leave
11. What time of day did you leave?
Middle of the night (midnight to 3:00 a.m.)
Pretty early in the morning (3:00 to 6:00 a.m.)
First thing in the morning (6:00 to 9:00 a.m.)
Late morning (9:00 a.m. to noon)
Early afternoon (noon to 3:00 p.m.)
Late afternoon / Early evening (3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m)
Evening (6:00 to 9:00 p.m.)
Late evening / Night (9:00 p.m. to midnight)
9
12. Who did you evacuate with (select multiple answers if necessary)?
Immediate family
Other relatives
Friends / neighbours / room mates
By yourself
Other (please specify)
13. What mode of transportation did you take to evacuate?
Your personal vehicle
Someone else's personal vehicle
Municipal transit bus
Greyhound (or similar commercial) bus
Train (just kidding...there are no trains)
Plane
Other (please specify)
14. Where did you stay once you evacuated? (select all that are applicable)
With friends
With relatives
In a hotel or a motel
At an evacuation shelter
Other (please specify)
10
15. Where did you evacuate to?
Stayed within the Fort McMurray area
North to an Industry Camp
Edmonton
Red Deer
Calgary
Other (please specify)
Just a few demographic / wrap up questions and we'll be all finished!
16. What is your gender?
Male
Female
17. What was your age on May 1st, 2016
17 or younger
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25 or older
18. What was your occupational / student status at the time of the wildfire?  (select as many as apply)
Working full time
Working part time
Full time student
Part time student
Unemployed
11
19. What was your marital status at the time of the wildfire?
Single
Married
Common Law
Separated / Divorced
Other (please specify)
20. During the time of the wildfire what were your living arrangements?
Living with spouse / common law partner
Living with parents
Living with relatives
Living with friends / room mates
Living by yourself
Other (please specify)
21. In May of 2016 what type of dwelling did you live in?
A house / townhouse
An apartment / condo building
An apartment / suite in a house
College residence
Other (please specify)
22. In a couple of key words (or less) state one positive outcome you learned / gained from your wildfire
experience.
12
23. If you have any other comments that you would like to share, concerning your evacuation or wildfire
experience in May of 2016, please do so here:
13
The Prize Raffle
Fort McMurray Evacuation Study
Thank you for your participation!
If you would like to be entered in the raffle for a pair of Wireless Beats Headphones, please enter your name and contact information
below (this information will be kept separate from the survey results and will not be used in any way other than for the raffle).  If you win
the prize, you will be contacted via text message or by email (you can provide your address information at that time, so that your prize
can be delivered to you). The draw date is June 1st.
Name  
Email Address  
Cell Phone Number (for
texting only)  
24. Contact Information (for the prize raffle only)
Thanks again for your participation!!
Wildfires and evacuations are difficult events. If you feel you’d like to speak with a mental health professional about your experiences,
please call Alberta Health Services’ Health Link at 811 or visit http://www.albertahealthservices.ca/assets/news/advisories/ne-pha-
wildfire-mental-health-resources.pdf for a list of local resources. Thanks.
14
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APPENDIX C - Email to Staff and Students at Keyano College 
 
The email from the Marketing and Media Liaison, of Keyano College, Carmen Toth, To 
the Staff and Students at Keyano College (as emailed to Chris Kearns, April 18, 2017), is 
on the next page.  			
2017-08-08, 1)40 AMresearch
Page 1 of 1https://mail.lethbridge.ca/owa/?ae=Item&t=IPM.Note&id=RgAAAADvk…qYmNNSLtPh5AAGiJE04AAAJ&a=Print&pspid=_1502177999550_202504231
research
Carmen Toth [Carmen.Toth@keyano.ca]
Sent:Tuesday, April 18, 2017 2:16 PM
To: Chris Kearns
  
Chris
We	send	out	the	following	message	to	all	students	today	via	email.		Hope	this	gets	you	your	extra	50	surveys.		Good
luck.
	
Students	–	Take	a	short	survey	to	win	Headphones
	
Were	you	involved	in	the	evacua?on	for	the	wildfires?		Then,	we	need	your	experience.
A	study	is	being	conducted	to	see	the	effect	this	evacua?on	had	on	young	adults.		It	is	strictly	for	academic
purposes	and	has	been	approved	by	the	Keyano	Ethics	CommiJee.
If	you	can	spare	a	few	minutes	visit
hJps://www.surveymonkey.com/r/FortMacEvac
Everyone	entering	will	be	entered	into	a	draw	for	a	pair	of	Wireless	Beats	Headphones.
Thank	you	in	advance	for	your	?me.
	
	Carmen	TothInterim	Marketing	&	Communications	Director213	Bob	Lamb	BuildingKeyano	College8115	Franklin	AveFort	McMurray,	AB	T9H	2H7
	Direct:	780-588-4777Email:		Carmen.Toth@keyano.ca
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APPENDIX D - Jacksonville State University IRB Approval 
 
The Jacksonville State University Institutional Review Board Approval (Dated March 15, 
2017) is on the following page.	
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APPENDIX E - Keyano College Research Ethics Board Approval 
 
The Keyano College Research Ethics Board Approval (Dated March 31, 2017) is on the 
following page.  
 
	
!
!
 
 
8115 Franklin Avenue 
Fort McMurray, AB  T9H 2H7 
Phone:  (780) 791-4850 
Fax:  (780) 791-4841!
!
Research(Ethics(Board(
!
March!31,!2017!
!
!
Christopher!Kearns!
PSCC!Manager!
City!of!Lethbridge!
(403)!330A5196!
chris.kearns@lethbridge.ca!
!
Dear!Chris,!!
!
The!Research!Ethics!Board!has!reviewed!your!application!for!your!project!“Fort!McMurray!Evacuation!
Study.”!!Your!application!to!conduct!research!at!Keyano!College!has!been!approved!given!the!method!of!
contacting!and!recruiting!participants!is!by!way!of!setting!up!an!information!booth!at!a!strategic!location!
in!the!College!as!discussed.!!As!mentioned,!we!will!pass!on!the!word!as!well!for!you.!
Please!notify!the!committee!of!any!methodological!changes!that!occur!throughout!your!project!and!
provide!us!with!a!brief!final!report!upon!project!completion.!
!
If!you!have!any!questions!or!require!research!support,!please!contact!me!at!louis.dingley@keyano.ca,!or!
780A791A4832.!!
!
All!the!best,!
!
!
!
Louis!Dingley!!
Chair,!Research!Ethics!Board!
!
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APPENDIX F – Locations Where Participants Evacuated 
 
Table F1 
Communities and Locations Where the Participants Evacuated 
Alberta Participants Miles Other	Provinces	&	Territories Participants MilesAnzac	 2 30															 New	Brunswick 2 2,880									Athabaska 8 188													 British	Columbia 3 509													Bonnyville 3 259													 Vancouver 3 985													Boyle 6 178													 Victoria 3 1,041									Calgary 20 459													 Ontario 1 1,232									Camrose 1 296													 Toronto 2 2,357									Canmore 1 516													 Nova	Scotia 4 3,066									Cold	Lake 6 270													 Newfoundland 4 3,739									Conklin 1 96															 Yellowknife 1 1,013									Daysland 1 306													Drayton	Valley 2 355													 Other	Countries ParticipantsEdmonton 141 270												 India 1Fort	McKay 5 36															Ft.	Saskatchewan 2 254													Grasslands 1 158													Jasper 1 492													Kikino 1 205													Lac	La	Biche 8 180													Leduc 1 295													Lloydminster 3 355													Morinville 2 259													Olds 1 405													Pincher	Creek 1 589													Red	Deer 3 369													Rocky	Mountain	House 1 407													Sherwood	Park 2 271													St.	Albert 1 271															 	
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APPENDIX G – Demographic Details of the Participants 	
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APPENDIX H – Comments from Question 22 and Question 23 
 
The responses for both of these questions are unedited and appear as the respondents 
entered them in their survey.   
 
Question 22 
 
In a couple of key words (or less) state one positive outcome you learned / gained from 
your wildfire experience. 
 
Responses: 
 
• SAFETY PRECAUTION 
• That we have a lot of people in our lives that are there for us even though we don't 
always stay in contact. 
• adversity brings people together. 
• Always keep your gas tank half full 
• Avoid watching mainstream media 
• We need one another. 
• Our community banded together to try and repair it and now we are back to 
business as usual 
• Keep the gas tank full. keep a portable,tidy, up-to-date file cabinet. Have 
emergency kit prepared. Back up all photos to a usb stick. Have emergency funds. 
• I grew up a lot being forced out of my home. 
• Learned that even in bad situations im able to keep calm and make sure that my 
child is safe.  
• Resilience and an ability to quickly respond to changing conditions. And how to 
fit a bunch of animals in a tiny car! 
• Unity 
• Never lose hope. 
• met friendly people helped me 
• keep important files secured and ready to grab in case of emergency 
• Always be Prepared 
• Be aware/be prepared/be knowledgeable/stay calm. 
• To always be prepared  
• My pets didn't die because of community assistance. Sense of community grew 
for many.  
• Strength to deal with emegency situation, human around us caring generous and 
have hearts of Golds. 
• When there's a fire near the city keep your fuel tank full. 
• Stronger understanding of the generosity people exhibit towards others in difficult 
situations. 
• I decided to finally go to college. 
• Don't rely on authorities. Social media is more up to date and ontop of situations.  
• How to evacuate in case of emergency 
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• The fact that stuff is stuff and If I didn't think to pack something in my car when 
we thought we would lose our home then it must not have been that important.  
• I learnt to never take things for granted 
• I will never underestimate nature and always make sure to have my medical 
supplies that are detrimental to my health and lungs considering I have asthma. 
Especially a half mask with cartridges. The smoke affected me greatly for weeks 
during and after the fire. 
• My family and the city of Fort McMurray formed a tighter bond.  
• Stay calm, anxiety 
• Always keep your vehicle fuelled up.  
• I learned just how kind and helpful complete strangers can be.  
• To be grateful 
• When it comes down to it the community will help each other out and be there for 
each other.  
• People's sympathy 
• I SURVIVED!!!  
• Help from government and redcross 
• New connections and friends  
• Quick response by the local government saved many lives. 
• Importance of staying calm while packing.  
• Be thankful for everything you have, including your family 
• Emergency preparedness  
• Edmonton people are super nice!!!  
• PTSD 
• No matter how hard it is, God will provide a way to overcome it. 
• I learn that material things doesn't really matter. It showed me how people can 
outpour love even if they did not know us. The love we got from the edmonton 
communiy was overwhelming and right across canada. 
• That things can change from maybe bad to life threatening in just a moments 
notice. Be aware of actions on the environment. 
• My safety is my first preferance.  
• What matters in life  
• To always listen to radio station because I was home watching CTV yet I did not 
know what was happening in my city until I went out to pick my kids from 
school. 
• very supportive community 
• Resilience of so many that lost so much 
• Seeing the province and country come together to help those who were evacuated. 
• people helped 
• Always have 2 jerry cans of gas in the garage and, a emergency checklist or 
backpack with supplies.  
• People are very helpful  
• none.. 
• The confidence to remain calm, and make sound decisions 
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• nothing. 
• To be more prepared and to always help one another out through issues that arise 
in our community  
• money,food,time away from school, no diplomas 
• Importance of family 
• People help others 
• Be prepared and have an evacuation plan in place 
• Kindness of Humanity still exists.  
• Always have gas in the car  Not to be afraid to ask for help  
• Material items really don't mean anything when it comes down to it. It still 
amazes me how friendly and open people were. 
• The kindness of strangers and support of the Government. 
• Everyone came together in unity  
• I know I can live even if I lost everything material.   
• What a home is, compared to a house.   How special and sacred 'piece of mind' is.  
• I learned how people come together in the time of need.  
• Keep all important documents in one place 
• Be prepare for,food,gas,and other essentials if you smell smoky  
• be aware of the news 
• To always be prepared with important and personal belongings  
• Can rely on others to help each other in times of need more than you think.  
• Seeing the whole community come together and helping each other out. 
• Family is what matters most 
• How to evacuate  
• Fortmac strong:) 
• generous people are a lot, they are very nice 
• Family is everything.  
• It brought the community closer together. 
• Always have a more than three quarters of a tank in your vehicle  
• Chance to spend more time at my summer home. 
• Pride of my home town.  
• Importance of preparation (supplies/important items) 
• Be Independent 
• Organized chaos 
• I have learned to always be prepared and to take what is most valuable and 
important with you. (ex. i.d. important paper, food, clothing,blankets, etc.) 
• Very nice to see people acting calmly and helping each other - minimal casualties 
for such a huge disaster!  
• The appropriate measures taken to follow an evacuation, and to be more prepared 
if it ever happened again. 
• Anti-depressants  help control the crying. 
• We survived & Albertans help hold us up. 
• Stay with family. They won't leave you and will protect you. Always have ur 
emergency sets prepared and ready for any weather.  
		 166 
• The people were very helpful  
• Canadians are the most helpful people on earth! They helped us a lot such as gas, 
water, food at the highway. And that we will always have each others back. 
• people were nothing but kind and generous and more than willing to help. I 
believe now that people do come together when everyone needs it most. I learned 
that we are Fort Mac strong, Alberta strong.  
• my fiancé and I went ahead with our wedding and made some amazing friends 
who took great care of us 
• When push comes to shove, I can do what needs to be done to stay safe. 
• My family members were all safe and that was all that mattered. 
• Dont leave it too late 
• I learnt to never underestimate these life tragedies that may occur at any time 
especially when least expected. 
• I did not really PANIC. Tried to remain CALM so others around me did not 
stress. 
• Humbling  
• Sometimes you have to take matters in your own hands. We evacuated before the 
warning for Beacinhill and by that time, it was already on fire. 
• friends and family is the most important thing there is   and it is what it is motto 
• Leave as soon as you hear the announcement  
• I'm resilient and resourceful. 
• i have learned that the most important things in life are not your house/car but 
whether your loved ones are safe. 
• Think fast 
• Better sense of community 
• I learned that I don't need as much stuff as I have.  The kindness of others was 
overwhelming and felt amazing. 
• I learned that love  amazing 
• I was was so relieved, that I remembered taking my two pets with. 
• The zoo was free and so was West Edmonton mall attractions.  The children of 
our community benefited greatly from these experiences as it took their minds off 
of their fears. 
• Always have your gas tank full  
• -we can never predict what's gonna happen tomorrow  -do to others what you 
want others to do to you (help people) 
• ALWAYS BE PREPARED! 
• Family banded together. 
• things mean nothing, family is all that matter. things can be replaced, family 
cannot. 
• The generosity and understanding from my fellow Canadians was unimaginable. 
• some people are good. 
• Confidence to handle life threatening situations 
• Be prepared and don't let your gas tank go below half.  
• That our house didn't burn to the ground. To properly prepared yourself for an 
emergency. 
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• That there is so much kindness in our community and in Canada.people care truly 
for one another  
• Never to take things for granted and never to ignore warnings from authorities 
• To really focus on the little things in life and not take anything for granted  
• Keep your gas tank full during wildfire season! 
• Things and houses are replaceable, memories and family members are not. Learn 
what truly matters. 
• Help 
• That the government gives out money to protect us.  
• ALWAYS BE PREPARED FOR AN EMERGENCY!!!!!!!  IF YOUR GUT 
FEELING SAYS TO GO - DO IT - EVEN IF YOU LEAVE FROM WORK 
WITHOUT PERMISSION... 
• Canadians are very very supportive of each other. Edmonton was a very great and 
supportive community  
• I learned that positive thinking really helps get through any stressful situation. It 
reduces stress and instilled hope in me. 
• Strength in positive thinking 
• To make the best out of the situation 
• Strength with family and friends 
• grateful 
• Personal strength 
• Have personal emergency plans made and ready to put in action 
• Things are just things. Not that it wasn't heart wrenching to watch people lose 
everything, but once my family was safe, the rest didn't seem as important.  
• Na 
• Resilience. Possessions don't matter. 
• I learned how compassionate people can be.  
• People are ready to help 
• The generosity of people was amazing, was blown away by all the help and 
support that was offered by total strangers 
• Strength and solidarity in the community. 
• Good community 
• Connected with family  
• Don't sleep thru it  
• Leave earlier. Don't wait for the FD.  
• our friends & community pulled together to help each other in a time of crisis!!! 
• I'm still here 
• Have your valuable stored in a place where you can get them quickly.  
• I really don't know 
• A stronger sense of community within fort mcmurray 
• Better sense of community; knowing neighbours; opportunity to live in a large 
City(Edmonton) and a pedestrian lifestyle 
• It gave me a push to continue my education as I lost my job 
• Pack an emergency bag 
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• Never give up 
• Put your documents in a safe place 
• resilience 
• Community support and the feeling of support from the rest of the country 
• Be prepared for any emergency. Keep gas fuel full. 
• Awareness of emergency preparedness 
• You never take anything for granted and never ever think that this could never 
happen to our home town.  I couldn't believe the generosity that we were shown 
in stores and businesses.  So giving.  I so appreciate everything that was done for 
us. 
• Paying attention to surrounding areas when traveling  
• Patience 
• Be prepared 
• Material possessions don't matter. People do.  
• always be prepared  
• Connection with people  * Quick responses  * Kindness of people 
• resilience of our town is exceptional 
• compassion amid the adversities  
• Sense of community 
• Got to visits home town 
• How welcoming and kind Canada has been. 
• Hard to find one, the quick international response was comforting 
• I learned that the community can come together and help each other 
• Trust in strangers 
• Safety and preparedness is key 
• Community, unity, recognize all our blessings, our stuff was just physical and 
could be replaced, others have it mu h worse, made us stronger 
• To be more aware 
• Time to travel. Free time to reflect.  
• It brought my family closer together. 
• Always be prepared 
• Being calm can save your life. 
• To never take anything for granted. 
• I learned that possessions and things don't matter, and that family and friends are 
all you need. 
• do not procrastinate  
• How friends and family can help me through any situation.  
• Learned what really matters in life.  
• Canadianism 
• No matter much expensive items you have, when it's gone all of us are equal. You 
can't take all those things with you to the grave. You were born with nothing, 
you'll die with nothing. I have friends who lost everything, what matters is they're 
safe. Yes it's hard to accept that your hard earned money into buying stuff is gone 
but those things are irreplaceable, your life isn't. I know it's easy for me to say 
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because our house didn't burn down but I know the feeling of not having those 
things back home(third world country). I gained the wisdom of appreciating the 
simple things like spending time with family and friends. 
• Staying with friends and family is okay in short periods 
• crisis bonds a community. 
• it made me realize how strong I am, going through such a time in my life. Also , it 
made me realize how nice Canadians are in caring for people who went through a 
terrific experience like the wildfire. 
• Gratitude 
• Resilency 
• Preparedness  
• Vacation 
• Strength of numbers 
• I learned resilience that I could be strong and cope in any situation cause I 
survived the fire ,the evacuation and even getting settled in a new environment.  
• Run from danger. 
• Be prepared to leave in a moments notice with important things stored in one 
place 
• Not to panic and always keep suitcase ready with gas full 
• People are compationate 
• How important family and friends are ; and the collaboration of all communities 
and surrounding areas. 
• Prepare 
• Be ready. Life is more important than anything you own. 
• life happens 
• Always plan ahead   
• Kindness from strangers 
• People are kind and that help will be given to those who need it. 
• Coming together as a community afterwards and supporting each other 
• We all supported one another  
• Everyone sticks together 
• Always be prepaired 
• Be prepared 
• Being a part of the evacuation and then return to Fort McMurray really made me 
feel proud to be a part of this community.  It really put into perspective the 
important things in life. When you are in a situation where you realize you might 
not make it, and every decision you make could mean life or death for your 
children, things that used to be important are not anymore. 
• Leave immediately. Only bring what's really important. 
• How to deal with stress 
• I get a new home 
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Question 23 
 
If you have any other comments that you would like to share, concerning your evacuation 
or wildfire experience in May of 2016, please do so here: 
 
Responses: 
 
• GAS STATION PROXIMITY 
• I feel like there should be someone in charge to keep everyone updated. Perhaps 
the radio station and announce what is going on in every part of the city if 
possible. But then again, the smoke really interrupts with the signal 
• Glad mostly everyone was able to work together, maintain order and get out safe, 
except for the one crash that was had that killed around 4 people, may they rest in 
peace. 
• I was very lucky with my gas and living arrangements. Although I did have to 
miss my final semester of my senior year and my grad was pushed until 
September. 
• the fire department did an amazing job with dealing with the situation at hand 
• Karma has a way of rewarding the kind people of the world. My dad let people 
stay in his motorhome in Anzac overnight (because they had nowhere to 
go/stay/sleep). The couple left in the morning, but when they heard that we had to 
evacuate as well, they called us right away to tell us we could stay with them. We 
didn't need it (as we have family in Morinville) but it was refreshing to see such 
kindness from complete strangers!  
• was worry a lot, 
• late notice to evacuate 
• More prevention work. More education.  
• I was scared and worried but on the same day when I met kind people, I realized I 
am in good hands and above all my trust on my creator become stronger. 
• It sucked knowing you were about to lose your home because we could see the 
fire through the trees when we left Abasand. 
• It was the most frightening experience of my life and my spouse and I lost little 
and did not experience the nightmare of heading South through the wildfire but I 
will never have any doubt that this was an escape not an evacuation. 
• If we didn't flee due to concerns and allowed authorities to dictate us, many would 
not have made it. The authorities and government dropped the ball on this one and 
are lucky that it didn't cost lives.  
• Authorities were very effective in safely evacuating 88000 people. It was 
incredible  
• Life changing and terrifying experience. 
• IT DAMAGED MY SELF AS IM SO WORRIED NOW EVERYTIME I SEE 
FIRE .  
• N/A 
• We should have multiple exit to the north and to the south as well. 
• I hope no one else ever has to go through this.  
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• It was a heartbreaking experience. I never faced this kind of wildfire in my entire 
life. It was a life threatining situtation. I suggest that safety control measures 
should be taken ahead of time as a preventive measure in order to protect entire 
life of the people in FortMcMurray.  
• Ended up dropping out of school due to fire. 
• I am still in Fort mcmurray because of love shown by individuals and corporate 
bodies through red cross and Alberta government; it really helped me to get out of 
the trauma caused by the wildfire. 
• na 
• Humanity can be amazing in a time of need 
• Wildfird could have been stopped if the provncial government acted swiftly 
• It was a traumatic experience that brought a lot of mental illnesses to the 
community of Fort McMurray. Till this day, I still have PTSD and anxiety 
whenever I here the sirens go off on the firetruck. I feel that my attention is drawn 
into the sound, and I start to feel anxious on wondering what's happening. Im glad 
no one got hurt in Fort McMurray after they evacuated, however, this fire was a 
learning experience to always have gas in your warehouse, an emergency kit, and 
to become aware of hot temperatures that surround Fort McMurray. We all came 
together as one, and that made us #fortmacstrong. 
• it was horrible 
• evacuated from beacon hill and police did not have time to get through before the 
fire got to my house. my neighbor kicked in our back door and saved my little 
sister as the house behind mine was already burning. 
• The evacuation order was issued way too late, but everyone was very helpful and 
it turned out to be a pretty smooth process 
• There was no notice the morning of that the fire was a threat. We should have 
been notified that we should prepare in case of. Instead I left with nothing.  
• Help out people in need.  Look to Twitter for information on available help. 
• I don't think anyone took it seriously at first, or even after. It is still incredibly 
hard to believe that this happened.  
• Was out of town during the fire, but was heading back home from Vancouver the 
day it happened (may 3rd). got turned around by police in grassland. was very 
concerned for the safety of my family who was in town at the time as well as 
concerned about my home that I have lived in in Fort McMurray for 21 years, 
since I was born. 
• I'm proud of the unity that the community displayed during the chaos. I'm also 
grateful to the cities, such as Edmonton and Lac La Biche, for being warm and 
inviting to us. 
• I hope it will not happen again because I am still financially effected . 
• traffic, hard to get out 
• Worst day.. EVER. 
• I hope that no individual, or being would ever have to experience what I, amongst 
a whole city went through that day. #AllLivesMatter   
• the notice was late. It was late afternoon when fire is very big before they decide 
to evacuate 
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• My concern is that the fire department of Fort McMurray is taking all the credit. 
However there were other heros that day.  
• None  
• Don't understand why the evac wasn't the day before.   People in leadership knew 
how bad it was but for people who are uninformed and wild fires are not common 
to them didn't know what to do or know how bad it was.  Evac should have been 
voluntarily the days before.  People should have been told this could be very 
serious days before and should leave if possible.  Know I would have.   
• Thankful for the tremendous support from the Oil Sands companies!  
• The credit for the evacuation should go to the oil companies. If it had not been for 
the massive amount of safety Training lives would have been lost. there were not 
enough first responders until a state of emergency was called and that was 
Wednesday.  Why was the site equipment refused on Sunday. Push that fuel into 
the valleys and nothing is lost. Why did the Premier refuse to call a state of 
emergency when it was first requested on Sunday.  
• The college did nothing for students or staff.  Kicked out of the school when it 
closed, no information on what to do, where to go.  What about students who do 
not own a vehicle?  For staff, it took quite awhile for the decision to shut down 
the college.  They think of the bottom line not the well-being of the staff.  
Because of their (the college) indecision we ended up trapped North and then 
didn't think about family or personal (emotional & psychological) needs during 
the evacuation and re-entry.  Keyano management entered housing units and 
threw away personal bar fridges (that didn't need to be tossed as they only had 
drinks in them) and did not reimburse or replace them.  Housing units were never 
cleaned inside for smoke damage and still smell like smoke. 
• The city's evacuation routes were not followed. On Hospital St. The police 
blocked the road south where the large "E" for evacuation is directing drivers to 
go. 
• up north some of us went without food or water.  Were kicked out at 4:30 am 
when owners of private camps closed them, leaving us with no where to go.  Shell 
gave us gas & water.  Thankful for the first responders that finally got us out in 
the convoys.  Anxiety & panic attacks since the fire makes life almost unbearable.  
Our community has increased domestic violence, families torn apart, drug abuse, 
and mental illness issues.  as May 3 approaches many like ourselves don't want to 
be here.   
• Learnt who you're friends are and who care for u. Uofa sucks! Theyre not 
welcoming and seemed to be pushing us away.  
• Always pack some emergency supplies  
• Always have a full tank of gas, emergency supplies in your car, extra clothing, 
gas, food in your car. Be calm during the whole thing and always be kind to one 
another 
• I headed up north first but the line was ridiculous until they allowed us to head 
south. During that process we had stopped at petro to gas up where the line was 
super long. When I got up to my turn it was another 30 mins trying to find a 
person who would allow me to use their petro card... some people cared more 
about getting fired than they did helping out all the others as it was a company 
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card . That had made many people including myself time more wasted and the 
situation more stressful . Once we had gotten gas and went north, everything was 
much more smooth  
• I believe everything that took place was the best way possible to handle such a 
situation. There were very few fatalities which was the most impressive aspect 
about the evacuation. 
• All sites were great assisting evacuation because not everybody went straight to 
the South. Many people went North and were accommodated by companies. I left 
camp at 4:30am on May 4th to drive south. There was not much fire, but lots of 
smoke at that time. There was no extreme traffic until several hours south of 
town. 
• Thanks to the RCMP firefighters and to all local enforcement  
• I just think they weren't on top of it. Darby Said WHEN the fire hits town, at that 
point, we should have been evacuated area by area. Not left alone until the town 
was up in flames. My brother and I were both home, he was sick and I was about 
to go back to sleep, who knows what could have happened if I did. 
• No comment   Red Cross was extremely helpfullb 
• The city of McMurray really dropped the ball! They had much more resources 
available 
• My apartment were burnt,my sister and i lost all out stuffs including clothes gifts 
winter outfits that we brought from our country.We're international students and 
our family is back home in our country. 
• Good thing my toy collection is okay. 
• If it was not for social media and Pete Potetco (last broadcast station) from the 
RCMP detachment I would not have known to evacuate.  The city and authorities 
performed poorly when it came to evacuation. I do not even remember an official 
order to evacuate Timberlee. 
• it was a tragic, and scary on different levels for different people. But fortunately 
or luckily for me, i encountered good people from fort mc in Edmonton and on 
the way to Edmonton with good hearts. I can say we rebuild fort mc not just 
physically but with our deeds. we've got people with big hearts in fort mc!! 
• send strength/ hope/courage and love to the people still dealing with rebuilding 
and fighting with insurance companies. 
• 10/10 would evacuate again (I made more money and worked less) 
• red tape is far, far too much.  WalMart wouldn't let me cash the Red Cross 
coupons for food/clothes because of no ID.  It was left in fire.    Greed.  Greed is 
horrible after a disaster. 
• People should have been evacuated sooner. I could see the fire from my home 
before my area was even evacuated. 
• The provincial and city emergency response team did a fantastic job during and 
after the evacuation looking after the safety of residents.  Adequate information 
and support provided 
• I'm glad my family and my dog got out safe and myself. It is something I will 
never forget. Being from Fort McMurray born and raised it definitly has stuck 
with me from the effect it had on my home and my home town.  
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• Having a party with all your buddies that you were supposed to takw a road trip 
with  
• It was the most surreal experience I've ever had thanks to all Canadians who 
helped  
• It felt really good to know that the entire country had our back 
• No 
• Im very proud with my community and my very selfless family for helping out 
the evacuees in fort McKay  
• I need a better plan of action for managing pet safety. Luckily all survived with no 
lasting effects, but with a large number, early planning is key. 
• We should have been evacuated much, much sooner than we were. Lives were put 
at risk unnecessarily, and it is frustrating that no one has taken responsibility or 
apologized for this.  
• Na 
• Still a long road ahead. 
• The evacuation should have been called earlier and the water bomber should have 
been on standby like it normally was in the summers beforehand.  
• I seem to be more emotional after the fire for no known reason 
• They should have told the community to leave earlier. They put people at risk. 
• Hats off to first responders!  
• I feel as though major incidents happen and overall the RMWB did well during 
and after the evacuation. My life has since returned to normal 
• My home is gone and it was really hard for me and my family 
• I have seen  Canadian people how good they are to other nationality in times of 
hardships. 
• The wildfire was a horrific experience, you don't know what you should do during 
those times; but everyone in the community helped each other. Everyone got 
connected in an instance and that was the most wonderful thing that happened 
despite of the frightful situation. 
• It is truly overwhelming to see such camaraderie between people especially 
during this difficulty time.   
• Used many resources from evacuation supplies centers, thankful my family and 
friends were not physically hurt  
• It could have been worse. I'm grateful to have been in Canada while something 
like this happened.  
• Surprisingly civil. At least what I saw, only once did I see someone freak out and 
nearly hit someone with their vehicle while trying to evacuate faster than 
everyone else. 
• I think that the officials should have evacuated everyone a little bit sooner. I 
resided in Waterways and we had no evacuation notice and the only way we knew 
to get out was because the fire was coming down over the hill and that's is when 
we knew it was time to go 
• I think mandatory evacuation should have been done from the start of the fire for 
the entire city 
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• The experience was heartwarming when it comes to the surreounding area was 
willing to help us. Some even bought water and drove to the highway 63 to hand 
us water. Simple gestures like that was very heartwarming. It's been almost a year 
& I get teary eyed just talking about it because I don't think I'll ever forget the 
avalanche of kindness we felt and received across the country. I never felt that 
kind of help in my life and it's very overwhelming that goes through my soul. 
Throughout the course of our stay in Edmonton, I can't stop thanking very 
individual who was willing to help us. God bless their beautiful heart. And if 
you're one of those people who helped us, THANK YOU a million times over.  
• impressed by the help of local agencies and companies.  2) May 1-3 was too long 
a a waiting period to evacuate people.   3) "Lessons learned" should be conducted 
so that we can avert future crises. 
• No comments 
• It'd be nice if we are given an advance evacuation notice instead of a last minute 
rushed notice. 
• News media blow things out of proportion. I don't recall which paper it was but 
they stated with graphs that my area in woodbuffalo was 80% burnt down. While 
in fact it was only 20%. This really made me lose hope, I thought I lost my home. 
I was fortunate to not have 
• Big learning experience and makes your value what you have and who you have 
in your ljfe. 
• Alberta and rmwb were great with financial help and up to date info 
• Our grad was postpone... Sad. 
• do not forget the hinterlands 
• It's all good now 
• The radio stations were incredibly helpful and encouraging. I don't know what I 
would have done without them. 
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